The question compares two outcomes relative to a benchmark of price stability. Moderate inflation (around 2-3%) is prices rising gently; deflation is prices falling. Both deviate from the ideal of a stable price level, but the mechanisms by which they harm the economy are very different.
Case for the claim — moderate inflation is less harmful. Moderate, anticipated inflation imposes modest costs: menu costs (updating price lists), shoe-leather costs (holding less cash), and mild redistribution from savers to borrowers if nominal interest rates adjust slowly. These costs are small when inflation is low, stable and expected. Deflation, by contrast, triggers three self-reinforcing problems that moderate inflation does not. First, deferred spending: if consumers expect prices to fall, they postpone big-ticket purchases, which cuts AD further, pushing prices down more — a deflationary spiral. Second, debt deflation: the real value of fixed-nominal debts RISES when the price level falls, so borrowers face a heavier real burden, defaults rise and bank lending contracts; this was the central mechanism Fisher identified in the 1930s and that re-appeared in Japan after 1990. Third, the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates means a central bank facing deflation cannot cut rates below (approximately) zero to stimulate demand, so monetary policy loses traction precisely when it is most needed. Moderate inflation suffers from none of these dynamics.
Case against — moderate inflation has its own costs. Moderate inflation still redistributes real income — from unindexed savers, pensioners and fixed-income earners to debtors and holders of real assets. It introduces fiscal drag where tax brackets are not indexed, raising real tax burdens over time without parliamentary approval. It erodes international competitiveness if domestic inflation exceeds that of trading partners, worsening the current account unless the exchange rate adjusts. And moderate inflation is only mild if expectations stay anchored — if the central bank loses credibility, 'moderate' can drift into 5%+ territory, at which point the costs compound. In a fixed-exchange-rate regime or currency union, deflation may even be a NECESSARY adjustment mechanism (an 'internal devaluation') that restores competitiveness — moderate inflation cannot do that job.
Reasoned judgement. For a monetarily-sovereign economy with an anchored inflation target, functioning financial system and moderate household debt, moderate inflation is clearly LESS harmful than deflation: deflation's debt-deflation and zero-lower-bound consequences are structural and severe, while moderate inflation's costs are small and well-understood. This is why most modern central banks target around 2% inflation rather than zero — they want a cushion against deflation. The ranking becomes more ambiguous for economies in a currency union that need competitiveness adjustment, or where the central bank's credibility is weak so that 'moderate' inflation does not stay moderate. The strongest formulation is therefore: in the standard case (independent central bank, flexible exchange rate, well-anchored expectations), moderate inflation is clearly preferable to deflation; in the specific case of a currency-union adjustment or a credibility-poor regime, the trade-off is tighter.