The Path to Power (1932–1933)

The Preussenschlag ('coup against Prussia') was Chancellor Papen's most consequential act. First, on 20 July 1932 Papen used an emergency decree under Article 48 to dismiss the SPD-led coalition government of Prussia — by far Germany's largest state, covering about two-thirds of the country. Second, he installed himself as Reich Commissioner for Prussia, bringing the Prussian police and administration under central (and conservative) control. Third, the justification was 'inability to maintain order' during SA-Communist street battles, but the deeper purpose was to destroy the largest democratic stronghold in Germany; the SPD-led Prussian government accepted dismissal without resistance — only appealing to the courts, which delivered an inconclusive ruling. Fourth, the act was decisive in two ways: it showed that the state apparatus would not defend democracy against right-wing assault, and it meant that when Hitler took central power in January 1933, Prussia was already under Reich control — making the Nazi takeover dramatically easier.

Kurt von Schleicher was Chancellor for just 57 days (3 December 1932 to 28 January 1933) — and his failure paved the way for Hitler. First, Schleicher was a Reichswehr general and political fixer in Hindenburg's circle; he had engineered Brüning's fall and was Papen's Defence Minister before becoming Chancellor himself. Second, his strategy — the 'cross-front' (Querfront) — was to split the Nazis by negotiating with Gregor Strasser (the 'left' Nazi who had clashed with Hitler) and to win trade-union support for public-works employment, building a centre-right coalition stretching from moderate Nazis to unions. Third, the strategy failed within weeks: Hitler summoned Strasser, demanded loyalty, and forced him to back down on 8 December 1932, holding the Nazis together; conservatives were alarmed by Schleicher's overtures to trade unions; the industrialists lobbied Hindenburg against him. Fourth, when Schleicher asked Hindenburg for emergency powers to suspend the Reichstag, Hindenburg refused — by now persuaded by Papen that a Hitler deal was safer — and Schleicher resigned on 28 January 1933, opening the way to Hitler.

Franz von Papen was the single most important political actor in bringing Hitler to the Chancellorship. As Chancellor from June to November 1932 he discredited the Republic; as the broker of the Cologne deal in January 1933 he engineered Hitler's appointment; and as Vice-Chancellor from 30 January 1933 he provided the conservative cover that made the appointment respectable. Without Papen, the path to Hitler's Chancellorship is hard to imagine. Papen as Chancellor (June-November 1932). Hindenburg appointed Papen Chancellor on 1 June 1932 at Schleicher's recommendation. Papen, a Catholic aristocrat who immediately resigned from the Centre Party, formed the 'Cabinet of Barons' — conservatives and businessmen with no Reichstag base. He ruled by Article 48 emergency decree. His most consequential act was the Preussenschlag (20 July 1932) — using emergency decree to dismiss the SPD-led Prussian state government, destroying Germany's largest democratic stronghold without resistance. He called two Reichstag elections (July and November 1932), but both produced an anti-system majority of Nazis plus KPD; he could find no governing majority. Offered Vice-Chancellorship to Hitler in August 1932 (Hindenburg refused to make Hitler Chancellor at that point); Hitler refused. By December 1932 Papen had proposed a 'New State' — suspending the constitution and ruling by decree indefinitely — and was dismissed by Hindenburg on Schleicher's advice. Papen the political broker (December 1932 - January 1933). Replaced as Chancellor, Papen was bitter and looked for revenge against Schleicher. He had two crucial assets: personal access to Hindenburg (they had become close friends, often dining together) and the trust of conservative industrialists. In November 1932 a group of leading industrialists (including Hjalmar Schacht and Fritz Thyssen) had sent Hindenburg a letter urging Hitler's appointment — Papen could deliver business support. He saw that the Nazis could not be excluded forever and concluded that he could use Hitler as a popular front-man for a conservative government in which he himself would hold real power. The Cologne meeting (4 January 1933). On 4 January 1933 Papen met Hitler secretly at the Cologne home of the banker Baron Kurt von Schröder. They agreed in principle on a coalition government with Hitler as Chancellor and Papen