Why is "Saying the Bolsheviks led the February Revolution." a common mistake in The February/March 1917 Revolution and the Fall of the Tsar?

Why it happens: Soviet propaganda later claimed this. How to avoid it: **The Bolsheviks played almost no role in February.** Lenin was in Switzerland; Trotsky was in New York; Stalin in Siberian exile. The Petrograd Bolshevik organisation **advised against demonstrations on 23 February**; women textile workers ignored them. The revolution was led by women, workers and soldiers acting spontaneously. The Bolsheviks' role came **after** February (Lenin's April Theses).

Why is "Saying the February Revolution took weeks or months." a common mistake in The February/March 1917 Revolution and the Fall of the Tsar?

Why it happens: Major revolutions usually take longer. How to avoid it: **The February Revolution took 5 days (23-27 February OS)** in the streets; the abdication came on 2 March; Mikhail refused on 3 March. The whole process from first strikes to end of dynasty was **9 days**. The speed reflects how ready the regime was to fall — structural causes had been building for decades.

Why is "Saying Nicholas II abdicated of his own choice without pressure." a common mistake in The February/March 1917 Revolution and the Fall of the Tsar?

Why it happens: He signed the document. How to avoid it: **Nicholas was under massive pressure**: army defection in Petrograd (27 Feb), train diverted to Pskov (1 March), **generals' collective recommendation** (Alekseyev's poll: Brusilov, Ruzsky, Evert, Grand Duke Nicholas), **Duma demand** (Guchkov + Shulgin), **imperial family** plotting, **Allied warnings**. He abdicated because **almost everyone of consequence had concluded he must** — he no longer had political or military capacity to refuse.

Why is "Saying the army remained loyal to the Tsar throughout the February Revolution." a common mistake in The February/March 1917 Revolution and the Fall of the Tsar?

Why it happens: Armies usually support governments. How to avoid it: **The Petrograd garrison mutinied on 27 February** (Volynsky Regiment killed Captain Lashkevich, then Litovsky/Preobrazhensky/Moscow followed); ~80,000-100,000 soldiers joined the revolution. **At Stavka, the generals (Alekseyev's poll) recommended abdication**. The army — the regime's ultimate base — defected. This was the decisive moment of the revolution.

Why is "Saying Dual Power was a stable arrangement." a common mistake in The February/March 1917 Revolution and the Fall of the Tsar?

Why it happens: It lasted 8 months. How to avoid it: **Dual Power was inherently unstable** — the Provisional Government had formal authority but the Soviet had real power over workers/soldiers/transport. The Soviet declined to take government itself (Marx's stage theory); the Provisional Government could not act effectively without Soviet support. The arrangement produced political stalemate that undermined the Provisional Government and contributed to its October 1917 fall.

Why is "Saying the Romanov dynasty was founded by Nicholas II." a common mistake in The February/March 1917 Revolution and the Fall of the Tsar?

Why it happens: Confusion about dynastic history. How to avoid it: The **Romanov dynasty began in 1613** when **Michael I** was elected Tsar by the Zemsky Sobor, ending the 'Time of Troubles'. It ruled Russia for **over 300 years** (1613-1917). Nicholas II was the **last** Romanov ruler, not the founder. His abdication ended the dynasty (3 March 1917).

Cambridge IGCSE History (0470)

The February/March 1917 Revolution and the Fall of the Tsar

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Detailed Study Notes

Detailed notes on Depth Study C - Why did the Tsarist regime collapse in 1917 for Cambridge IGCSE History, covering key concepts, explanations, examples, and exam-focused revision points.

The February/March 1917 Revolution and the Fall of the Tsar — Cambridge IGCSE History 0470

In a few astonishing days between 23 February and 2 March 1917 (Old Style; 8-15 March New Style), the Tsarist regime that had ruled Russia for over 300 years simply collapsed. International Women's Day (23 February OS / 8 March NS) brought women textile workers onto the cold Petrograd streets demanding bread; Putilov workers joined; strikes spread through the capital (~200,000 by 25 February); on 26 February troops fired on demonstrators at Znamenskaya Square; but on 27 February the Volynsky Regiment mutinied — soldiers refused to fire on protesters and instead joined them. By that evening Petrograd was in revolutionary hands. The Duma's Provisional Committee (formed 27 Feb, chaired by Rodzianko) and the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies (re-formed 27 Feb) emerged as rival authorities — the famous 'Dual Power' (Dvoevlastiye) of 1917. Nicholas II tried to return from Stavka but his train was diverted; on 2 March 1917 (Old Style; 15 March NS) Nicholas abdicated — first in favour of his son Alexei, then on doctors' advice in favour of his brother Grand Duke Mikhail, who refused the throne the next day. The Romanov dynasty, which had ruled Russia since 1613, ended. A Provisional Government under Prince Lvov (a Kadet aristocrat) took office; the Petrograd Soviet under Mensheviks and SRs co-existed as parallel authority. The February Revolution was largely spontaneous — not led by any party — and it succeeded because the army (the regime's ultimate support) refused to fire on the people. The Tsar's collapse was sudden but the structural causes had been building for decades. The Bolsheviks, with Lenin still in Swiss exile, played almost no role in February 1917 — that would come later (Topic 12).

At a glance

Petrograd in mid-February 1917: severe cold (-26°C in some weeks), bread queues, ~1.2 million strikers in January-February alone, food shortages, Tsar at Stavka Mogilev — capital in revolutionary mood.
International Women's Day (23 February OS / 8 March NS): women textile workers in Petrograd's Vyborg district struck and called men out; ~90,000 on strike that day; demanding 'Bread' and 'Down with Autocracy'.
24-25 February: strikes spread; ~200,000-300,000 on strike; women and workers joined; demonstrations grew daily.
26 February: troops fired on demonstrators at Znamenskaya Square; ~50+ killed; turning point — workers shocked but defiant.
27 February (decisive day): Volynsky Regiment mutinied — soldiers refused to fire and joined demonstrators; other regiments followed (Litovsky, Preobrazhensky); by evening Petrograd garrison ~80,000-100,000 sided with revolution.
Duma's Provisional Committee formed 27 February (chaired by Mikhail Rodzianko); Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies re-formed same day (chaired by Menshevik Nikolai Chkheidze).
'Dual Power' (Dvoevlastiye): Provisional Government (formally legal authority) + Petrograd Soviet (real power over workers, soldiers, transport) emerged as parallel authorities.
Nicholas II tried to return from Stavka but his train was diverted; he reached Pskov on 1 March; was met by Rodzianko's delegate Vasily Shulgin and the Octobrist Alexander Guchkov.
2 March 1917 (15 March NS): Nicholas abdicated — first for himself in favour of Alexei (then withdrew on doctors' advice about the haemophilia), then in favour of brother Grand Duke Mikhail; Mikhail refused the throne on 3 March pending a constituent assembly.
The Romanov dynasty (since 1613) ended; Provisional Government under Prince Lvov (Kadet aristocrat) took office; Petrograd Soviet Order No. 1 (1/14 March) required officers' authority to be approved by soldiers' committees.

What you’ll learn

Mapped to the Cambridge IGCSE 0470 syllabus (2027-2028).

Describe the events of the February Revolution day by day (23 Feb to 2 March OS).
Explain why the Petrograd garrison joined the revolution (Volynsky Regiment mutiny).
Describe the formation of the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet ('Dual Power').
Explain Nicholas II's abdication and the end of the Romanov dynasty.
Assess why the Tsarist regime collapsed so quickly in February 1917.

Petrograd on the eve of revolution (early February 1917)

By mid-February 1917 Petrograd was in multiple simultaneous crises — bread shortages, severe cold, accelerating strikes, political deadlock — ready to explode into revolution.

Russia in early 1917. By January-February 1917 the Tsarist regime was in terminal crisis (Topic 11.3). After 30 months of war:

~1.7 million Russian dead, ~3 million wounded, ~2.5 million POWs.
Inflation ~400% since 1914; real wages ~30% below 1914.
Bread queues in Petrograd, Moscow and other major cities.
Severe winter 1916-17: -26°C in some weeks; fuel shortages.
Ministerial leapfrog continuing: Alexander Protopopov (Rasputin's choice) was Interior Minister; Prince Nikolai Golitsyn was Prime Minister.
Tsar at Stavka Mogilev, ~1,000 km from Petrograd.
Empress Alexandra governing under continuing Rasputin-style influence (despite his murder December 1916).
Duma alienated: even Octobrists hostile after Progressive Bloc rejection.

Petrograd specifically. The Russian capital was the centre of the crisis:

Population ~2.4 million by early 1917 (swollen by refugees from the lost western territories).
400,000+ industrial workers — concentrated in the Putilov Works, the Vyborg district, and other heavy-industry zones.
~200,000 soldiers in the Petrograd garrison — mostly reservists, recently conscripted, including many older men and former workers who sympathised with the strikers.
Bread crisis by mid-February: rations cut to 1 lb (450g) per person per day; queues from 4 a.m.; many returning home empty-handed.
Strike activity: ~1.2 million strikers in January-February 1917 alone; Putilov Works the centre of unrest.

The Putilov strike (18-22 February). The immediate trigger of the February Revolution was a strike at the Putilov Works — Russia's largest factory:

18 February 1917 (OS): a section of Putilov workers went on strike over the dismissal of fellow workers and pay issues.
By 21 February: management threatened to lock out the entire workforce (~30,000 workers).
22 February: the lockout was carried out; ~30,000 Putilov workers were on the streets demanding to be re-hired.

The Putilov workers became the shock-troops of the early revolution: militant, well-organised, with revolutionary experience, and now (since 22 Feb) on the streets with no work to return to.

Nicholas II's response: leaving for Stavka. On the morning of 22 February 1917 (OS), the day before the revolution began, Nicholas II left Petrograd by train for Stavka Mogilev. His ministers and the British Ambassador had warned him to remain in the capital; he insisted on returning to army HQ for what he considered routine military business. His departure from Petrograd at the critical moment would prove disastrous: when the revolution began the next day, the Tsar was not in the capital to manage it.

Empress Alexandra was left in Petrograd with her sick children (four had measles in February 1917); she was politically isolated and her advice to ministers was increasingly erratic.

Government complacency. The regime's response to the worsening crisis in Petrograd was complacent:

Interior Minister Protopopov assured the Tsar that he had the situation under control.
Police reinforcements had been planned but not fully implemented.
Plans existed for military repression but the regime's faith in its own troops was misplaced.
The Tsar received soothing reports from Petrograd while Stavka focused on military planning.

Public mood: tinder waiting for a spark. Petrograd in mid-February 1917 was in a mood that historians have compared to a tinderbox:

Food queues were becoming political schools — women exchanged complaints about the regime.
Strikes were spreading.
Locked-out Putilov workers were on the streets.
Soldiers in the garrison were grumbling.
Petrograd society was openly contemptuous of the regime, the Empress, and the recently-dead Rasputin's legacy.
Rumours of impending revolution circulated; Duma deputies discussed scenarios.

The day before: 22 February. On 22 February 1917 (OS / 7 March NS) — the day before what became 'Day One' of the revolution — the following had happened:

Nicholas II had left Petrograd for Stavka.
The Putilov lockout had been confirmed.
~30,000 Putilov workers were on the streets.
Various other factories were on strike.
Bread queues continued.
Plans were being made for International Women's Day demonstrations the next day.

The next day — Thursday 23 February 1917 (OS) / 8 March 1917 (NS) — would be International Women's Day. The Bolshevik organisation in Petrograd (small, badly organised) had advised against major demonstrations, fearing they were premature. The women textile workers ignored the advice and struck anyway.

The February Revolution was about to begin — and it would be driven not by parties but by women, workers, and (within days) soldiers.

Russia in Jan-Feb 1917: ~1.7m military dead, ~400% inflation, ministerial leapfrog continuing (Protopopov, Golitsyn), Tsar at Stavka Mogilev.
Petrograd: ~2.4m population (refugee-swollen); ~400,000 workers; ~200,000 soldiers in garrison; -26°C winter; bread rations cut to 1 lb/day.
Putilov strike trigger (18-22 Feb): lockout 22 Feb left ~30,000 workers on the streets — shock-troops of early revolution.
22 February (OS): Nicholas II left Petrograd for Stavka Mogilev against warnings — not in capital when revolution began.
Government complacency: Protopopov assured Tsar of control; regime had plans for repression but faith in own troops misplaced.

