Year 1: gross profit margin 40%, profit margin 12%, ROCE 15%, current ratio 1.8, acid test 0.9.
Year 2: gross profit margin 35%, profit margin 7.5%, ROCE 9%, current ratio 1.25, acid test 0.45.
The managing director is right about the revenue: sales grew by $160 000, or 20%, and gross profit rose in absolute terms from $320 000 to $336 000. Capital employed has increased by $160 000, which suggests real investment, and a business a fifth larger may be better able to negotiate with suppliers and to defend its position against competitors. If the new investment is recent, it may not yet be producing the profit it eventually will.
But every one of the five ratios has moved the wrong way, and profit itself fell by $24 000 — a quarter of what it was. The gross profit margin dropped from 40% to 35%, so Kilbride is keeping five cents less in each dollar of sales after paying for its goods, which points to discounting as the source of the extra revenue. The profit margin fell much further, from 12% to 7.5%, so expenses grew faster than sales as well. ROCE fell from 15% to 9%, meaning the extra $160 000 invested is earning less than the money already in the business, and 9% is barely above what a low-risk investment would return without any business risk at all.
The liquidity deterioration is the most serious part. Current liabilities have doubled, from $100 000 to $200 000, while inventory has risen from $90 000 to $160 000 — so Kilbride has funded more stock with more short-term debt. The current ratio has fallen from a comfortable 1.8 to 1.25, and the acid test from 0.9 to 0.45. That last figure means Kilbride could settle less than half its short-term debts without selling inventory, and its inventory has grown much faster than its sales, which suggests it is not selling as readily as hoped.
I do not agree that the company is improving. Revenue measures size, not success, and Kilbride has grown 20% larger while earning a quarter less profit and halving its ability to pay its debts. The pattern — rising revenue, falling margins, rising inventory and rising short-term liabilities — is the classic picture of overtrading: expansion outrunning the working capital available to support it. The liquidity position is the immediate danger, because a business with an acid test of 0.45 and $200 000 falling due within the year can be forced to stop trading regardless of its revenue growth.
What would change my view is evidence that the extra capital employed is a recent investment still coming into use. If the $160 000 has gone into capacity that will be filled next year, both ROCE and the margins could recover and Year 2 would be a year of investment rather than decline — though even then the liquidity would need addressing urgently, probably with long-term finance in place of the extra short-term liabilities. I would want Year 3's figures, a breakdown of what the new capital bought, and an explanation of why inventory has risen by 78% when revenue rose only 20%.