as Vice-Chancellor. Conservatives would hold the majority of cabinet posts (8 of 11), including Vice-Chancellor (Papen), Economics (Hugenberg), Foreign Affairs (Neurath) and the Reichswehr. The Nazis would supply the popular base, the conservatives would supply the personnel — and Papen would be the real power behind Hitler. This was the decisive deal. Lobbying Hindenburg (January 1933). Through January 1933 Papen lobbied Hindenburg intensively, helped by the President's son Oskar Hindenburg (also won over). Papen presented the deal as the safest available option: Schleicher had failed; civil war loomed; Hitler could not be excluded forever; the conservative cabinet would 'tame' him. Hindenburg, 85 years old and exhausted, was susceptible to the pressure. When Schleicher asked for emergency powers and was refused, the way was clear. 30 January 1933. Hindenburg appointed Hitler Chancellor of a cabinet in which the Nazis held only 3 of 11 posts. Papen became Vice-Chancellor and Reich Commissioner for Prussia — believing himself the real power. He famously told a friend that day: 'In two months we'll have pushed Hitler so far into a corner that he'll squeak.' Within six months he was wrong: the Reichstag Fire Decree (28 February), the Enabling Act (24 March) and the Night of the Long Knives (June 1934) swept Papen and the conservatives aside. The verdict on Papen. Papen bears more individual responsibility for Hitler's appointment than any other politician except Hindenburg. He had: discredited the Republic as Chancellor; destroyed the SPD-led Prussian government; brokered the Cologne deal; lobbied Hindenburg; supplied the conservative cabinet that made the appointment look safe; and demonstrated the catastrophic conservative miscalculation that 'we have hired him.' Hindenburg held the constitutional authority; Hitler held the mass support; but Papen put them together. His role in the Nazi rise is the textbook example of how a clever short-term political calculation can produce the worst possible long-term outcome.

The conservative elite believed they could 'use' Hitler in January 1933 for three connected reasons. First, the cabinet composition seemed to constrain Hitler structurally. The Nazis held only 3 of 11 cabinet posts — Hitler as Chancellor, Frick at Interior, Göring as Minister without Portfolio. The other 8 posts went to conservatives: Papen as Vice-Chancellor, Hugenberg (DNVP) at Economics and Agriculture, Neurath as Foreign Minister, conservatives at the Reichswehr. The conservatives believed this 3-out-of-11 ratio meant they outvoted Hitler in cabinet on every important issue, controlled the economy and foreign policy, and could remove him if necessary. Papen famously said: 'In two months we'll have pushed Hitler so far into a corner that he'll squeak.' Second, Hindenburg's constitutional authority seemed to provide a safety-net. As President, Hindenburg held the power to dismiss the Chancellor under Article 53 and to issue emergency decrees under Article 48. Papen had close personal access to Hindenburg — they had become friends — and Hindenburg's son Oskar acted as a political adviser. The conservatives believed they could appeal to Hindenburg to remove Hitler if he overreached. As long as the 85-year-old President was alive, the conservatives thought, Hitler could be managed. Third, the theory of 'taming' a mass movement made political sense to them. Excluding the Nazis indefinitely meant permanent political crisis: 37% of the electorate had no representation in government. Bringing the Nazis into government, the theory ran, would force them to be realistic — accept compromises, manage practical problems, lose their crusading edge. A Nazi Chancellor surrounded by conservative ministers would, the conservatives hoped, become a moderated and useful tool. The strategy of 'inside the tent' was politically rational on its own terms. Together — cabinet structure, presidential authority, and the theory of 'taming' — these reasons made the conservative miscalculation look like a clever piece of statecraft to its authors. They were catastrophically wrong on every count: the Reichstag Fire Decree (28 February 1933), the Enabling Act (24 March), the suppression of all rival parties (summer 1933) and the Night of the Long Knives (June 1934) destroyed the safeguards within six months, and Hindenburg's death in August 1934 removed the last constitutional check. The conservatives' theory of 'using' Hitler turned out to be the most consequential miscalculation of twentieth-century European history.