The revolutionary week (23-27 February 1917 OS)

In five days — from International Women's Day on 23 February to the Volynsky mutiny on 27 February — the Petrograd revolution went from a women's bread protest to the collapse of regime authority in the capital.

Thursday 23 February 1917 (OS) / 8 March 1917 (NS): International Women's Day. The February Revolution began with women textile workers in Petrograd's Vyborg district. Despite Bolshevik advice that the time was not right for major demonstrations, women workers struck on the morning of 23 February and called male workers out from the metal works along the Sampsonievsky Prospect.

By midday:

~90,000 workers were on strike in the Vyborg and Petrograd districts.
Crowds were marching toward the city centre carrying placards: 'Bread!', 'Down with the autocracy!', 'Down with the war!', 'Down with the German woman!' (a reference to Empress Alexandra).
Women played a central role — a striking feature of the day was the gender of the early demonstrators.
Demonstrators converged on Nevsky Prospect but were largely dispersed by police by evening.

Despite the dispersal, the day's significance was immediately clear: a mass strike movement had begun. Bolshevik and Menshevik organisations now scrambled to support it.

Friday 24 February (OS). The strikes spread dramatically:

~200,000 on strike (more than half the Petrograd industrial workforce).
Crowds again marched through the city; Nevsky Prospect was crowded with demonstrators.
Cossacks were deployed — but several Cossack units refused to charge the demonstrators with their traditional whips, a small but significant sign.
Slogans escalated: 'Down with the war!', 'Down with Nicholas!', 'Bread, peace, freedom!'.

Reports from Petrograd reached the Tsar at Stavka. He ordered the Petrograd garrison to be reinforced and to restore order.

Saturday 25 February (OS). The strikes became a general strike in Petrograd:

~250,000-300,000 on strike — almost all major factories.
Streetcars and most public services stopped.
Mounted Cossacks again refused to attack demonstrators in some encounters; one Cossack reportedly killed a police officer who had whipped a demonstrator.
Some shootings by police at demonstrators — a few casualties.

The mood was tense but no longer purely about bread; it was a political crisis. Liberal Duma deputies were openly discussing scenarios. Nicholas at Stavka, increasingly anxious, sent a telegram to General Khabalov, commander of the Petrograd Military District, ordering: 'Tomorrow I command the disorders in the capital to be ended.' The order required Khabalov to use armed force.

Sunday 26 February (OS): Bloody Sunday II. On Sunday 26 February — eerily echoing Bloody Sunday of 22 January 1905 — troops fired on demonstrators:

Demonstrations continued despite the Tsar's order; ~150,000 demonstrators on the streets.
At Znamenskaya Square (now Vosstaniya Square) on Nevsky Prospect, troops of the Pavlovsky Regiment opened fire on demonstrators; ~50+ killed, including women.
Smaller shootings occurred elsewhere.
Workers shocked but defiant: news spread rapidly; the killings reinforced rather than broke revolutionary determination.

That evening, the Pavlovsky Regiment's 4th Company mutinied — refusing to be deployed against demonstrators again. The officers were unable to restore discipline; the mutineers fled to other regiments to spread the news.

The mood at the front, in Petrograd, and at Stavka was now wildly divergent:

Demonstrators: enraged by the killings but not retreating.
Petrograd society: panicking and seeking political solutions through the Duma.
Soldiers in the garrison: shocked and uncertain.
Tsar at Stavka: still receiving reassuring reports from Protopopov.

Monday 27 February (OS): the decisive day. 27 February was the decisive day of the revolution:

The Volynsky Regiment mutiny (morning).

At dawn, soldiers of the Volynsky Regiment's Training Detachment — including those who had fired on demonstrators at Znamenskaya the day before — mutinied. They killed their commanding officer (Captain Lashkevich) and refused further deployment.
The Volynsky mutineers marched out of barracks to other regiments to spread the mutiny.
Litovsky Regiment joined.
Preobrazhensky Regiment (the most prestigious in the army, the Imperial Guards) joined.
Moscow Regiment joined.

By midday, most of the Petrograd garrison had refused to fire on demonstrators and was joining them.

The crucial transformation. This was the decisive moment of the revolution: the army — the Tsarist regime's ultimate instrument of repression — had changed sides. Without loyal troops, the regime could not suppress the demonstrations. All previous Tsarist crises (1905, 1825, 1773-74) had been crushed by loyal troops; in 1917, the troops would not fire.

Why did the army mutiny?

Petrograd garrison was unrepresentative of the army: largely reservists, recently conscripted, many older men or former workers; not the front-line peasant conscripts.
Many soldiers had relatives among the strikers — the workers were not 'others' to them.
Bread queues and food shortages affected soldiers' families.
Shock of firing on women on 26 February: many soldiers refused to do it again.
Officers had limited authority; the Volynsky's Captain Lashkevich was killed at the start of the mutiny.
General Khabalov (commander of Petrograd Military District) lost control; his reports to Stavka became increasingly desperate.
Anti-regime sympathy had spread to the garrison; soldiers had been politicised by the same conditions as the workers.

Petrograd in revolutionary hands (evening of 27 February). By evening of 27 February:

~80,000-100,000 soldiers of the Petrograd garrison had joined the revolution.
Workers had armed themselves by raiding arsenals.
Police stations were burned; police were attacked.
The Kresty Prison was stormed and political prisoners released.
Government buildings were attacked.
The Okhrana headquarters was destroyed (along with valuable secret-police archives).

By that evening, Petrograd was in revolutionary hands. The regime had lost control of its own capital in a single day.

Khabalov's collapse. General Khabalov, the commander supposed to restore order:

Had ~12,000 'loyal' troops at his disposal early on 27 February.
By evening, he had ~1,500 men holed up in the Admiralty.
His telegrams to Stavka grew increasingly desperate.
He effectively gave up by the night of 27-28 February.

The regime's military power in Petrograd had collapsed. Word reached Stavka but reports were still partial; the Tsar would not realise the full extent of the collapse until 1 March.

The wider point. The five days from 23 to 27 February showed a classic revolutionary escalation: bread protest → political demonstration → mass strike → state violence → army mutiny → regime collapse. The pattern was not unique to Russia (compare 1789 France, 1848 Europe) but the speed was extraordinary. In five days, the autocracy that had ruled Russia for over 300 years lost control of its capital.

What made February 1917 different from 1905 was the army's defection. In 1905 the army (returning from Manchuria) had crushed the Moscow Armed Uprising in December. In 1917 the Petrograd garrison joined the revolution. Without loyal troops, no regime can survive popular upheaval — a fact the Bolsheviks would also discover in October 1917.

Thursday 23 Feb 1917 (OS) / 8 March NS: International Women's Day — women textile workers in Vyborg struck; ~90,000 on strike; women called men out.
Friday 24 Feb: ~200,000 strikers; Cossacks refused to charge; Nicholas ordered reinforcements to Petrograd garrison.
Saturday 25 Feb: general strike (~250,000-300,000); Tsar telegrammed Khabalov: 'I command the disorders to be ended'.
Sunday 26 Feb: Pavlovsky Regiment fired on demonstrators at Znamenskaya Square — ~50+ killed; Pavlovsky 4th Company mutinied that evening.
Monday 27 Feb (decisive day): Volynsky Regiment mutinied + killed Captain Lashkevich; Litovsky, Preobrazhensky, Moscow regiments joined; ~80,000-100,000 soldiers joined revolution; Kresty Prison stormed; Petrograd in revolutionary hands.

Dual Power, the abdication, and the end of the dynasty

While the streets were in revolt, two parallel authorities formed: the Duma's Provisional Committee (formal authority) and the Petrograd Soviet (real authority over workers and soldiers). On 2 March 1917 Nicholas II abdicated; the Romanov dynasty ended.

The Duma's response (27 February). While the Petrograd garrison was mutinying on 27 February 1917 (OS), the Duma met in extraordinary session at the Tauride Palace. The Tsar had ordered the Duma prorogued; the Duma defied the order and continued meeting, marking its move into open opposition.

Late on 27 February, twelve Duma deputies formed the 'Provisional Committee of the State Duma for the Restoration of Order in the Capital and for the Establishment of Relations with Individuals and Institutions' — quickly abbreviated to the Duma's Provisional Committee. It was chaired by Mikhail Rodzianko (Duma Chairman, Octobrist) and included:

Pavel Milyukov (Kadets).
Alexander Kerensky (Trudovik/SR-affiliated; the only socialist).
Alexander Guchkov (Octobrists).
Vasily Shulgin (Nationalists).
And others.

The Duma's Provisional Committee declared itself responsible for restoring order. It claimed to be the only constitutionally legitimate authority during the crisis.

The Petrograd Soviet (27 February). At the same time, in the same building (the Tauride Palace) but in a different wing, the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was being re-formed — drawing on the 1905 model. It was chaired by Menshevik Nikolai Chkheidze with Alexander Kerensky (who would be in both bodies) as vice-chair.

The Soviet:

Included workers' delegates from factories.
From the next day (28 February), included soldiers' delegates from the mutinying regiments — making it the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' AND Soldiers' Deputies.
Met daily; eventually had ~3,000 delegates by mid-March.
Was dominated by Mensheviks and SRs; Bolsheviks were a small minority (Lenin still in Switzerland).

The 'Dual Power' (Dvoevlastiye). The result was the famous 'Dual Power' (Dvoevlastiye) that would define 1917 until the October Revolution:

The Provisional Government (formed from the Duma's Provisional Committee on 2 March) was the formal legal authority — internationally recognised, claiming to govern Russia.
The Petrograd Soviet was the real power in the capital: controlled workers' organisations, controlled the soldiers, controlled the railways (transport), controlled communications (telegraph).

The Provisional Government could not act effectively without Soviet support; the Soviet at first declined to take government itself (most socialists believed Russia needed a bourgeois-democratic stage before a socialist revolution). Both bodies were based in the Tauride Palace, in adjacent wings — a striking architectural image of dual power.

Soviet Order No. 1 (1 March 1917 OS / 14 March NS). The Petrograd Soviet's most consequential early act was Order No. 1, issued on 1 March 1917:

Soldiers' committees (soviets) were to be elected in every military unit.
These committees would control all weapons.
Officers' authority required confirmation by the soldiers' committees.
Officers could no longer impose the salute or other ranks-of-discipline outside the line of duty.
The Soviet's authority over the soldiers was paramount.

Order No. 1 effectively transferred command of the Petrograd garrison from the regular officers to the Soviet's elected committees. Soldiers and officers immediately understood that the old hierarchy was over.

The order was intended for the Petrograd garrison only but spread rapidly to the front. The discipline of the Russian army collapsed as a result. Many officers later blamed Order No. 1 for destroying military authority; the Soviet defended it as a necessary protection of the revolution against counter-revolution.

Nicholas II at Stavka and the abdication crisis (1-2 March). While Petrograd was reorganising itself, Nicholas II at Stavka Mogilev was finally trying to respond:

26-27 February: Nicholas received conflicting reports; Protopopov sent reassurances; Khabalov sent desperate telegrams; Rodzianko sent warnings.

Late 27 February: Nicholas decided to return to Tsarskoe Selo (his residence near Petrograd) and ordered military reinforcements to Petrograd under General Nikolai Ivanov to restore order.

28 February-1 March: Nicholas's train was diverted by railway workers (sympathetic to the revolution); his attempt to reach Tsarskoe Selo was blocked; he ended up at the Northern Front Headquarters at Pskov on 1 March 1917.

At Pskov, Nicholas met with General Nikolai Ruzsky (Northern Front commander). Rodzianko in Petrograd had been telegraphing army commanders begging them to support the Duma's request for the Tsar's abdication; the army high command had decided that Nicholas must go to save the dynasty and the war effort.

Stavka chief General Mikhail Alekseyev polled the army commanders:

General Brusilov (south-western front): agreed Nicholas must abdicate.
General Ruzsky (northern front): agreed.
General Evert (western front): agreed.
Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich (Caucasian front): agreed.
All recommended abdication.

This was an astonishing moment: the senior generals had effectively concluded the Tsar was no longer capable of leading the war effort. The army — the dynasty's ultimate base — had abandoned Nicholas.

