Establishing the Dictatorship (1933–34)

The fire (27 February 1933). On the evening of 27 February 1933 — less than four weeks after Hitler's appointment — the Reichstag building in Berlin caught fire. By the time fire brigades extinguished the blaze, much of the building had been gutted.

A young Dutch communist, Marinus van der Lubbe, was caught on the premises and confessed to setting the fire alone. Modern historians broadly accept that van der Lubbe acted alone, although the Nazis claimed a wider communist conspiracy at the time and some Nazi figures (Göring above all) may have known more than they admitted. Whether van der Lubbe was sole arsonist or pawn, the Nazis seized on the fire as a propaganda gift.

Hitler's reaction. Hitler claimed that the fire was the start of a communist uprising to seize power. Within hours he was demanding emergency measures from Hindenburg. Goebbels' propaganda machine flooded the country with the message: only Hitler could save Germany from the Bolshevik threat.

The Reichstag Fire Decree (28 February 1933). The next morning Hindenburg signed the Decree for the Protection of People and State — usually called the Reichstag Fire Decree — drawn up by the Nazi leadership and presented as emergency legislation under Article 48. It:

• Suspended civil liberties guaranteed by the constitution: freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, the right to a fair trial, freedom from arbitrary arrest, secrecy of correspondence.
• Allowed the Reich government to take over state governments that failed to maintain order.
• Authorised the death penalty for a range of crimes including arson against public buildings.

The Decree was technically an emergency measure — but it was never withdrawn. It became the legal basis of the Nazi police state for the next twelve years.

Mass arrests of the left. Within hours of the Decree:

• 4,000-5,000 Communist (KPD) leaders, activists and Reichstag deputies were arrested.
• SPD newspapers and meetings were banned.
• 'Wild' SA terror broke out across Germany — arbitrary arrests, beatings, killings, makeshift concentration camps (the first proper one, Dachau, opened on 22 March 1933).
• The KPD was effectively destroyed as a legal political force, even though it remained technically legal until November 1933.

The election campaign in terror. The Reichstag had already been dissolved in early February 1933 for a new election on 5 March. The campaign was now conducted under the Decree:

• KPD candidates could not campaign; SPD candidates were harassed; their meetings were broken up by SA violence.
• The Nazis had unlimited access to the radio (then a state-controlled medium) and to government funds.
• The Reichstag Fire was used as the central propaganda theme.

The 5 March 1933 Reichstag election. Despite the terror, the Nazis did not win an absolute majority:

• NSDAP: 288 seats (43.9%) — up from 196 in November 1932.
• SPD: 120 seats.
• KPD: 81 seats (won despite the terror; deputies were arrested and prevented from taking their seats).
• DNVP: 52 seats (around 8%).
• Centre: 74 seats.

Together with the DNVP, the Nazis had a Reichstag majority of around 52% — enough to form a government but not enough to change the constitution (which required two-thirds). The 'free election' element of the Nazi rise had peaked.

The lesson. The Reichstag Fire was the pivot that turned Hitler's coalition Chancellorship into the legal foundation for dictatorship. Within 36 hours of the fire, the Decree had:

• Suspended civil liberties (permanently, as it turned out).
• Legitimised the persecution of the left.
• Established the legal framework of the police state.
• Established the technique of using a 'crisis' (real or staged) to justify extraordinary powers.

The conservative 'we have hired him' theory had its first puncture. Hindenburg, who had signed the Decree, did not realise — or did not care — that he had just legalised the destruction of the German left and the elimination of constitutional safeguards. The pattern of 'crisis + decree' would define the next eighteen months.

The legislative target. The Nazis already had the Reichstag Fire Decree, which gave them emergency powers, but it depended on Hindenburg's signature and could in principle be withdrawn. Hitler wanted something more permanent: a law passed by the Reichstag itself that would grant him legislative authority without Reichstag involvement, for a period long enough to dismantle democracy completely.

This required a constitutional amendment — needing a two-thirds majority in the Reichstag.