Nazi electoral success was hugely important in Hitler becoming Chancellor in January 1933 — without 230 Reichstag seats in July 1932 the conservatives would have had no reason to deal with Hitler — but it was not sufficient on its own. The appointment ultimately required the conservative miscalculation of the Papen-Hindenburg deal, which converted electoral support into actual power. The fairest verdict is that electoral success was the necessary condition that made Hitler unignorable, while conservative miscalculation was the sufficient condition that delivered the Chancellorship. Both were needed; neither alone could have done it. The case that electoral success was crucial. First, the statistical evidence is overwhelming. In 1928 the Nazis won 12 Reichstag seats and no one needed to bargain with them. By September 1930 they had 107 seats; by July 1932 they had 230 seats (37.4%) — the largest single party in Germany. The Cologne deal happened precisely because Hitler led Germany's largest party. Without the electoral rise of 1929-32, Papen would have had no reason to meet Hitler at Schröder's villa. Second, the breadth of Nazi support was real and politically usable. The Nazis had built a coalition of middle classes, farmers, youth and conservatives that other parties could not match. Their mass support was the political currency Hitler could spend at the Cologne meeting and that the conservatives wanted to borrow. Third, Hitler's refusal to accept the Vice-Chancellorship in August 1932 — and his demand for the Chancellorship itself — was politically credible only because of his electoral strength. A weaker leader would have been forced to accept a subordinate post or be excluded; Hitler's seats gave him bargaining power. Fourth, the electoral rise made other paths to power unnecessary. Hitler did not need to seize power by coup (as in 1923) because the electoral rise had made him a constitutional candidate for Chancellor. The 1928 strategic decision (Topic 8.1) to pursue power through elections was vindicated. Fifth, the electoral rise built the legitimacy that made the appointment respectable. Hindenburg could appoint Hitler precisely because the Nazis were a major democratic party, not a fringe putschist group. The case that other factors were more important. First, the Nazis never won a Reichstag majority in a free election. Their peak was 37.4% (July 1932); by November 1932 they had fallen to 33.1%. In a properly functioning democracy this would mean opposition, not government. The electoral rise made them necessary in any coalition but did not entitle them to the Chancellorship. Second, the November 1932 fall suggested the Nazi vote might continue declining. Activists were exhausted, funds depleted, the lack of progress towards power frustrating supporters. Some historians argue that if democratic politics had continued through 1933, the Nazis might have collapsed. The conservatives saved them. Third, the conservative miscalculation was the proximate cause. Papen brokered the Cologne deal; Hindenburg made the appointment; the 3-of-11 cabinet design was the conservative theory of 'taming' Hitler. Without these elite manoeuvres, Hitler does not become Chancellor on 30 January 1933 — regardless of his Reichstag seats. Fourth, Hitler's personal leadership mattered. His refusal to accept Vice-Chancellorship in August 1932, his holding the Nazi Party together against Strasser in December, his negotiating skill at Cologne — none of these is reducible to 'electoral success'. A different Nazi leader might have failed where Hitler succeeded. Fifth, the Depression and Brüning's policies had created the conditions in which the conservative miscalculation made sense. Without mass unemployment, fear of communism and the collapse of the moderate parties, the conservatives would not have looked for a Nazi-conservative deal. Sixth, the failure of the left and the state apparatus to defend democracy was crucial. The SPD-KPD split prevented unified resistance; the Reichswehr, judiciary and police were largely anti-republican; the Preussenschlag had already destroyed the largest democratic stronghold without resistance. Even with the Nazi electoral rise, a stronger democratic defence might have prevented the appointment. Weighing and comparing. Electoral success was the necessary condition for Hitler's appointment. Without 230 Reichstag seats, no Cologne meeting, no deal, no Chancellorship. The 1928 result (12 seats) and the post-1933 history (no need for another free election) both confirm that the electoral rise was the political currency Hitler spent on 30 January 1933. But electoral success was not sufficient. The 33.1% of November 1932 did not deliver the Chancellorship by itself; it could have produced indefinite opposition. What delivered the Chancellorship was the conservative decision to bring Hitler into government in a 'tame' coalition. That decision was their miscalculation, not Hitler's achievement. So the proper framework is two-stage: electoral success made Hitler available; conservative miscalculation brought him in. Both stages were necessary; neither alone was sufficient. Overall judgement. Nazi electoral success was hugely important in Hitler becoming Chancellor in January 1933 — it was the necessary condition that made him a candidate for power and that other politicians had to take seriously. Without the rise from 12 to 230 seats between 1928 and 1932, there is no Hitler Chancellorship. In this sense electoral success was indispensable. But it was not the most important single cause. The proximate cause was the conservative miscalculation — Papen's deal, Hindenburg's signature, the 3-of-11 cabinet design, the theory of 'taming' Hitler. Without this, the electoral rise would have produced political deadlock, not Nazi government. The fairest verdict is that electoral success was necessary but not sufficient — the foundation on which the conservative miscalculation built the Chancellorship. Both stages mattered, and the rise to power requires both to explain it.