The abdication (2 March 1917 OS / 15 March NS). At Pskov on 2 March 1917, two Duma deputies arrived to negotiate with Nicholas:

Alexander Guchkov (Octobrist, former Duma Chairman).
Vasily Shulgin (Nationalist Duma deputy).

They presented the Duma's demand: Nicholas should abdicate. Nicholas, after consulting his generals and his own conscience, agreed.

The act of abdication was written by Nicholas himself:

He abdicated in favour of his son Tsarevich Alexei.
His personal physician advised that Alexei's haemophilia made him unfit for the throne.
Nicholas then revised the abdication to skip his son and abdicate in favour of his brother, Grand Duke Mikhail.

The signed abdication document was handed to Guchkov and Shulgin around midnight on 2 March 1917 (OS).

Grand Duke Mikhail refuses (3 March). On 3 March 1917 (OS) / 16 March NS, Grand Duke Mikhail Romanov met with members of the Duma's Provisional Committee in Petrograd. They asked him to take the throne. Mikhail consulted Rodzianko and Milyukov, who advised:

Milyukov: take the throne to preserve the constitutional monarchy.
Rodzianko and Kerensky: refuse — public mood was too anti-monarchy.

Mikhail decided to refuse the throne, conditional on a future Constituent Assembly deciding Russia's form of government. He issued a manifesto deferring to the will of the future assembly.

The Romanov dynasty (which had ruled Russia since 1613) ended on 3 March 1917.

The new authority: Provisional Government (2-3 March). On 2 March 1917, the Duma's Provisional Committee had agreed with the Petrograd Soviet on the formation of a Provisional Government to rule Russia until a Constituent Assembly could be elected.

Composition of the first Provisional Government:

Prince Georgy Lvov (Kadet aristocrat, head of the Zemstvo Union): Prime Minister.
Pavel Milyukov (Kadets): Foreign Minister.
Alexander Guchkov (Octobrists): War Minister.
Alexander Kerensky (Trudovik/SR): Minister of Justice — the only socialist in the cabinet; also member of the Petrograd Soviet, providing crucial link.
Mikhail Tereshchenko (sugar magnate): Finance Minister.
And other liberal-conservative figures.

The government was liberal-conservative in composition but operated alongside the socialist-dominated Petrograd Soviet. Russia had become a republic in everything but constitutional form.

The Soviet's conditional support. The Petrograd Soviet conditionally supported the Provisional Government, requiring:

Full civil liberties (granted).
Amnesty for political prisoners (granted — political prisoners had already been released by the crowds on 27 February).
Universal suffrage for the future Constituent Assembly.
Replacement of police with people's militia.
No special police force.
No movement of the Petrograd garrison out of the city (a crucial demand protecting the revolution).

The Provisional Government accepted these conditions, which formed the basis of Dual Power.

Why the regime collapsed in five days. The Tsarist regime collapsed in February 1917 in five days for specific reasons:

Army defected: the ultimate base of the regime turned on it (27 February).
Tsar was absent: Nicholas was at Stavka, not in Petrograd.
Elite alienation: even Octobrists and grand dukes wanted Nicholas to go.
No alternative leadership in the regime: ministers were incompetent; no one took charge.
Mass civilian discontent: bread queues, strikes, anti-war sentiment all converged.
Generals refused to defend the regime: the army high command supported abdication.
The dynasty had no popular base left: even the imperial family was alienated.

The Tsar in his diary on 2 March 1917 wrote:

'All around treason, cowardice and deceit.'

The phrase captures the regime's view but also reveals Nicholas's failure to understand his own role. The dynasty had not been betrayed; it had betrayed Russia's expectations.

The wider point. The February Revolution was largely spontaneous: no party led it, no leader directed it; women textile workers started it, soldiers' mutinies completed it, Duma deputies and Soviet activists organised its political consequences. The Bolsheviks (with Lenin in Switzerland) played almost no role in February 1917.

The Tsarist regime fell because almost no one was prepared to defend it any longer. The structural causes had been building since the 19th century; WWI had brought them all to crisis; the bread crisis of February 1917 was the spark. Within five days, a 300-year dynasty was over.

The next chapter would be the contest over what kind of revolution had begun — and who would shape its future. That story is Topic 12.

27 Feb: Duma's Provisional Committee formed (Rodzianko chair, Milyukov, Kerensky, Guchkov); Petrograd Soviet re-formed in same building (Chkheidze chair).
Dual Power: Provisional Government (formal legal authority) + Petrograd Soviet (real power over workers/soldiers/transport/communications).
Soviet Order No. 1 (1 March OS): soldiers' committees in every unit; officers' authority required Soviet confirmation; collapsed military discipline.
Nicholas's train diverted to Pskov 1 March; generals (Alekseyev poll: Brusilov, Ruzsky, Evert, Grand Duke Nicholas) recommended abdication.
2 March 1917 OS (15 March NS): Nicholas abdicated, first for Alexei then for brother Grand Duke Mikhail; Mikhail refused throne 3 March; Romanov dynasty (since 1613) ended.

Why the Tsar fell so quickly

The Tsarist regime collapsed in five days because army loyalty (the regime's ultimate base) defected; the Tsar was absent; elite alienation extended even to the imperial family; mass civilian discontent converged with military mutiny.

The puzzle of February 1917. The most striking feature of the February Revolution is its speed. The Tsarist regime had ruled Russia for over 300 years; it had survived 1825, the Crimean War, 1881, 1905, and 30 months of WWI. Yet it collapsed in five days — between 23 and 27 February 1917 (OS).

How? Historians have given several converging explanations.

1. The army defected. The single most important reason: the Petrograd garrison mutinied on 27 February and joined the revolution. Without loyal troops, no regime can suppress popular upheaval; the Tsarist regime had relied on military force to crush 1825, 1905, and previous unrest. In 1917, the troops would not fire.

Why did this army defect when previous armies had not?

Petrograd garrison was unrepresentative: largely reservists, older men, recent conscripts; many were former workers; many had family among the strikers.
WWI experience: 30 months of disastrous war had eroded soldier loyalty.
Conditions in the garrison: food shortages, fuel shortages, low pay, poor accommodation, no leave.
Shock of 26 February killings: many soldiers (especially Pavlovsky 4th Company) refused to fire on women and unarmed demonstrators again.
No effective officer authority: Captain Lashkevich was killed by his own troops; General Khabalov could not regain control; the chain of command broke down quickly.

The Petrograd garrison in 1917 was different from the army that had crushed Moscow in 1905 — and different in ways that meant it would not crush its own civilian population.

2. The Tsar was absent. Nicholas II was at Stavka Mogilev (~1,000 km from Petrograd) when the revolution began. He was not in the capital to manage the crisis personally, give orders, rally his supporters, or threaten his enemies. By the time he tried to return on 28 February, railway workers diverted his train; he ended up at Pskov on 1 March, hundreds of miles from where decisions were being made. His personal presence might have changed nothing — but his absence made everything worse.

Some historians argue that even if Nicholas had been in Petrograd, the revolution would still have succeeded (the structural causes were too deep). But his absence at the critical moment meant no central regime figure was directing the response. Empress Alexandra was politically isolated and looking after her sick children; Protopopov was incompetent and increasingly unstable; the cabinet was disorganised.

3. Elite alienation extended into the imperial family. By February 1917, even the regime's natural supporters had concluded that the Tsar must go:

Generals: General Alekseyev (Stavka chief) polled commanders; all recommended abdication.
Duma: even Octobrists alienated since the Progressive Bloc (August 1915).
Aristocracy: had murdered Rasputin in December 1916.
Grand Dukes: were plotting coups by early 1917.
British and French ambassadors: were privately conveying warnings.

When the Tsar's own generals collectively recommended his abdication on 1-2 March 1917, the regime had nothing left to stand on. The dynasty could not survive losing the army's loyalty, and the army high command had decided Nicholas must go to save what was left.

4. Mass civilian discontent converged with military mutiny. The February Revolution was unique in combining:

Mass civilian protest (women + workers).
Military mutiny (Petrograd garrison).
Elite political reorganisation (Duma's Provisional Committee).
Soviet formation (workers' and soldiers' council).

Previous Tsarist crises had had some of these elements but not all simultaneously. 1905 had had massive civilian protest and some military mutiny (Potemkin) but the bulk of the army remained loyal. 1825 had been only an elite military conspiracy. 1917 combined all elements.

The bread queues + Putilov lockout + International Women's Day demonstrations + Volynsky mutiny + Duma Provisional Committee + Soviet formation all happened within five days. The regime could not respond to a multi-front crisis when each front was independently capable of breaking it.

5. The regime had no political base. By 1917 the Tsarist regime had alienated every major social group:

Workers: economic crisis, no political rights, strikes returning to 1905 levels.
Peasants: ~15 million conscripted; land hunger; war-weariness.
Soldiers: 30 months of disaster; ~1.7 million dead; conditions poor.
Liberal middle class: Progressive Bloc rejected; Milyukov's 'stupidity or treason' speech.
Octobrists: alienated since August 1915.
Conservative aristocracy: murdered Rasputin December 1916.
Imperial family: grand dukes plotting coups.
National minorities: Russification continued; ~7m refugees from western territories.
Even the Russian Orthodox Church: increasingly alienated.

The regime had no political base left except the small court circle. When the army defected on 27 February, there was no one prepared to defend the regime.

6. The structural causes had been building for decades. The February Revolution succeeded so quickly because the structural causes were ready. From the 19th-century mismatch between modernising economy and medieval autocracy (Topic 11.1), through the unresolved 1905 Revolution and Stolypin's incomplete reforms (Topic 11.2), through WWI's exposure and intensification of every weakness (Topic 11.3) — the regime had been weakening for decades. By February 1917, almost everything was ready except the trigger.

The trigger came in the bread queues of Petrograd on 23 February — but the trigger could have come in many other forms. The regime was ripe to fall; it would fall when something pushed it.

7. Spontaneity and lack of party leadership. Crucially, the February Revolution was largely spontaneous:

No party led it: Bolsheviks had advised against demonstrations on 23 February; SRs and Mensheviks had not planned a revolution; the women textile workers acted on their own initiative.
No single leader directed it: there was no Lenin or Robespierre coordinating.
The Petrograd Soviet was re-formed only on 27 February — after the revolution had effectively succeeded.
The Duma's Provisional Committee was a reaction, not a leadership.

The Bolsheviks in particular played almost no role in February 1917. Lenin was in Switzerland; Trotsky was in New York; Stalin was in Siberian exile. The Bolsheviks in Petrograd were a small underground group that had not even predicted the revolution. Lenin only heard of it from Swiss newspapers on 2 March.

This spontaneity matters for understanding what followed:

Because no party owned February, no party could direct it.
The new authorities (Provisional Government, Soviet) were ad hoc responses, not pre-planned regimes.
The contest over what the revolution meant — and who would shape its future — would be intense (Topic 12).

The verdict. The Tsarist regime fell so quickly in February 1917 because:

The army defected at the critical moment (decisive).
The Tsar was absent at Stavka.
Elite alienation extended even into the imperial family.
Mass civilian discontent converged with military mutiny.
The regime had no political base left.
Structural causes had been building for decades.
Spontaneity meant no party could prevent or moderate the collapse.

Compared to 1905: the regime had survived then because the army remained loyal, the opposition was divided, and the regime could offer concessions. In 1917 the army defected, the opposition was unified in its rejection of the Tsar, and the regime had no credible concessions to offer (Nicholas's abdication was the only concession left). The regime had run out of options.

The wider significance. The February Revolution shows what happens when a regime loses its ultimate base — the army. It also shows the importance of spontaneous popular action: history is not always made by leaders; sometimes women textile workers in a bread queue change the world. And it shows the fragility of even apparently solid regimes: 300 years of Romanov rule ended in 5 days because the conditions were ready for collapse and the structural causes had become impossible to manage.

The Romanovs ended on 3 March 1917. The October Revolution would come 8 months later. But February 1917 was the moment when the old Russia died.

