The claim under evaluation is that governments can achieve a permanent reduction in unemployment at the cost of a modest one-off rise in inflation — the stable Phillips-curve trade-off of 1950s-60s textbooks. The claim has strong theoretical and empirical weaknesses, though it contains a kernel of short-run truth. Case for the trade-off — the traditional Phillips curve. Phillips's 1958 study of UK wage data, and Samuelson-Solow's 1960 US work, documented a downward-sloping curve. The mechanism is intuitive: when unemployment is low, labour is scarce, firms bid up wages to attract workers, and these costs feed through to prices. In the 1950s-60s this curve looked stable, and governments believed they could pick a point on it through fiscal and monetary expansion. Case against — the expectations-augmented Phillips curve. Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1967) argued that the traditional curve held expected inflation CONSTANT. If demand-management policy pushes U below the natural rate U*, actual inflation exceeds expected inflation, workers briefly accept lower real wages, and the economy moves from point A on SRPC₁ to a boom point B. But workers adjust expectations, demand compensating nominal wage rises, real wages return to equilibrium, and U moves back to U* — this time at a higher inflation rate (point C on SRPC₂). The LONG-RUN Phillips curve is VERTICAL at U*. Pushing persistently below U* delivers only accelerating inflation (the accelerationist hypothesis) — not lower long-run unemployment. Empirical support for the critique. The 1970s stagflation broke the stable curve; inflation and unemployment rose together. Since 1980, episodes of low inflation combined with low unemployment (late 1990s US, mid-2010s UK) and recent inflationary surges that have unwound show that the apparent curve is unstable and shifts with expectations. Further weakening — rational expectations. Lucas and Sargent argued that if households and firms form rational expectations, they anticipate the stimulus and adjust nominal wages and prices immediately. The short-run trade-off then disappears for ANTICIPATED policy — only UNEXPECTED stimulus works, and even that gain is brief. Partial counter — hysteresis. Blanchard and Summers pointed out that long-term unemployment damages skills and the long-term unemployed can drop out of the labour force. This can raise U* itself, giving a case for AVOIDING deep recessions and perhaps for mild stimulus to prevent U* from rising. But hysteresis does NOT restore the exploitable trade-off — it just means U* is not fixed. Inter-relatedness with other problems. Even where a short-run trade-off is available, exploiting it generates costs through the OTHER macroeconomic links. Higher inflation erodes the internal value of money and typically pulls the external value down (currency depreciation), worsens the current account by reducing competitiveness, and if the stimulus is demand-led also accelerates import demand via the MPM. These spillovers mean the true cost of 'modestly higher inflation' is spread across four problems, not one. Policy implication. Modern central banks target inflation rather than the Phillips-curve menu because the menu is unstable and the long-run gains illusory. Supply-side policies — training, incentives, labour-market flexibility — are the way to lower U* itself. Demand-management stabilises the economy AROUND U* and the inflation target; it does not sustainably push below it. Judgement. The claim of a STABLE, exploitable trade-off is false in the long run and unreliable even in the short run. A short-run Phillips curve exists for a given level of expected inflation, so unexpected demand stimulus can temporarily lower U — but the gain decays as expectations re-anchor, inflation ratchets up, and the extra inflation imposes further costs on the current account and the external value of money. The right conclusion is: the trade-off is TRANSITORY, STATE-DEPENDENT and increasingly costly to re-use, not a stable menu that governments can rely on. The policy implication — inflation targeting plus supply-side reform — is now orthodoxy for well-governed economies for precisely this reason.