Between March 1930 and January 1933 three Chancellors — Brüning, Papen and Schleicher — failed in succession, each trying a different strategy and each rejected by Hindenburg in turn. Their cumulative failure exhausted the conservative alternatives and opened the way to Hitler. The three failures form a sequence — orthodox economics, conservative authoritarianism, cross-front coalition — each more desperate than the last. Brüning (March 1930 - May 1932): orthodox economics failed. Heinrich Brüning, a Catholic Centre Party Chancellor, attempted to solve the Depression by deflation — cutting wages, salaries, pensions and unemployment benefits, raising taxes, forcing down prices and defending the Reichsmark. He hoped this would make exports competitive and persuade the Allies to cancel reparations (achieved at Lausanne, July 1932). Unable to get measures through the Reichstag, he ruled increasingly by Article 48 emergency decree. The strategy failed catastrophically: deflation deepened the slump (unemployment rose to 6 million by January 1933), the Republic became identified with austerity and decree-rule, the middle class was ruined, and the Nazi vote exploded from 12 seats (1928) to 107 (September 1930). Brüning was nicknamed the 'Hunger Chancellor'. He was dismissed by Hindenburg on 30 May 1932 after losing the President's confidence, replaced by Papen. His failure was the failure of orthodox economics — and it created the audience for Nazi extremism. Papen (June - November 1932): conservative authoritarianism failed. Franz von Papen, a Catholic aristocrat with no Reichstag base, was Schleicher's choice as a 'usable' Chancellor. He formed the 'Cabinet of Barons' — conservatives and businessmen — and ruled by Article 48. His most consequential act was the Preussenschlag (20 July 1932), using emergency decree to dismiss the SPD-led Prussian government and install himself as Reich Commissioner — destroying Germany's largest democratic stronghold. He called two Reichstag elections (July and November 1932); both produced an anti-system majority of Nazis plus KPD, leaving him no governing majority. Offered Hitler the Vice-Chancellorship in August 1932; Hitler refused. By December he was proposing a 'New State' — suspending the constitution and ruling indefinitely by decree — effectively a recipe for civil war. Schleicher persuaded Hindenburg that the army could not defend this plan; Papen was dismissed on 3 December 1932. His failure was the failure of conservative authoritarianism without mass support — and it discredited the option of government by decree alone. Schleicher (December 1932 - January 1933): the cross-front failed. Kurt von Schleicher, a Reichswehr general and political fixer, attempted a 'cross-front' (Querfront) strategy: split the Nazis by negotiating with Gregor Strasser (the 'left' Nazi), and win trade-union support for public-works employment — a coalition stretching from moderate Nazis to unions. The strategy collapsed in seven weeks. Hitler summoned Strasser, demanded loyalty, and forced him to back down (8 December); the Nazi Party did not split. Conservatives were alarmed by Schleicher's overtures to trade unions; the industrialists lobbied Hindenburg against him. When Schleicher asked Hindenburg for emergency powers to suspend the Reichstag and ban extremist parties, Hindenburg — now persuaded by Papen — refused. Schleicher resigned on 28 January 1933. His failure was the failure of right-wing coalition-building without solid backing — and it exhausted the conservative alternatives. The cumulative failure. Three Chancellors, three strategies, three failures: orthodox economics (Brüning), authoritarian decree (Papen), cross-front coalition (Schleicher). None could find a Reichstag majority; none could solve the Depression; none could exclude or include the Nazis successfully. The cumulative effect was twofold. First, the failures discredited every conservative alternative. By late January 1933 there was no conservative Chancellor in reserve. Second, the failures normalised rule by Article 48 emergency decree — making the path to Hitler's later use of emergency powers a routine continuation rather than a constitutional rupture. The road from Brüning to Hitler was paved by these three failures. The conservatives believed they had exhausted the alternatives and that bringing Hitler into a 'tame' coalition was the safest remaining option. They were catastrophically wrong, but the foundations of their misjudgement had been laid by three years of failed Chancellorships. Without Brüning, Papen and Schleicher having failed in turn, there is no political vacuum for Hitler to fill on 30 January 1933.