Army defected: Petrograd garrison mutinied 27 Feb; without loyal troops, regime could not survive. Garrison unrepresentative (reservists, older men, ex-workers).
Tsar absent at Stavka (~1,000 km from Petrograd); train diverted to Pskov 1 March; could not manage crisis personally.
Elite alienation: generals (Alekseyev poll), Duma (since Progressive Bloc), aristocracy (Rasputin's murder Dec 1916), grand dukes plotting; British/French warnings.
Mass civilian + military convergence: bread queues + Putilov lockout + Women's Day + Volynsky mutiny + Duma + Soviet all within 5 days.
Regime had no political base left except small court circle; structural causes building since 19th century; spontaneity (no party led February, Lenin in Switzerland).

Aftermath: the Provisional Government, Dual Power, and what February meant

The February Revolution produced 'Dual Power' between the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet — an unstable arrangement that would last 8 months before the October Revolution. February ended the dynasty but left Russia's political future open.

The new regime (March 1917). By 3 March 1917 Russia had a new political structure:

Provisional Government under Prince Lvov (with Milyukov, Guchkov, Kerensky, Tereshchenko, etc.) as the formal legal authority.
Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies as a parallel authority controlling workers, soldiers, transport, communications.
Dual Power (Dvoevlastiye) as the operative arrangement: the Provisional Government governed only in cooperation with the Soviet.
Romanov dynasty ended; Nicholas and his family were under house arrest at Tsarskoe Selo.

This was not a stable settlement but a transitional arrangement until a Constituent Assembly could be elected to determine Russia's permanent form of government.

The Soviet's choice not to take power. A crucial point: the Petrograd Soviet had the power to take government on 27 February but chose not to. Why?

Most Soviet leaders (Mensheviks, SRs) believed:

Marx's stage theory of history: Russia must first complete its bourgeois-democratic revolution before a socialist revolution was possible.
The Provisional Government should govern the bourgeois-democratic stage.
The Soviet should serve as revolutionary watchdog ensuring the Provisional Government honoured democratic commitments.
A socialist revolution was for the future.

This was the dominant socialist analysis in March 1917. Only the Bolsheviks (when Lenin returned in April 1917) would challenge it with the 'April Theses' demanding 'all power to the Soviets' (Topic 12).

Order No. 1 and the army. The Petrograd Soviet's Order No. 1 (1 March 1917) had major consequences for the Russian army:

Soldiers' committees were elected in every unit.
Officers' authority required Soviet confirmation.
Officers could no longer impose discipline outside the line of duty.

The order spread from the Petrograd garrison to the front; the Russian army's discipline collapsed rapidly through spring 1917. Mass desertion would become a central problem of the Provisional Government's failed war effort.

Popular gains: the freest Russia. The February Revolution made Russia temporarily the freest country in the world:

Civil liberties: full freedom of speech, press, assembly, association.
Political prisoners released.
Death penalty abolished (for civilian crimes).
Police replaced by people's militia.
Universal suffrage for the future Constituent Assembly.
National minorities: Polish, Finnish, Ukrainian, Jewish populations welcomed.
Eight-hour working day: granted by employers under Soviet pressure.

Lenin in Switzerland reportedly read of these freedoms with mixed feelings — bourgeois freedoms were good but insufficient for socialist revolution.

Continuing problems. But the February Revolution did not solve Russia's fundamental problems:

War: continued; Provisional Government committed to fighting on.
Land: peasants still demanded redistribution; Provisional Government deferred decisions to Constituent Assembly.
Food: shortages continued; transport remained chaotic.
Workers: still wanted higher wages; inflation continued.
Minorities: demanded autonomy or independence; Provisional Government was inconsistent.
Dual Power: produced political stalemate.

These unresolved problems would drive the further radicalisation of 1917 and eventually the October Revolution.

Lenin's return (3 April 1917). Vladimir Lenin had been in Swiss exile when the February Revolution began. He was eager to return to Russia but had to cross Germany — Britain and France would not let him travel through Allied territory. The German government decided to transport Lenin through Germany in a 'sealed train' (April 1917) in the hope that he would disrupt Russia's war effort.

Lenin arrived at the Finland Station in Petrograd on 3 April 1917. His 'April Theses' would transform Bolshevik policy and set up the October Revolution (Topic 12).

Nicholas II's fate. After his abdication:

March 1917: confined to Tsarskoe Selo with his family.
August 1917: transferred to Tobolsk in Siberia (away from Petrograd radicals).
April 1918: moved to Ekaterinburg in the Urals (Bolshevik decision).
17 July 1918: Nicholas, Alexandra, their five children, and four servants were murdered by Bolsheviks in the basement of the Ipatiev House — to prevent White rescue.

The bodies were thrown down a mineshaft and later moved; most remains were found in 1991 and reburied in St Petersburg in 1998. Alexei and Maria's bodies were found separately in 2007. The Russian Orthodox Church canonised Nicholas II and his family as 'passion bearers' (Saint Nicholas II) in 2000.

The wider significance of February 1917. February 1917 ended one Russia and opened the question of what Russia would become. The Romanov dynasty (since 1613) was over; the autocracy that had ruled Russia since Ivan III (1462) was finished; the political structure that had survived for 300+ years collapsed in 5 days.

What February did:

Ended the Tsarist regime.
Released civil liberties.
Created Dual Power.
Set up the contest over Russia's future.

What February did not do:

End the war.
Solve land hunger.
Solve food shortages.
Resolve minority questions.
Determine Russia's permanent political structure.

These problems remained for the Provisional Government and Soviet to resolve — and they would not be resolved before the October Revolution (Topic 12) gave the Bolsheviks the chance to determine Russia's future.

The verdict on the February Revolution. February 1917 was:

Spontaneous: not led by any party.
Democratic: produced civil liberties unprecedented in Russian history.
Incomplete: did not solve the underlying problems.
Unstable: Dual Power was a recipe for political conflict.
Transitional: a constituent assembly was supposed to determine Russia's future.

The February Revolution was the moment when 300 years of Romanov autocracy ended — but it was the beginning of Russia's 1917 transformation, not the end. The Tsar had fallen; what Russia would become was undecided. The contest over the future would last through 1917 and the Civil War (1918-21) before being decided by Bolshevik victory.

For Topic 11: the question was 'Why did the Tsarist regime collapse in 1917?' The answer is: structural weaknesses building since the 19th century (Topic 11.1); unresolved problems after 1905 (Topic 11.2); WWI's exposure and intensification of weakness (Topic 11.3); and the immediate collapse of the regime in February 1917 (Topic 11.4) when army defection, Tsar's absence, elite alienation, and mass civilian discontent converged in 5 days.

For Topic 12: the question becomes how the Bolsheviks — with Lenin returning on 3 April — would seize power 8 months later. The political space opened by February 1917 would be filled by October 1917.

The Tsar had fallen. The revolution was just beginning.

Provisional Government formed 2 March (Lvov PM, Milyukov, Guchkov, Kerensky, Tereshchenko) as formal legal authority; Petrograd Soviet as parallel authority.
Dual Power (Dvoevlastiye): unstable but operative arrangement; Soviet had real power over workers/soldiers/transport but chose not to take government (Marx's stage theory).
February made Russia temporarily freest country in world: civil liberties, political prisoners released, death penalty abolished, universal suffrage promised; 8-hour day.
Continuing problems: war, land, food, minorities, Dual Power — drove radicalisation of 1917; Lenin returned 3 April 1917 (German 'sealed train') with April Theses.
Nicholas II under house arrest; eventually murdered with family at Ekaterinburg 17 July 1918; canonised by Russian Orthodox Church 2000.

Quick recap

Petrograd in mid-Feb 1917: ~1.7m military dead, ~400% inflation, bread queues, ministerial leapfrog (Protopopov, Golitsyn); Tsar at Stavka Mogilev.
Putilov lockout (22 Feb) released ~30,000 workers onto streets; Nicholas left Petrograd same day for Stavka.
23 Feb (Women's Day) - 27 Feb: women textile workers + Putilov struck → ~250,000 strikers by 25 Feb → Pavlovsky shooting at Znamenskaya 26 Feb (~50 killed) → Volynsky Regiment mutinied 27 Feb (Captain Lashkevich killed); ~80,000-100,000 soldiers joined revolution.
Duma's Provisional Committee (27 Feb, Rodzianko chair) and Petrograd Soviet (re-formed 27 Feb, Chkheidze chair) emerged simultaneously — Dual Power.
Soviet Order No. 1 (1 March): soldiers' committees in every unit; officers' authority required Soviet confirmation; military discipline collapsed.
Nicholas's train diverted to Pskov 1 March; generals (Alekseyev poll: Brusilov, Ruzsky, Evert, Grand Duke Nicholas) all recommended abdication.
2 March 1917 OS (15 March NS): Nicholas abdicated for himself and Alexei (haemophilia); transferred to brother Grand Duke Mikhail; Mikhail refused 3 March pending Constituent Assembly; Romanov dynasty (since 1613) ended.
Provisional Government (Lvov PM) + Petrograd Soviet = Dual Power; Lenin returned 3 April 1917; Nicholas + family murdered Ekaterinburg 17 July 1918.

How it’s examined

The collapse subtopic of Topic 11.

Paper 1 (a) 4 marks — Describe the events of International Women's Day 1917 / the Volynsky Regiment mutiny / the Petrograd Soviet's Order No. 1 / Nicholas II's abdication.
Paper 1 (b) 6 marks — Why did the Petrograd garrison mutiny in February 1917? / Why did Nicholas II abdicate?
Paper 1 (c) 10 marks — 'The Tsar fell in February 1917 mainly because of the army's defection.' How far do you agree?
Paper 4 (a) 15 marks — Write an account of the events of the February Revolution between 23 February and 3 March 1917.
Paper 4 (b) 25 marks — 'The Tsarist regime collapsed in 1917 because of WWI.' How important was WWI in causing the regime's collapse? Explain your answer.
Paper 2 — sources include photographs of Petrograd queues, Women's Day demonstrators, the Volynsky mutiny, Rodzianko, Nicholas at Pskov, the abdication document.

Sources: Cambridge IGCSE History 0470 Syllabus (for examination in 2027 and 2028); Figes, O. A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891-1924 (Pimlico, 1996); Service, R. The Russian Revolution 1900-1927 (Palgrave Macmillan, 4th ed. 2009); Pipes, R. The Russian Revolution (Vintage, 1991); Hasegawa, T. The February Revolution: Petrograd 1917 (Brill, 2017). Last reviewed 2026-05-31.

Take this whole topic with you

Step-by-step worked examples — The February/March 1917 Revolution and the Fall of the Tsar

Step-by-step solutions to past-paper-style questions on the february/march 1917 revolution and the fall of the tsar, written exactly the way a tutor would explain them at the board.