The Nazi-DNVP arithmetic. After the 5 March 1933 election, the Reichstag had 647 deputies. The Nazis (288) plus the DNVP (52) totalled 340 — not a two-thirds majority (432). To get two-thirds, Hitler needed:

• The 81 KPD deputies (already arrested or in hiding — could be declared absent and counted as if voting in favour under existing rules).
• The Centre Party (74), the BVP (18), the SPD (120) and the smaller liberals.

The arithmetic depended on excluding the KPD and getting the Centre Party to vote with the Nazis.

Getting the Centre Party. The decisive negotiation was with the Centre Party, led by Ludwig Kaas. Hitler made promises to Kaas:

• The Catholic Church would be protected.
• Civil servants from the Centre Party would keep their jobs.
• A formal Concordat with the Vatican would be negotiated.
• The constitution would be 'respected' in spirit.

Kaas — who believed Hitler could be 'civilised' through cooperation — persuaded the Centre Party to back the Act. (He later regretted this decision and went into exile.) The BVP, the smaller liberal parties and other moderates also fell into line.

Excluding the KPD. The KPD deputies had been arrested under the Reichstag Fire Decree or were in hiding. The Nazis declared them 'absent' from the Reichstag and excluded them from the vote-count, retroactively reducing the required two-thirds majority. This was legally questionable but no court intervened.

The Kroll Opera House setting. With the Reichstag building destroyed, the special session was held in the Kroll Opera House in Berlin on 23 March 1933. The hall was surrounded by SA and SS men; deputies entering were threatened; Nazi banners draped the chamber. SPD leader Otto Wels gave a brave speech opposing the Act — the only major party to do so. He was harangued and threatened but spoke despite the danger.

The vote (24 March 1933). The vote was held on 24 March 1933. The result:

• For: 441 votes (Nazis, DNVP, Centre, BVP, smaller parties).
• Against: 94 votes (SPD).

The Act passed with the required two-thirds majority.

What the Enabling Act did. The Act was officially titled the 'Law to Remedy the Distress of People and Reich'. It gave Hitler's cabinet the power to:

• Pass laws without Reichstag approval for four years.
• Pass laws that deviated from the constitution.
• Conclude treaties with foreign powers without Reichstag approval.

The President was bypassed entirely. Hitler did not need Hindenburg's signature on emergency decrees anymore — he could simply legislate on his own authority.

Why the Enabling Act mattered. The Enabling Act was the constitutional foundation of the Nazi dictatorship. It:

• Ended parliamentary democracy in Germany.
• Made Hitler the legal sole source of legislation.
• Was passed with apparent legality — by a two-thirds Reichstag majority — giving the dictatorship a legal-constitutional facade.
• Was extended for four more years in 1937, 1939 and 1943 — it remained the legal foundation of the regime until 1945.

The Act was both a turning point and a continuation. It made the Nazi revolution legal, while the actual revolution — destruction of opposition, terror, Gleichschaltung — was already well under way.

The conservative complicity. The DNVP voted enthusiastically for the Enabling Act, believing it gave Hitler what he needed to defeat the left and would not threaten conservative interests. Hugenberg (DNVP Economics Minister) was particularly enthusiastic. Papen, as Vice-Chancellor, also supported the Act. The conservatives believed they were still controlling Hitler. They could not have been more wrong: within weeks the Enabling Act would be used to destroy them too.

The Centre's tragedy. The Centre Party's vote for the Act was the great act of Catholic political self-destruction in Weimar history. Within four months the Centre Party would dissolve itself (5 July 1933), abandoned by the Vatican after the Concordat (20 July). Catholic Germany — which had resisted Bismarck's Kulturkampf — accepted the Nazi dictatorship in March 1933 in exchange for promises that proved worthless.

The end of constitutional democracy. After 24 March 1933 there was no parliamentary opposition that could stop Hitler. The KPD was arrested; the SPD had voted against but was politically isolated; the Centre and DNVP had voted for the Act and were therefore complicit. Hitler had achieved through legal means what he could not achieve in 1923 through coup: dictatorial power. The constitution he had sworn to uphold on 30 January was, with this single law, effectively suspended.

