A rightward shift of the LRAS curve means the economy's productive capacity has risen — more and/or more productive factors of production. Possible causes include capital accumulation, technological progress, labour-force expansion through immigration or participation, and institutional improvements. The question is whether this always translates into higher real output and employment.
Case supporting the view. On a vertical LRAS, a rightward shift from LRAS₁ to LRAS₂ raises Yf — the full-employment real output — to a higher level. Provided AD is positioned high enough to intersect LRAS₂ at or near Yf, the economy will produce the extra output and, because the demand for labour is a derived demand from the demand for output, employment will rise alongside real output. The price level typically falls (or rises more slowly) because the extra supply absorbs AD pressure. Over long time horizons, this is the central mechanism of economic growth: successive rightward LRAS shifts, met by matching AD expansion, raise living standards and provide jobs for a growing workforce.
Case against the view / qualifications. The view overstates the inevitability of the result for three distinct reasons.
First, AD must expand to meet the new potential. A rightward LRAS shift raises the potential for output but does not create the demand needed to realise it. If AD is weak — say, following a confidence shock, a contractionary policy stance or an exchange-rate appreciation — the economy will sit well below the new Yf and real output and employment will not rise. This is especially vivid on a three-section LRAS: the vertical section can have moved right, but if the economy is operating on the horizontal (highly elastic) section, AD is the binding constraint and the capacity rise is irrelevant to current output. The policy implication is that supply-side policies without supporting demand-side management can produce 'potential without realisation'.
Second, the composition of the LRAS shift matters for employment. An LRAS rise driven by labour-saving capital investment and technological progress raises labour productivity, which means fewer workers are needed per unit of output. In the aggregate, employment rises only if AD grows enough to absorb the extra potential output; otherwise the same output is produced with fewer workers, and employment can fall even as capacity rises. In specific industries, automation can displace workers whose skills do not match the new jobs, producing structural unemployment — a direct challenge to the 'always raises employment' claim.
Third, adjustment is not instantaneous. Even when AD does eventually expand, the transition takes time. New capital must be installed; workers must be re-trained; firms must reorganise. During the transition, there can be periods of lower employment in affected industries even though total potential has risen. The 'always' in the question presumes a smoothness that the real economy does not usually deliver.
Reasoned judgement. The claim is correct in a potential sense — a rightward LRAS shift always raises the ceiling on real output and, with matching AD and no composition shocks, raises employment too. The claim is false in an always / actual sense: whether the potential translates into actual higher output and employment depends on (i) whether AD expands to meet the new potential, (ii) whether the LRAS rise is labour-complementary or labour-saving, and (iii) whether workers can be re-matched to the new jobs. The strongest formulation is that supply-side improvements are necessary but not sufficient for growth in actual output and employment; AD-side management, labour-market policy and re-training complete the policy package. On that qualified reading the view is overstated: a rightward LRAS shift raises the ceiling on real output and employment, but it does not automatically push the economy up to that ceiling.