1Describe the February Revolution
Getting started• Paper 1 Section A part (a) — 4 marks• paper-1-a, February Revolution
Question
Describe the events of the February Revolution in Petrograd between 23 and 27 February 1917 (Old Style). (4 marks)
Step-by-step solution
1. Step 1
  Four facts: 23 Feb Women's Day strikes (~90,000); 25 Feb general strike (~250,000); 26 Feb Pavlovsky fires on Znamenskaya (~50 killed); 27 Feb Volynsky mutiny — army joined revolution.
Answer
The February Revolution unfolded over five days in Petrograd. First, on Thursday 23 February 1917 (Old Style; 8 March New Style — International Women's Day), women textile workers in the Vyborg district struck and called male workers out from neighbouring factories; ~90,000 workers were on strike that day, demanding 'Bread!', 'Down with autocracy!' and 'Down with the war!'. Second, the strikes spread rapidly: by Friday 24 February ~200,000 were on strike, with Cossacks refusing to charge demonstrators; by Saturday 25 February Petrograd was in a near-general strike (~250,000-300,000 striking) and the Tsar telegrammed General Khabalov ordering an end to disorders by force. Third, on Sunday 26 February troops of the Pavlovsky Regiment fired on demonstrators at Znamenskaya Square on Nevsky Prospect, killing approximately 50+ people including women; the Pavlovsky 4th Company mutinied that evening, refusing further deployment. Fourth, the decisive day was Monday 27 February: the Volynsky Regiment's Training Detachment mutinied at dawn, killing Captain Lashkevich and marching out to spread the mutiny; the Litovsky, Preobrazhensky and Moscow regiments joined through the day; by evening ~80,000-100,000 soldiers of the Petrograd garrison had joined the revolution; workers had armed themselves; police stations were burned; the Kresty Prison was stormed; the Okhrana headquarters was destroyed. Petrograd was in revolutionary hands. The same day the Duma's Provisional Committee (Rodzianko, Milyukov, Kerensky) and the Petrograd Soviet (Chkheidze chair) were formed at the Tauride Palace.
Examiner tip
Four points: 23 Feb Women's Day, escalation through 25 Feb, 26 Feb Pavlovsky firing, 27 Feb Volynsky mutiny + garrison defection + revolutionary takeover. Specific dates throughout.
2Describe Nicholas II's abdication
Getting started• Paper 1 Section A part (a) — 4 marks• paper-1-a, abdication
Question
Describe Nicholas II's abdication on 2 March 1917 (Old Style). (4 marks)
Step-by-step solution
1. Step 1
  Four facts: train diverted to Pskov 1 March; generals' poll recommended abdication; Guchkov + Shulgin at Pskov 2 March; abdicated for Alexei then brother Mikhail; Mikhail refused 3 March.
Answer
Nicholas II's abdication ended over 300 years of Romanov rule. First, after the Petrograd garrison joined the revolution on 27 February, Nicholas tried to return from Stavka Mogilev to Petrograd; his train was diverted by sympathetic railway workers and he ended up at the Northern Front Headquarters at Pskov on 1 March 1917. Second, Stavka chief General Mikhail Alekseyev polled the army commanders — Brusilov (south-western), Ruzsky (northern), Evert (western), and Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich (Caucasian) — all of whom recommended abdication; the generals had concluded that Nicholas must go to save the war effort and the dynasty. Third, on 2 March 1917 (Old Style; 15 March New Style), Duma deputies Alexander Guchkov (Octobrist) and Vasily Shulgin (Nationalist) arrived at Pskov; Nicholas signed the abdication document he had written himself: first in favour of his son Tsarevich Alexei, then — on his personal physician's advice that Alexei's haemophilia made him unfit — revised in favour of his brother Grand Duke Mikhail. The Tsar wrote in his diary that day: 'All around treason, cowardice and deceit.' Fourth, on 3 March 1917, Grand Duke Mikhail refused the throne on the advice of Rodzianko and Kerensky, conditional on a future Constituent Assembly deciding Russia's form of government. The Romanov dynasty, which had ruled Russia since 1613, ended. A Provisional Government under Prince Lvov took office, operating alongside the Petrograd Soviet in 'Dual Power' (Dvoevlastiye).
Examiner tip
Four points: train diverted to Pskov, generals' poll, Guchkov/Shulgin at Pskov + Alexei then Mikhail, Mikhail's refusal + end of Romanovs + Dual Power. Specific dates and names throughout.
3Paper 4: Write an account of how the Tsar fell in 1917
Building confidence• Paper 4 part (a) — 15 marks• paper-4-a, write an account, fall of Tsar
Question
Write an account of the events leading to the fall of Tsar Nicholas II between February and March 1917. (15 marks)
Step-by-step solution
1. Step 1
  Structure: Petrograd eve of revolution → 23-27 Feb (Women's Day → Volynsky mutiny → garrison defects) → Duma + Soviet formation → Nicholas's train diverted → generals' recommendation → 2 March abdication → Mikhail refuses → Romanovs end + Provisional Govt formed.
Answer
In just nine days between 22 February and 3 March 1917 (Old Style), the Tsarist regime that had ruled Russia since 1613 collapsed entirely. The combination of food crisis, women's protest, mass strikes, troop mutinies, Duma reaction, and elite alienation produced the most rapid major-state collapse of the twentieth century. Petrograd on the eve of revolution. By February 1917 Petrograd was in multiple crises: ~1.2 million strikers in January-February alone; severe cold (-26°C); food shortages with bread rations cut to 1 lb/day; queues from 4 a.m.; ~7 million refugees displaced; ministerial leapfrog (Protopopov as Interior Minister, Golitsyn as PM). The Putilov Works — Russia's largest factory — was the centre of unrest; on 18 February a section of Putilov workers struck; on 22 February the management locked out the entire workforce of ~30,000, leaving them on the streets. The same day, 22 February, Nicholas II left Petrograd for Stavka Mogilev — against ministerial warnings — for what he considered routine military business; his departure from the capital at the critical moment would prove disastrous. The revolutionary week (23-27 February 1917 OS). Thursday 23 February (International Women's Day): women textile workers in the Vyborg district struck and called male workers out from the metal works; ~90,000 were on strike that day; demonstrators marched toward Nevsky Prospect carrying placards demanding 'Bread!', 'Down with autocracy!', 'Down with the war!', 'Down with the German woman!' (a reference to Empress Alexandra). The Bolsheviks had advised against major demonstrations, fearing they were premature; the women workers ignored them. Friday 24 February: strikes spread to ~200,000; Cossacks deployed but several units refused to charge with their traditional whips. Nicholas at Stavka ordered Petrograd garrison reinforcements. Saturday 25 February: near-general strike (~250,000-300,000); Nicholas telegrammed General Khabalov: 'Tomorrow I command the disorders to be ended.' Sunday 26 February: troops of the Pavlovsky Regiment fired on demonstrators at Znamenskaya Square on Nevsky Prospect, killing ~50+ including women; the Pavlovsky 4th Company mutinied that evening, refusing further deployment. Monday 27 February (decisive day): at dawn, the Volynsky Regiment's Training Detachment mutinied — soldiers who had fired on demonstrators the day before killed their commanding officer Captain Lashkevich and refused further deployment; they marched to other regiments to spread the mutiny. The Litovsky Regiment joined; then the Preobrazhensky Regiment (the most prestigious Imperial Guard); then the Moscow Regiment. By evening ~80,000-100,000 soldiers of the Petrograd garrison had joined the revolution. Workers armed themselves by raiding arsenals; police stations were burned; the Kresty Prison was stormed and political prisoners released; the Okhrana headquarters was destroyed. Petrograd was in revolutionary hands. The Duma and Soviet form (27 February). The same day, two parallel authorities emerged at the Tauride Palace. The Duma's Provisional Committee was formed by ~12 deputies — chaired by Mikhail Rodzianko (Octobrist, Duma Chairman) with Pavel Milyukov (Kadets), Alexander Kerensky (Trudovik), Alexander Guchkov (Octobrists), Vasily Shulgin (Nationalists). The Tsar had ordered the Duma prorogued; the Duma defied the order. In the adjacent wing, the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was re-formed — chaired by Menshevik Nikolai Chkheidze with Kerensky as vice-chair — drawing on the 1905 model. Dual Power (Dvoevlastiye) had begun. The Soviet's Order No. 1 (1 March OS). The Soviet's most consequential early act was Order No. 1: soldiers' committees were to be elected in every unit; officers' authority required Soviet confirmation; officers could no longer impose discipline outside the line of duty; the Soviet's authority over the soldiers was paramount. The order transferred command of the Petrograd garrison from regular officers to elected committees and spread to the front, collapsing Russian army discipline. Nicholas's failed return. Nicholas at Stavka was receiving conflicting reports. Late on 27 February he decided to return to Tsarskoe Selo and ordered General Nikolai Ivanov to lead military reinforcements to Petrograd. 28 February-1 March: Nicholas's train was diverted by sympathetic railway workers; his attempt to reach Tsarskoe Selo was blocked; he ended up at the Northern Front Headquarters at Pskov on 1 March 1917. The military reinforcements were also turned back; the regime's military response collapsed. The generals' poll. At Stavka, General Mikhail Alekseyev (Stavka chief) polled the army commanders by telegram: General Brusilov (south-western), General Ruzsky (northern), General Evert (western), Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich (Caucasian) — all recommended abdication. The army high command had concluded that Nicholas must go to save the war effort and the dynasty. This was the astonishing moment when the dynasty's own commanders abandoned it. Abdication (2 March 1917 OS). At Pskov on 2 March 1917, two Duma deputies — Alexander Guchkov and Vasily Shulgin — arrived to negotiate with Nicholas. They presented the Duma's demand: Nicholas should abdicate. Nicholas, after consulting his generals and his own conscience, agreed. He wrote the abdication document himself: first in favour of his son Tsarevich Alexei; then — on his personal physician's advice that Alexei's haemophilia made him unfit to take responsibility for the throne — revised in favour of his brother Grand Duke Mikhail. The signed abdication was handed to Guchkov and Shulgin around midnight on 2 March. Nicholas wrote in his diary: 'All around treason, cowardice and deceit.' Mikhail's refusal (3 March). On 3 March 1917, Grand Duke Mikhail met with Duma deputies in Petrograd. They asked him to take the throne. Milyukov urged him to do so (to preserve constitutional monarchy); Rodzianko and Kerensky advised refusal (public mood too anti-monarchy). Mikhail refused the throne, conditional on a future Constituent Assembly deciding Russia's form of government. The Romanov dynasty, which had ruled Russia since 1613, ended on 3 March 1917. The Provisional Government. A Provisional Government under Prince Georgy Lvov (Kadet aristocrat, head of the Zemstvo Union) took office: Milyukov Foreign Minister, Guchkov War Minister, Kerensky Justice Minister (and only socialist), Tereshchenko Finance Minister, and others. The Provisional Government was the formal legal authority; the Petrograd Soviet was the real power over workers, soldiers, transport, communications. Dual Power would last 8 months until October 1917. Why the regime fell so quickly. The Tsar fell in five days for specific reasons: the army defected (Petrograd garrison mutiny 27 Feb — the decisive moment); the Tsar was absent at Stavka, unable to manage the crisis personally; elite alienation extended even to the imperial family and the generals; mass civilian discontent converged with military mutiny; the regime had no political base left; structural causes (Topics 11.1-11.3) had been building for decades. The wider point. The February Revolution was largely spontaneous: no party led it, no leader directed it; women textile workers started it, soldiers completed it, Duma deputies and Soviet activists organised its political consequences. The Bolsheviks played almost no role — Lenin was in Switzerland (he heard of the revolution from newspapers on 2 March); Trotsky was in New York; Stalin was in Siberian exile. The Tsarist regime fell because almost no one was prepared to defend it any longer. The 300-year Romanov dynasty ended in 9 days — not because of revolutionary parties but because of women in bread queues, mutinying soldiers, and dynasty's generals telling the Tsar to go. By 3 March 1917, the old Russia was over; what would replace it remained to be decided. The Bolsheviks would seize the opportunity 8 months later (Topic 12).
Examiner tip
Paper 4 (a) account (~1,200 words): structured by phase (eve → revolutionary week → Duma + Soviet → Order No. 1 → Nicholas's failed return → generals' poll → abdication → Mikhail refuses → Provisional Government → why so quickly → wider point), specific dates throughout, sustained analytical framing.
4Explain why the Petrograd garrison joined the revolution
Building confidence• Paper 1 Section A part (b) — 6 marks• paper-1-b, army mutiny
Question
Why did the Petrograd garrison mutiny in February 1917? (6 marks)
Step-by-step solution
1. Step 1
  Three reasons: (1) garrison unrepresentative (reservists, older men, ex-workers with family among strikers); (2) WWI exhaustion + bad conditions; (3) shock of 26 Feb killings + breakdown of officer authority.
Answer
The Petrograd garrison mutinied in February 1917 for three connected reasons. First, the Petrograd garrison was unrepresentative of the wider Russian army and was politically sympathetic to the strikers. The garrison contained ~200,000 troops by February 1917 — mostly reservists, older men, and recent conscripts, including many former Petrograd workers who had been called up as the war went on. Many soldiers had relatives among the strikers — the women textile workers and Putilov men were not 'others' to them but their wives, mothers, neighbours, and former workmates. Food shortages and bread queues affected soldiers' families directly; the same revolutionary atmosphere in Petrograd society reached the barracks; anti-regime sentiment had spread through the garrison along with the bread crisis. This was not the army that had crushed the Moscow Armed Uprising in December 1905 — it was a politicised, ageing, urbanised garrison that identified with the workers rather than with the regime. Second, WWI exhaustion and bad conditions had broken army morale. By February 1917 Russia had suffered ~1.7 million military dead, ~3 million wounded, ~2.5 million POWs. The Brusilov Offensive of 1916 had cost ~1 million Russian casualties for tactical gains that did not change the war. Soldiers in the garrison lived in poor conditions: inadequate food, fuel shortages in winter 1916-17 (-26°C in some weeks), low pay, no leave, overcrowded barracks. The regime's prestige had been destroyed by 30 months of disasters. Soldiers had no reason to die for a regime that could not feed them, equip them, or end the war. The ministerial leapfrog under Empress Alexandra and Rasputin's legacy had made the government visibly dysfunctional. Third, the shock of the 26 February killings and the breakdown of officer authority on 27 February were the decisive triggers. On 26 February the Pavlovsky Regiment fired on demonstrators at Znamenskaya Square killing ~50+ including women; many soldiers were horrified — the Pavlovsky 4th Company mutinied that evening, refusing further deployment. On 27 February the Volynsky Regiment's Training Detachment — soldiers who had fired the previous day — mutinied at dawn, killing Captain Lashkevich (their commanding officer) and marching out to spread the mutiny to other regiments. Officer authority collapsed quickly: Lashkevich's death removed local discipline; General Khabalov's chain of command broke down within hours; many officers fled or hid; the Litovsky, Preobrazhensky and Moscow regiments followed Volynsky. The combination — soldiers refusing to fire on women + the death of an officer + spread of mutiny across regiments — turned the garrison from reluctant tool of regime repression into active participant in the revolution. Together — unrepresentative garrison politically sympathetic to strikers, WWI exhaustion and bad conditions, and the shock of 26 February + breakdown of officer authority on 27 February — these reasons explain the Petrograd garrison's mutiny. This was the decisive moment of the revolution: in 1905 the army (returning from Manchuria) had crushed the Moscow Armed Uprising; in 1917 the Petrograd garrison joined the revolution. Without loyal troops, the Tsarist regime could not survive popular upheaval. The army's defection was the immediate cause of the regime's collapse.