The concept of Gleichschaltung. Gleichschaltung — literally 'bringing into the same gear' or 'coordination' — was the Nazi term for the systematic Nazification of all areas of German life. Between the Enabling Act of March 1933 and the Night of the Long Knives in June 1934, the Nazis systematically destroyed every centre of independent power and built a one-party state.

The principle was that no organisation could remain independent of Nazi control. Everything had to be either Nazi or dissolved.

State governments (March-April 1933). The first targets were the state (Land) governments. The Reichstag Fire Decree had already allowed the Reich to take over states that failed to maintain order; in March-April 1933 the Nazis used this to:

• Appoint Reichsstatthalter (Reich Governors) in each state, drawn from local Nazi Gauleiters.
• Replace state governments that resisted with Nazi-controlled administrations.
• By April 1933 every state was effectively under Nazi control.
• The Law for the Reconstruction of the Reich (30 January 1934) formally abolished the powers of the state legislatures, turning Germany from a federal into a unitary state.

Trade unions destroyed (2 May 1933). On 1 May 1933 the Nazis declared Labour Day a national holiday, with mass meetings and rallies celebrating the workers. On 2 May 1933 — the day after — SA and SS men raided the offices of every German trade union:

• Union leaders were arrested.
• Funds were seized.
• Property was confiscated.
• All independent trade unions were dissolved.

In their place, the Nazis created the German Labour Front (Deutsche Arbeitsfront — DAF) under Robert Ley, which all workers and employers were required to join. The DAF was not a trade union in any meaningful sense — it had no right to strike, no right to bargain, and was an instrument of Nazi control over the workforce.

The destruction of the trade unions was a major victory: the most organised potential opposition to the Nazi regime was eliminated in a single day, with little resistance.

Political parties dissolved (June-July 1933). With the trade unions gone, the political parties followed:

• SPD: banned on 22 June 1933 as 'hostile to the people and the state'. SPD newspapers had already been closed; SPD leaders had fled abroad or been arrested; SPD funds had been seized.
• KPD: had been effectively banned since the Reichstag Fire; formally banned on 14 July.
• DNVP: under pressure from the Nazis, dissolved itself on 27 June 1933 — Hugenberg resigning from the cabinet.
• DDP, DVP, Stahlhelm: all dissolved themselves in June-July.
• Centre Party and BVP: dissolved themselves on 5 July 1933 — abandoned by the Vatican after the Concordat negotiations.

The Law against the Formation of New Parties (14 July 1933) made the NSDAP the only legal political party in Germany. This was the legal birth of the one-party state.

The Concordat with the Catholic Church (20 July 1933). The most striking act of coordination was the Concordat with the Vatican, signed on 20 July 1933 by Papen (as Vice-Chancellor) and Cardinal Eugenio Pacelli (the future Pope Pius XII). The Concordat:

• Recognised Catholic religious life in Germany.
• Protected Catholic schools and youth organisations.
• In return, the Catholic Church withdrew from politics, accepting the dissolution of the Centre Party and BVP.

The Concordat gave the Nazi regime a major international diplomatic recognition within months of taking power. It was Pacelli's hope that the agreement would protect Catholic institutions; in practice the Nazis repeatedly violated the terms while keeping the Concordat in force as a propaganda asset.

Civil service (April 1933). The Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service (7 April 1933) removed Jews and political opponents from government employment. Thousands of civil servants — including judges, professors, doctors, school-teachers — lost their jobs. The civil service was 'cleansed' of those who could not be trusted to follow Nazi orders.

Cultural life (March-September 1933). The cultural sphere was also coordinated:

• Joseph Goebbels became Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda on 13 March 1933 — controlling press, radio, cinema, theatre, music and art.
• A Reich Chamber of Culture (September 1933) regulated all artistic production; Jews and political opponents were excluded.
• Book burnings on 10 May 1933 in cities across Germany — students burned 'un-German' books by Jewish, communist, liberal and pacifist authors.
• The press was brought under Nazi control through licensing and the Editor's Law (October 1933).

Education and youth.

• Schools were 'coordinated' with Nazi curricula emphasising race, German history and physical fitness.
• Jewish teachers and students were excluded.
• The Hitler Youth (built since 1926) became increasingly compulsory; rival youth organisations (Catholic, socialist) were dissolved or merged.

The army (Reichswehr). The Reichswehr was for now left largely untouched — Hitler needed army support to consolidate his position. The army would be coordinated only after the Night of the Long Knives (see next section), when its loyalty was secured.

The pace and scale. Gleichschaltung in 1933 was remarkable for its speed and scale:

• The whole process — state governments, trade unions, political parties, civil service, culture, education, religious life — took about six months (March to September 1933).
• The pace was made possible by the Enabling Act (legislative authority), the Reichstag Fire Decree (suspended civil liberties), SA terror (street-level intimidation), and the eagerness of many institutions to coordinate themselves to avoid forced takeover.

Self-coordination. A crucial point: many organisations coordinated themselves. Universities expelled Jewish staff before being forced to. Professional bodies (doctors, lawyers, engineers) reorganised on Nazi lines. Sports clubs adopted Nazi rules. Local authorities renamed streets. Civil servants joined the Nazi Party in waves. Voluntary collaboration by the German middle classes and the state apparatus made Gleichschaltung astonishingly smooth.

The conservative miscalculation deepens. By summer 1933 the conservatives in the cabinet were finding that the 'taming' theory had collapsed:

• Hugenberg had been forced out (June 1933) and the DNVP had dissolved itself.
• Papen had lost most of his real influence and was politically isolated.
• The Reichswehr was still neutral but watching nervously.
• Only Hindenburg's life and the army's loyalty stood between Hitler and total power.

By the end of 1933 the Nazi state-party fusion was almost complete. Only the remaining problem of the SA (and Röhm's ambitions) and the question of what would happen after Hindenburg's death stood between Hitler and total dictatorship. Both would be solved in 1934.

The SA problem by 1934. By spring 1934, Hitler faced one major remaining problem: the SA (Sturmabteilung) and its leader Ernst Röhm.

The SA had grown enormously since Hitler became Chancellor:

• It had over 2 million members by mid-1934 — larger than the army (limited to 100,000 by Versailles).
• It was led by Ernst Röhm, Hitler's friend from 1919-23 and creator of the SA.
• The SA had been crucial in the Nazi rise — the street muscle, the propaganda spectacle, the visible threat of revolution.

But the SA was now a problem for Hitler in three ways:

First, Röhm's 'Second Revolution' demands. Röhm wanted a genuine 'national socialist revolution' — going beyond the destruction of the left to a social transformation favouring workers and ordinary Nazis over the existing elites. He called for a 'Second Revolution' to fulfil the socialist promises of the 25-Point Programme. This alarmed conservatives, businessmen and (above all) Hitler, who had no intention of antagonising the elites he was now allied with.

Second, the army's hostility. Röhm wanted the SA to absorb the Reichswehr — merging the army into the SA under his leadership. To the army (Reichswehr) this was anathema: the regular officer corps despised the SA as undisciplined thugs, and viewed Röhm's ambitions as a direct threat. The army told Hitler that it would not accept SA control. Without army loyalty, Hitler could not survive Hindenburg's coming death.

Third, conservative pressure. By spring 1934, conservative figures (Papen above all) were urging Hitler to curb the SA. Papen gave a famous speech at Marburg on 17 June 1934 criticising SA radicalism and warning of 'social chaos'. The speech was suppressed but was widely read and signalled growing conservative opposition.

Hitler's choice. Hitler had to choose between:

• The SA (his old comrades, but now a political liability) — or
• The army (whose loyalty he needed for total power).

He chose the army.

Planning the purge. The plan was developed through May-June 1934 by Heinrich Himmler (head of the SS) and Reinhard Heydrich (his deputy), with Hermann Göring in Berlin. The SS — which had been a small bodyguard but had grown enormously in 1933-34 — would be the instrument. The army agreed to cooperate (and to provide weapons and transport).