Examiner tip
Three reasons — garrison unrepresentative (reservists/family among strikers), WWI exhaustion + bad conditions, 26 Feb shock + officer authority collapse — each developed with specific evidence (200,000 garrison, Lashkevich killing, ~50 dead at Znamenskaya). Strong closing.
5Paper 4: How important was spontaneity in the February Revolution?
Stretch• Paper 4 part (b) — 25 marks• paper-4-b, importance essay, spontaneity
Question
'The February Revolution was a spontaneous popular uprising rather than a revolution led by parties.' How important was spontaneity in the February Revolution? Explain your answer. (25 marks)
Step-by-step solution
1. Step 1
  Structure: thesis → case for spontaneity (no party led, Bolsheviks advised against demonstrations, Lenin in Switzerland, women textile workers started it, soldiers' mutiny spontaneous) → case for party role (Mensheviks/SRs in Soviet, Duma reaction, war-industry committees prepared liberal opposition) → weighing → 'spontaneous popular action with party organisational response' verdict.
Answer
The February Revolution was overwhelmingly a spontaneous popular uprising rather than a party-led revolution — women textile workers initiated it on International Women's Day, soldiers' mutinies completed it, and the major revolutionary parties played almost no role in starting or directing it — but the political consequences (Dual Power, Provisional Government, Soviet) were organised by parties responding to the popular upheaval. The fairest verdict is that the popular mass movement was spontaneous and decisive in the streets, while the political reorganisation was led by parties responding to a revolution they had not made. The case that the February Revolution was spontaneous. First, no party led or planned the February Revolution. The Bolsheviks (with Lenin in Swiss exile) had a small underground presence in Petrograd; their local committee actually advised against major demonstrations on 23 February (International Women's Day) because they thought the moment was premature. The women textile workers ignored Bolshevik advice and struck anyway. Mensheviks and SRs had not planned a revolution; the Provisional Bloc liberals in the Duma had been seeking reform within the system rather than revolutionary overthrow; the strike movements were not directed from above. Second, the founding spark was women textile workers in the Vyborg district acting on their own initiative. Women had no formal political organisation; they were not Bolshevik or Menshevik or SR cadres; they were factory workers with grievances about bread, war, and the regime, marking International Women's Day. ~90,000 workers were on strike that first day — produced by women's solidarity, not by party direction. Third, Lenin and the senior Bolshevik leadership were not in Russia. Lenin was in Switzerland; Trotsky was in New York; Stalin was in Siberian exile; Bukharin was in New York. They learned of the revolution from foreign newspapers days after it had succeeded. Lenin heard of the abdication on 2 March from Swiss newspapers. The Bolshevik party as it existed in Petrograd was small, inexperienced, and largely surprised by events. Fourth, the strike escalation from 23 to 25 February was driven by working-class solidarity, not by party calls. Workers from one factory joined demonstrations supporting workers from another; the Putilov Works lockout (22 February) had released ~30,000 workers onto the streets and they were the shock-troops of the early revolution. The pattern was workers acting in solidarity with workers, not parties mobilising followers. Fifth, the Volynsky Regiment mutiny on 27 February was spontaneous. Soldiers killed their commanding officer Captain Lashkevich and marched out to other regiments without party direction; they were responding to their own conscience after firing on women the day before. The mutiny spread through the garrison (Litovsky, Preobrazhensky, Moscow regiments) by soldier-to-soldier contact, not by party organisation. This was the decisive moment of the revolution and it was entirely spontaneous. Sixth, the formation of the Petrograd Soviet on 27 February was a re-creation of a 1905 model by activists from various parties rather than a single-party project. Mensheviks, SRs, Bolsheviks, and unaffiliated workers and soldiers all participated. The Menshevik Chkheidze was chair; SR Kerensky was vice-chair; Bolsheviks were a minority. The Soviet emerged from popular initiative, not from a party plan. Seventh, even Nicholas II's abdication was not the result of party action. The decision came from Stavka chief Alekseyev's poll of the generals; the generals — not opposition parties — concluded the Tsar must go. The Duma deputies who delivered the abdication demand (Guchkov, Shulgin) were responding to events, not driving them. The case for some party role. First, the Mensheviks, SRs and Bolsheviks had been organising in factories for years; their workers' education, propaganda, and underground networks meant that when the strikes began, politicised workers were available to organise the spreading movement. The atmosphere of working-class consciousness — strikes, slogans, anti-regime sentiment — was the product of decades of party work. Second, the Duma's Provisional Committee on 27 February was a clear party-political act by liberal-conservative politicians (Rodzianko Octobrists, Milyukov Kadets, etc.) deciding to take leadership of the political response. The Provisional Government formed on 2 March was a party coalition. The political reorganisation of the revolution was therefore party-led, even if the popular uprising was not. Third, the Progressive Bloc (1915) and Milyukov's 'stupidity or treason' speech (1916) had prepared the political ground for elite acceptance of Nicholas's abdication. The Duma deputies' willingness to demand abdication on 2 March was the result of their political development through 1915-16 — not solely spontaneous reaction to street events. Fourth, the Petrograd Soviet was organised by experienced socialist activists (Mensheviks, SRs) who knew the 1905 model and could give institutional form to popular discontent. Soviet Order No. 1 (1 March) was a party-political document, not a spontaneous popular cry. Fifth, the War-industry committees organised by liberal industrialists since June 1915 had given the moderate opposition organisational experience and political networks they could mobilise in February 1917. Sixth, in subsequent weeks the parties shaped the revolution's direction: Provisional Government policies, Soviet positions, eventual party realignments. The fact that the popular uprising was spontaneous did not prevent parties from shaping what came after. Weighing and comparing. The popular uprising of February 1917 — women's protest, mass strikes, military mutinies — was overwhelmingly spontaneous. No party directed the strikes; the Bolsheviks advised against them; Lenin was in Switzerland; the Volynsky mutiny was self-organised. The decisive moments of the revolution (Women's Day strikes, mass strike escalation, Volynsky mutiny) were popular initiatives. But the political consequences of the revolution — the Duma's Provisional Committee, the Petrograd Soviet, the Provisional Government, Soviet Order No. 1, Nicholas's abdication and Mikhail's refusal — were organised by parties and politicians responding to popular action. The Russian working class made the revolution in the streets; Russian liberal and socialist politicians organised what it meant. The proper framework is two-stage: spontaneous popular uprising (23-27 February) plus party-led political reorganisation (27 February - 3 March). The first stage was the decisive popular action; the second was the political settlement (Dual Power, Provisional Government) that determined what the revolution would become. Both stages were necessary; the first made the revolution; the second made the new regime. Overall judgement. Spontaneity was the defining characteristic of the February Revolution as a popular uprising — and one of its most distinctive features in revolutionary history. The Tsarist regime fell because women textile workers, Petrograd workers, and mutinying soldiers acted on their own initiative, not because a party led them. The Bolshevik advice against demonstrations on 23 February was ignored; Lenin and Trotsky were not in Russia; the Soviet was re-formed only after the revolution had effectively succeeded. In this sense the statement that February was 'spontaneous popular uprising' has overwhelming force. But the political consequences were party-organised: Duma's Provisional Committee, Petrograd Soviet, Provisional Government were all party-political constructions responding to popular upheaval. The fairest verdict is that February was a spontaneous popular uprising with party-led political consequences — and the spontaneity matters historically because it shows that revolution does not require revolutionary parties to begin. It shows working-class women can change the world when conditions are right. The Bolsheviks would later claim more credit for February than they deserved; but the truth is that the Petrograd women textile workers brought down the Romanov dynasty on 23 February 1917, and no party can take credit for that. The party-political stage would matter for what came next (Topics 12), but the initial revolution was the work of the people, not the parties.
Examiner tip
Paper 4 (b) essay (~1,250 words): clear thesis ('spontaneous popular uprising with party-led political consequences'), seven-point case for spontaneity, six-point case for party role, two-stage weighing framework, supported nuanced verdict. Level 5.
6Paper 2 source skill: a Women's Day photograph
Stretch• Paper 2 source-based question — 7 marks• paper-2, photograph, purpose
Question
Study Source D: a black-and-white photograph from 23 February 1917 (Old Style; 8 March New Style) in Petrograd, taken by an opposition newspaper photographer. It shows a large crowd of women textile workers marching down a snow-covered Petrograd street; the women carry banners reading 'BREAD!' and 'DOWN WITH AUTOCRACY!'; in the foreground a young woman holds a banner reading 'DOWN WITH THE GERMAN WOMAN!'. Children walk alongside; some women link arms; expressions are determined but anxious. Mounted Cossacks are visible at the edge of the photograph, watching but not charging. The caption (provided by the opposition newspaper that published it later) reads, 'WOMEN'S DAY IN PETROGRAD — THE STRIKE THAT TOPPLED THE TSAR'. What does this photograph reveal about the February Revolution? Explain your answer using details of the source and your knowledge. (7 marks)
Step-by-step solution
1. Step 1
  State the message. The February Revolution began as a spontaneous popular uprising led by working-class women whose grievances combined economic, political and gendered/anti-Empress sentiment — and the Cossacks' restraint shows the army's wavering loyalty.
2. Step 2
  Use the details. Women textile workers marching = gendered initiative, working-class origins; banners 'BREAD!' + 'DOWN WITH AUTOCRACY!' = economic + political demands fused; 'DOWN WITH THE GERMAN WOMAN!' = anti-Alexandra/anti-Empress sentiment connected to wartime German enmity; mounted Cossacks watching but not charging = army's wavering loyalty (would defect 27 Feb).
3. Step 3
  Add own knowledge. International Women's Day origin (Clara Zetkin 1910); Petrograd women textile workers in Vyborg district; Bolsheviks advised against demonstrations; ~90,000 strikers that day; Cossacks notably refused to charge in following days; revolution that began on Women's Day toppled regime by 27 Feb.
Answer
The photograph reveals several crucial features of how the February Revolution began. First, the large crowd of women textile workers marching together captures the gendered origins of the revolution: women workers — not party cadres, not male labour leaders, not revolutionary intellectuals — initiated the action that brought down the Romanov dynasty. The fact that women played the leading role is one of the most distinctive features of February 1917 in revolutionary history. Second, the banners 'BREAD!' and 'DOWN WITH AUTOCRACY!' show that economic and political demands were fused from the start: hunger drove the demonstration, but the demand was not just food — it was the end of the regime that had failed to provide it. The combination is critical: Russian women workers had been driven into the streets by bread queues that lasted from 4 a.m., by rations cut to 1 lb of bread per day, by inflation that had eaten ~30% of real wages — and they had concluded that the political system was responsible. Third, the banner 'DOWN WITH THE GERMAN WOMAN!' is particularly revealing: it refers to Empress Alexandra (German-born) and captures how wartime anti-German sentiment had fused with anti-Empress hatred and broader anti-regime feeling. The popular hatred of Alexandra and Rasputin (murdered just two months earlier) had become a key political fact. Fourth, the Cossacks watching but not charging is the photograph's most ominous detail for the regime: Cossacks were the traditional Tsarist instrument of repression of urban demonstrations (they had carried out Bloody Sunday in 1905). Their visible restraint — not charging the demonstrators with their whips — signals that the army's loyalty to the regime was wavering. Within days, the Petrograd garrison would mutiny and join the revolution (Volynsky Regiment, 27 February). Fifth, the children walking alongside and the anxious but determined expressions show that this was family revolution, not just political demonstration: women had brought their children because the children were hungry; this was about survival, not abstract politics. From my own knowledge, the historical context confirms every detail. International Women's Day had been established by Clara Zetkin at the 1910 Second International Socialist Women's Conference; it had been celebrated in Russia from 1913 onwards. In Petrograd on 23 February 1917 (Old Style; 8 March New Style), women textile workers in the Vyborg district struck and called male workers out from the metal works along Sampsonievsky Prospect; ~90,000 workers were on strike that first day. The Bolshevik organisation in Petrograd had actually advised against major demonstrations, fearing the moment was premature — the women ignored them and struck anyway. Cossacks were deployed but in following days refused to charge demonstrators with their traditional whips; one Cossack reportedly killed a police officer who had whipped a demonstrator. The army's wavering would become decisive on 27 February when the Volynsky Regiment mutinied. The photograph's caption — added later — claims the demonstration 'toppled the Tsar'. This is rhetorical but partly true: the women textile workers of Petrograd on 23 February 1917 began the revolution that, within nine days, ended a 300-year dynasty. The photograph therefore reveals: the spontaneous and popular origins of the revolution; the centrality of working-class women in its initiation; the fusion of economic and political grievances; the role of anti-Empress and anti-German sentiment; the army's wavering loyalty that would become decisive on 27 February; and the family/survival nature of the protest. None of this was planned by any party; the Bolsheviks in particular had advised against it. The Tsarist regime that had survived 1825, 1905, and 30 months of WWI fell because women workers acted on their own initiative on a single day — a fact opposition newspapers would later emphasise as both true and politically useful.
Examiner tip
Identifies what the photograph reveals (gendered origins, economic+political grievance fusion, anti-Empress/anti-German feeling, army's wavering) through the details (women textile workers, banners 'BREAD!'/'DOWN WITH AUTOCRACY!'/'DOWN WITH THE GERMAN WOMAN!', Cossacks not charging, children), then supports with own knowledge (Women's Day origin, Vyborg textile workers, Bolshevik advice against, ~90,000 strikers, Volynsky mutiny on 27 Feb). Strong analysis.