The purge would also be used to settle several other scores: eliminate conservative critics (Schleicher, Strasser), kill personal enemies (Gustav von Kahr from 1923), and silence troublesome priests and intellectuals.

The Night of the Long Knives (30 June 1934). The purge was carried out on 30 June 1934 (and continued into 1-2 July). The codename was 'Operation Hummingbird'.

The killings included:

• Ernst Röhm: arrested at Bad Wiessee (Bavaria), where the SA leadership was holding a conference; offered a pistol to shoot himself, refused, and was shot in his cell on Hitler's orders.
• Several dozen SA leaders killed across Germany.
• Gregor Strasser (the 'left' Nazi): murdered.
• Kurt von Schleicher (former Chancellor): shot at home along with his wife.
• Gustav von Kahr (former Bavarian leader who had stopped Hitler in 1923): murdered.
• Several Catholic priests and intellectuals: killed.
• Edgar Jung (Papen's speechwriter who had drafted the Marburg speech): murdered.

Total deaths: officially 77, in reality probably around 200. Papen himself was placed under house arrest but spared — he was needed as a figleaf.

The legal cover. On 3 July 1934 the cabinet passed the Law concerning Measures for the Defence of the State, declaring the murders 'legal measures of state self-defence'. Carl Schmitt, the leading constitutional theorist of the regime, wrote an article justifying the killings on the principle that 'the Führer protects the law'.

Hitler addressed the Reichstag on 13 July 1934, taking personal responsibility for the killings: 'In this hour I was responsible for the fate of the German people, and thereby the supreme judge of the German nation.' The Reichstag — now Nazi-dominated — applauded.

Consequences of the purge.

1. The army's loyalty. The army was delighted. The SA threat was eliminated; the army's monopoly of armed force was confirmed. This was the most important consequence: the army would now back Hitler completely, as it would soon demonstrate.

2. SS dominance. The SS (under Himmler) had risen enormously in importance. From the 30 June 1934 onwards the SS was the dominant Nazi police organisation, the SA shrank into a marginal role, and the path to the SS state of the later 1930s and 1940s was opened.

3. Conservative impotence. The murder of Schleicher and Edgar Jung, and the muzzling of Papen, showed conservatives that they could be killed too. Conservative independence collapsed entirely. Papen was sent off to Vienna as ambassador (and would survive to face Nuremberg).

4. Total personal power for Hitler. Hitler had now demonstrated that he could kill anyone, including old comrades, former Chancellors and conservative critics, with legal cover. The combination of legal authority (Enabling Act) and arbitrary terror (Night of the Long Knives) was the foundation of his personal dictatorship.

5. Public acceptance. The German public broadly accepted the purge. Hitler was widely thought to have restored order against an 'SA threat'; many Germans — including conservative middle classes who had feared SA radicalism — were relieved. The personality cult of Hitler grew further.

The verdict. The Night of the Long Knives was the moment Hitler completed his consolidation of personal power within the Nazi movement and the German state. He had eliminated the threat from within (the SA), eliminated the threat from former conservatives (Schleicher, Jung), and confirmed the army's loyalty for the moment when Hindenburg's death would make him head of state. Within six weeks of the purge, that moment came.

Hindenburg's last months. By spring 1934 the elderly Paul von Hindenburg was visibly declining. He was 86 years old, had been ill for some time, and had effectively withdrawn from active politics — leaving Hitler the freedom to act. He kept a residual constitutional authority (the power to dismiss the Chancellor) but no longer used it.

After the Night of the Long Knives, Hindenburg sent Hitler a brief telegram thanking him for 'saving the German nation'. Whether this reflected real approval or was drafted by Papen and signed by an ailing President is debated. Either way, it gave the regime constitutional cover for the murders.

Hindenburg's death (2 August 1934). Hindenburg died at his Neudeck estate on 2 August 1934, aged 86.

Hitler had been waiting. A law had been prepared in advance, on 1 August 1934 (the day before Hindenburg died, in anticipation), titled the 'Law concerning the Head of State of the German Reich'. It:

• Merged the offices of President and Chancellor into a single office.
• Conferred on Hitler the title 'Führer und Reichskanzler' ('Leader and Chancellor').
• Eliminated the Presidency as a constitutional check.

The law was technically unconstitutional — the Enabling Act had said it could not alter the Presidency. But there was no court that could rule against the regime; the law passed.

The oath of personal loyalty (2 August 1934). Within hours of Hindenburg's death, the entire Reichswehr swore a new oath of personal loyalty — not to the constitution, not to Germany, but to Adolf Hitler personally:

"I swear by God this sacred oath: that I will render unconditional obedience to Adolf Hitler, the Führer of the German Reich and people, supreme commander of the armed forces, and that I shall at all times be ready, as a brave soldier, to give my life for this oath."

This oath was crucial: it bound the army personally to Hitler, not to the state. Officers who later disagreed with Hitler (including the conspirators of July 1944) were tortured by the moral weight of an oath sworn in 1934.

The plebiscite (19 August 1934). To give the merger of offices a popular sanction, Hitler held a plebiscite on 19 August 1934. Germans were asked whether they approved of the merger:

• 89.9% voted yes.
• About 10% voted no.

The vote was held in conditions of intense propaganda and intimidation, but the result probably reflected genuine majority support — Germans saw Hitler as the strong leader Germany needed, and Hindenburg's death made some such fusion seem natural. The 10% 'no' vote suggests genuine opposition still existed.

The completion of the dictatorship. With Hindenburg's death, the offices merged, and the army oath of loyalty, Hitler held total personal power:

• Head of state (Hindenburg's former role).
• Head of government (Chancellor, with legislative authority under the Enabling Act).
• Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (a new constitutional fact).
• Sole legal party leader (NSDAP, the only legal party).

The constitutional offices of the Weimar Republic had been absorbed into one person. There was no internal check on Hitler's power.

The eighteen-month transformation. From 30 January 1933 to 2 August 1934 — just eighteen months — the conservatives' 'we have hired him' coalition had been transformed into total personal dictatorship:

1. Reichstag Fire Decree (28 February 1933): civil liberties suspended.
2. March 1933 election under terror: Nazis 44% (largest party).
3. Enabling Act (24 March 1933): legislative power without Reichstag.
4. Gleichschaltung (spring-summer 1933): state governments, trade unions, political parties, civil service, culture, education all coordinated.
5. One-party state (14 July 1933).
6. Concordat with Vatican (20 July 1933).
7. Night of the Long Knives (30 June 1934): SA purged, army won over, conservatives crushed.
8. Hindenburg's death and merger of offices (2 August 1934): Führer und Reichskanzler.
9. Army oath of personal loyalty (2 August 1934).
10. Plebiscite (19 August 1934): 89.9% approval.

The Weimar Republic was dead. The Nazi dictatorship was complete.

The 'legal revolution'. A crucial feature of the consolidation was its legal facade. Each step had been formally legal: Hindenburg signed the Reichstag Fire Decree; the Reichstag passed the Enabling Act with a two-thirds majority; the Centre Party voted for it; the trade unions were 'dissolved' under existing law; the SS purge was retroactively legalised; the merger of offices was 'voted on' by plebiscite.

This legal facade had important consequences:

• The state apparatus (army, judiciary, civil service) could accept the new regime without crisis of conscience.
• The international community recognised the regime as legitimate.
• The German public could see the Nazi state as a continuation of legality, not as an illegitimate coup.
• The Nazis could later cite their 'legal revolution' as proof of popular legitimacy.

In reality the legal facade had been used to dismantle constitutional democracy from within. Hitler had used the law to destroy the law.

The end of the topic. Topic 8 has covered the Nazi rise from the founding of the DAP in 1919 to Hitler's total personal power in August 1934 — fifteen years of marginal politics, failed coup, reorganisation, electoral breakthrough, political deals and legal revolution. The Nazi dictatorship was now in place.

Topic 9 will examine how the Nazis used that power to control German society. Topic 10 will look at how Germans lived under Nazi rule — workers, women, young people, churches, Jews, and other minorities. The story of Hitler's rise ends in August 1934; the story of his regime begins.