Model Answers — The February/March 1917 Revolution and the Fall of the Tsar

High-scoring sample answers for the february/march 1917 revolution and the fall of the tsar on the Cambridge IGCSE paper, with examiner-style notes mapping each response to the mark scheme and assessment objectives.

Question 1
Paper 1 Section A part (a) style4 marks
Describe the 'Dual Power' (Dvoevlastiye) that emerged in February-March 1917. (4 marks)
Model answer
The Dual Power (Dvoevlastiye) was the unstable parallel-authority arrangement that ran Russia between February and October 1917. First, it consisted of two bodies formed on the same day, 27 February 1917, in the same building (the Tauride Palace in Petrograd) but in different wings. The Duma's Provisional Committee — chaired by Mikhail Rodzianko (Octobrist) with Milyukov (Kadets), Kerensky (Trudovik), Guchkov (Octobrists), Shulgin (Nationalists) — claimed to be the formal constitutional authority and would become the Provisional Government on 2 March. Second, in the adjacent wing, the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was re-formed — chaired by Menshevik Nikolai Chkheidze with Alexander Kerensky (member of both bodies) as vice-chair — drawing on the 1905 Soviet model with workers' delegates and (from 28 February) soldiers' delegates from the mutinying regiments. Third, the arrangement worked because the Provisional Government had formal legal authority (recognised by Russia's Allies, by the bureaucracy, by international diplomacy) while the Petrograd Soviet had real power over workers (factory committees), soldiers (Soviet Order No. 1 of 1 March), transport (railway workers), and communications (telegraph workers). The Provisional Government could not act without Soviet support. Fourth, the arrangement was inherently unstable. The Soviet's leaders (Mensheviks and SRs) believed Marx's stage theory of history required a bourgeois-democratic stage before socialism, so they declined to take government themselves. Lenin's return on 3 April with the 'April Theses' demanding 'all power to the Soviets' would challenge this Menshevik-SR consensus. The Dual Power lasted until the Bolshevik seizure in October 1917, producing 8 months of political dysfunction that would undermine the Provisional Government's ability to act on war, land, food, or constitutional questions.
Why this scores
Four points: same building/27 Feb origin + members, Soviet leadership, division of authority (formal vs real), inherent instability + Marx stage theory + Lenin's later challenge. Specific dates and names.
Question 2
Paper 1 Section A part (a) style4 marks
Describe Soviet Order No. 1 of 1 March 1917. (4 marks)
Model answer
Soviet Order No. 1 was one of the most consequential acts of the February Revolution and a major factor in the later collapse of the Russian army. First, it was issued by the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on 1 March 1917 (Old Style; 14 March New Style) — just after the Soviet re-formed and began to assert authority over the mutinying Petrograd garrison. Second, the Order required that soldiers' committees (soviets) be elected in every military unit — from individual companies up to whole regiments — and that these committees should control the unit's weapons and the disposition of forces; officers' authority required confirmation by the soldiers' committees; officers could no longer impose the salute or other rank-discipline outside the line of duty. Third, the Order transferred effective command of the Petrograd garrison from regular officers to the elected committees, putting the Soviet at the centre of military authority in the capital. The intent was to protect the revolution against counter-revolution — to prevent officers from using their troops against the demonstrators. Fourth, although intended for the Petrograd garrison only, the Order spread rapidly to the front: soldiers' committees were formed throughout the Russian army; military discipline collapsed; mass desertion increased through spring 1917; officer authority was permanently weakened. Many officers later blamed Order No. 1 for destroying the Russian army's fighting capacity, contributing to the failures of the Kerensky offensive (June 1917) and the eventual Bolshevik seizure of power. The Soviet defended Order No. 1 as a necessary protection of the revolution.
Why this scores
Four points: 1 March 1917 origin, content (soldiers' committees, officers' authority via committees), transfer of command, spread to front + military discipline collapse. Specific date and significance.
Question 3
Paper 4 part (a) style15 marks
Write an account of the Volynsky Regiment mutiny and its consequences. (15 marks)
Model answer
The Volynsky Regiment mutiny on the morning of 27 February 1917 (Old Style) was the decisive moment of the February Revolution. In one morning, the Russian army — the Tsarist regime's ultimate instrument of repression — changed sides, and within hours the Petrograd garrison had joined the revolution; by evening, Petrograd was in revolutionary hands and the regime's collapse was inevitable. The build-up: 23-26 February 1917. By 26 February, the Petrograd demonstrations had been escalating for four days. Thursday 23 February (Women's Day) brought ~90,000 textile workers onto the streets. Friday 24 February: ~200,000 strikers; Cossacks refused to charge. Saturday 25 February: general strike (~250,000-300,000); Tsar telegrammed Khabalov ordering an end to disorder by force. Sunday 26 February: Pavlovsky Regiment fired on demonstrators at Znamenskaya Square, killing ~50+ including women; Pavlovsky 4th Company mutinied that evening, refusing further deployment. The army's morale was cracking. The Volynsky Regiment. The Volynsky Guards Regiment was based in Petrograd as part of the garrison. Its Training Detachment had been among the units that fired on demonstrators at Znamenskaya Square on 26 February. The Volynsky soldiers — many of them reservists, ex-workers, older men — were horrified by what they had done; the killing of women and unarmed demonstrators violated their sense of honour and their sense of who 'their' people were. The mutiny (dawn, 27 February). At dawn on Monday 27 February, the Volynsky Training Detachment was ordered to deploy again. The soldiers refused. Captain Lashkevich, their commanding officer, came to restore order; the soldiers killed him (some accounts say the regiment's NCO Sergeant Kirpichnikov fired the fatal shot; Kirpichnikov would later become a hero of the revolution). With Lashkevich dead, the chain of command in the Volynsky collapsed. The soldiers then marched out of barracks carrying their weapons — to spread the mutiny to other regiments. They went first to the Litovsky Regiment barracks, then to the Preobrazhensky Regiment (the most prestigious in the Russian Imperial Guard), then to the Moscow Regiment. At each barracks, the Volynsky soldiers called the troops out, sometimes by force, sometimes by persuasion. The cascading mutiny (morning-afternoon 27 February). Through the morning and afternoon of 27 February, the Petrograd garrison defected en masse: the Volynsky mutiny was joined by the Litovsky, Preobrazhensky, Moscow, Pavlovsky, Finland, and other regiments. By midday, soldiers were on the streets fraternising with demonstrators, sharing food and rumours, exchanging weapons. By evening, ~80,000-100,000 soldiers of the Petrograd garrison had joined the revolution. General Khabalov, commander of the Petrograd Military District, was unable to regain control: he had ~12,000 'loyal' troops at dawn; by evening, ~1,500 men holed up in the Admiralty; his telegrams to Stavka grew increasingly desperate. The consequences for Petrograd. With the army on the side of the revolution, the regime's repressive apparatus collapsed in Petrograd. Workers armed themselves by raiding arsenals (~40,000 rifles distributed). Police stations were burned across the city. The Kresty Prison was stormed; political prisoners were released onto the streets. The Okhrana headquarters was destroyed — along with its archives. Government buildings were attacked. Petrograd was in revolutionary hands by the evening of 27 February. The consequences for the regime. The Volynsky mutiny destroyed the regime's ability to manage the crisis: Stavka chief General Alekseyev received reports of the garrison defection and concluded the situation was uncontrollable; General Ivanov's planned military expedition to Petrograd was abandoned; Khabalov effectively gave up that night. Nicholas II at Stavka was still receiving partial reports but began to recognise the scale of the disaster by 28 February. The Duma's Provisional Committee was formed that same evening (27 Feb) under Rodzianko; the Petrograd Soviet re-formed in the same building under Chkheidze. The Volynsky mutiny had handed the regime to the revolution. The consequences for the army. The Volynsky mutiny set a precedent that would spread to the front. Within days, Soviet Order No. 1 (1 March 1917) would institutionalise soldiers' committees in every military unit and require officer authority to be confirmed by soldiers — directly inspired by what had happened to Captain Lashkevich. Russian army discipline collapsed through spring 1917; mass desertion rose; the June 1917 Kerensky Offensive would fail partly because of the soldiers' political consciousness. The Volynsky mutiny was therefore not just the cause of the regime's collapse in February but the beginning of the army's broader political-revolutionary transformation. The wider significance. The Volynsky mutiny shows the decisive role of the army in revolutionary outcomes. In 1905, the army (returning from Manchuria) had crushed the Moscow Armed Uprising. In 1917, the Volynsky Regiment refused to fire on demonstrators and instead joined them — and the regime collapsed within hours. No regime can survive without loyal troops: this was true for the Tsars, would be true for the Provisional Government (when the Petrograd garrison stayed neutral in October 1917), and would be true for many later regimes. The Volynsky mutiny also shows the importance of individual decisions in revolutionary moments: Sergeant Kirpichnikov shooting Captain Lashkevich was a specific act by a specific person; without that act, the mutiny might have been contained; with it, the Russian army's politicisation had begun. Soldiers everywhere watched what happened to officers who tried to enforce orders. Conclusion. The Volynsky Regiment mutiny on the morning of 27 February 1917 was the decisive moment of the February Revolution. Within hours of soldiers killing Captain Lashkevich and marching out to spread the mutiny, the Petrograd garrison had defected to the revolution, the regime's repressive apparatus had collapsed in the capital, and the Tsar's days were numbered. By evening, Petrograd was in revolutionary hands; within five days, Nicholas II would abdicate. The mutiny was the moment when the army — the regime's ultimate base — abandoned the Tsar, and the regime that had ruled Russia for 300 years could not survive without it. The Volynsky soldiers' decision on the morning of 27 February was, in retrospect, one of the most consequential acts in modern European history.
Why this scores
Paper 4 (a) account (~1,100 words): structured by phase (build-up → Volynsky context → mutiny + Lashkevich → cascading mutiny → consequences for Petrograd → for regime → for army → wider significance → conclusion), specific dates throughout, sustained analytical framing.
Question 4
Paper 1 Section A part (b) style6 marks
Why did Nicholas II abdicate on 2 March 1917? (6 marks)
Model answer
Nicholas II abdicated on 2 March 1917 (Old Style; 15 March New Style) for three connected reasons. First, the Petrograd garrison had defected and the regime had lost military control of its capital. On 27 February the Volynsky Regiment mutinied (killing Captain Lashkevich); the Litovsky, Preobrazhensky and Moscow regiments joined; ~80,000-100,000 soldiers of the Petrograd garrison sided with the revolution by evening. Workers armed themselves; police stations were burned; the Kresty Prison was stormed; the Okhrana headquarters was destroyed. General Khabalov's authority collapsed — his ~12,000 'loyal' troops at dawn became ~1,500 holed up in the Admiralty by evening. The military expedition under General Ivanov ordered to restore order was turned back. Without loyal troops, the regime could not suppress the revolution; the Tsar had no military means to reassert his rule. Second, his own generals recommended abdication. When Nicholas's train was diverted by sympathetic railway workers and he ended up at the Northern Front Headquarters at Pskov on 1 March, the situation was clear. Stavka chief General Mikhail Alekseyev polled the army commanders by telegram: General Brusilov (south-western front), General Ruzsky (northern front), General Evert (western front), Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich (Caucasian front) — all recommended abdication. The generals had concluded that Nicholas must go to save the war effort and the dynasty; without an effective Tsar, Russia could not continue to fight Germany; with the wrong Tsar, the dynasty itself was at risk. When the dynasty's own generals abandon the dynasty, the autocracy has lost its ultimate base. Nicholas accepted that his abdication was now the only way to save anything of the imperial system. Third, the Duma's Provisional Committee, the British and French allies, and even the imperial family had concluded he must go. Duma Chairman Mikhail Rodzianko had been telegraphing increasingly urgent warnings for days; on 2 March he sent Duma deputies Alexander Guchkov (Octobrists) and Vasily Shulgin (Nationalists) to Pskov to demand abdication. The British and French ambassadors had privately conveyed similar warnings through the winter. The imperial family itself had murdered Rasputin in December 1916 (Prince Yusupov, Grand Duke Dmitri Pavlovich, Purishkevich) and various grand dukes had been plotting coups. Even Nicholas's mother (Empress Maria Fyodorovna) and brother (Grand Duke Mikhail) had begged him to reform. The political pressure for abdication was overwhelming. Together — collapse of military control in Petrograd, generals' recommendation, Duma + Allied + imperial family pressure — these reasons led Nicholas to abdicate on 2 March 1917. He wrote the abdication document himself: first in favour of his son Tsarevich Alexei (then revised, on doctors' advice about the haemophilia, in favour of his brother Grand Duke Mikhail). Nicholas wrote in his diary that day: 'All around treason, cowardice and deceit.' The phrase captures his understanding of the moment, though he failed to see his own responsibility. Grand Duke Mikhail refused the throne the next day, conditional on a future Constituent Assembly deciding Russia's form of government. The Romanov dynasty, which had ruled Russia since 1613, ended on 3 March 1917. Nicholas had abdicated not because he wished to but because almost everyone of consequence had concluded he must — and he no longer had the political or military capacity to refuse.
Why this scores
Three reasons — collapse of military control in Petrograd, generals' recommendation (Alekseyev poll), Duma+Allies+imperial family pressure — each developed with specific evidence (Khabalov's 1,500, generals named, Guchkov+Shulgin at Pskov, 'treason cowardice deceit'). Strong closing.
Question 5
Paper 4 part (b) style25 marks
How important was WWI in causing the collapse of the Tsarist regime in 1917? Explain your answer. (25 marks)
Model answer
WWI was the decisive cause of the Tsarist regime's collapse in February 1917 — it exposed and intensified every weakness simultaneously, destroyed military prestige, produced the home-front crisis that triggered the February Revolution, and removed the army loyalty on which the regime depended. But the regime had pre-existing structural weaknesses that pre-dated WWI: the mismatch between modernising economy and medieval autocracy, peasant land hunger, unresolved 1905 Revolution, and Nicholas II's personal limitations. The fairest verdict is that WWI was the decisive trigger that exposed and intensified pre-existing structural weaknesses; both elements were necessary, and neither alone was sufficient. The case that WWI was decisive. First, WWI destroyed Russia's military prestige and ~1.7 million soldiers. The defeats at Tannenberg (Aug 1914, ~30,000 killed/92,000 captured), Masurian Lakes (Sept 1914), and the catastrophic Great Retreat (May-Sept 1915) lost Poland, Lithuania and Galicia with ~1.4 million casualties. The shells crisis exposed regime corruption (~4.5m rifles for 5+ million men). By early 1917, ~1.7 million Russian dead, ~3 million wounded, ~2.5 million POWs left almost no Russian family untouched. Second, WWI prompted Nicholas II's catastrophic decision to take personal command (September 1915). Eight of thirteen ministers had warned against it. The decision tied the Tsar personally to every defeat, left Empress Alexandra (German-born, increasingly hated, under Rasputin's influence) effectively governing Petrograd, and produced the 'ministerial leapfrog' of 1915-16 — four prime ministers (Goremykin, Stürmer, Trepov, Golitsyn), five interior ministers — making the regime dysfunctional. Third, WWI made Rasputin's influence catastrophic. The Empress's reliance on Rasputin had been bearable in peacetime but became disastrous in war: ministerial appointments based on his whim; Stürmer (German-named, PM Jan-Nov 1916); Protopopov (Interior Minister Sept 1916, mentally unstable). Rasputin was murdered by conservative monarchists on 16-17 December 1916 — too late to save the regime. Fourth, WWI produced the home-front crisis that triggered February 1917. Inflation rose ~400%; real wages fell ~30%; food shortages by 1916 despite Russia being the pre-war world's largest grain exporter (~15m peasants conscripted, transport collapse with locomotives 20,000 pre-war → ~9,000 by early 1917); ~7 million refugees displaced; strikes rose from 553,000 (1915) to ~1.2 million in January-February 1917 alone. Petrograd had severe bread queues by late 1916. Fifth, WWI alienated the regime's natural supporters: Progressive Bloc (August 1915) — 236/422 Duma deputies including Octobrists — demanded 'government of public confidence'; Milyukov's 'stupidity or treason' speech (1 November 1916); conservative monarchists murdered Rasputin; grand dukes plotted coups; the regime had no political base left except the small court circle. Sixth, WWI destroyed army loyalty. The Petrograd garrison — politicised, exhausted, sympathetic to strikers — mutinied on 27 February 1917; the Volynsky Regiment killed Captain Lashkevich and marched out to spread the mutiny; ~80,000-100,000 soldiers joined the revolution that day. Without loyal troops, the regime could not suppress the demonstrations; the army had been the regime's ultimate base and was now in revolt. The case that pre-existing weaknesses also mattered. First, the fundamental mismatch between modernising economy and medieval autocracy had been the underlying problem since the 19th century (Topic 11.1). Russia had a modern industrial economy under absolute monarchy; political reform had not matched economic modernisation; the Fundamental Laws of 1832 (and 1906) preserved autocratic powers that could not manage modern society. WWI exposed this mismatch but did not create it. Second, the 1905 Revolution had not been fundamentally resolved (Topic 11.2). The October Manifesto split the opposition; the Fundamental Laws preserved autocracy; Stolypin's reforms were partial when he died in 1911; by 1912-14 strikes were back at 1905 levels (~1.5 million strikers by July 1914). Some historians argue that without WWI, Russia might have faced a new revolution in 1914-15 anyway. Third, the peasant question had been unsolved since 1861. Land hunger, mir restrictions, ~80% peasant population — these structural problems pre-existed WWI and were not creations of the war. Fourth, the opposition parties (Kadets, SRs, Bolsheviks, Mensheviks) had been organising since the 1890s-1900s; Lenin had been writing about revolution since 1898; the 1903 RSDLP split had created the Bolsheviks. WWI gave the opposition opportunity but did not create it. Fifth, Nicholas II's personal limitations were independent of WWI: he was poorly trained for rule, suspicious of advice, religiously committed to autocracy. A different Tsar might have made different choices — particularly the catastrophic decision to take command in September 1915 reflected his personal character as much as wartime pressure. Sixth, Rasputin's influence on Alexandra pre-dated WWI — he had been part of the royal household since c.1905. The war intensified the political consequences but the underlying problem of dynastic vulnerability was pre-existing. Seventh, economic dependence on foreign capital (~50% of large industry foreign-owned or financed by 1914) made Russia vulnerable to wartime financial pressure that would not have been so severe for a more autonomous economy. Weighing and comparing. WWI was the decisive trigger of the regime's collapse — without it, the regime would not have fallen in February 1917 as it did. The war's specific contributions — military disasters, Nicholas's command decision, Alexandra/Rasputin in government, the ministerial leapfrog, the home-front crisis, the army's politicisation — were uniquely destructive. But the war's effects were uniquely destructive to this regime because of its pre-existing weaknesses. A stronger, more flexible, more reform-minded regime might have weathered the same war (Britain, France did — though both suffered enormously). The Tsarist regime fell because its structural problems made it incapable of managing modern total war. The proper framework is trigger plus foundation: WWI was the trigger that exposed and intensified pre-existing weaknesses; the pre-existing weaknesses were the foundation that made the war's effects so destructive. Without WWI, the regime might have lasted longer (though perhaps not indefinitely); without the pre-existing weaknesses, the war's effects would have been more manageable. Overall judgement. WWI was hugely important in causing the collapse of the Tsarist regime — the decisive trigger that combined military disaster, political dysfunction, home-front crisis and elite alienation into the perfect storm that produced February 1917. Without WWI, the regime would not have collapsed in 1917; the war's specific effects were uniquely destructive. In this sense the statement (implicit in the question) that WWI was decisive has overwhelming force. But the structural problems were the deeper cause that made the war so destructive to this particular regime: autocratic-modernisation mismatch, unresolved 1905, peasant land hunger, opposition development, Nicholas's personal limitations, dynastic vulnerability. The fairest verdict is that WWI was the decisive trigger that revealed and intensified pre-existing structural weaknesses; both elements were necessary, and neither alone was sufficient. WWI made February 1917 possible; the structural weaknesses made February 1917 catastrophic — and rapid (five days). The regime that had survived 1905 fell in 1917 because unprecedented total industrial war exposed every weakness simultaneously and the regime had become incapable of self-reform. By February 1917, the regime had lost the support of every social group except the court circle. The structural causes had been building since the 19th century; WWI brought them all to crisis simultaneously. War + structure produced revolution; neither alone would have done so on this timescale.
Why this scores
Paper 4 (b) essay (~1,200 words): clear thesis ('decisive trigger that revealed and intensified pre-existing weaknesses'), six-point case for WWI, seven-point counter-case, integrated 'trigger plus foundation' weighing, supported nuanced verdict. Level 5.
Question 6
Paper 4 part (a) style15 marks
Write an account of the role of the Bolsheviks during the February Revolution. (15 marks)
Model answer
The Bolsheviks played almost no role in the February Revolution — a fact that contradicts later Soviet propaganda but is essential for understanding 1917. The revolution that ended the Romanov dynasty was overwhelmingly the work of women textile workers, Petrograd workers, and mutinying soldiers acting spontaneously, with Bolshevik leaders absent abroad or in exile. Only after February did the Bolsheviks begin to play a major role — culminating in the October Revolution (Topic 12). Bolshevik leaders in February 1917. When the February Revolution began on 23 February 1917, the Bolshevik leadership was scattered far from Petrograd: Vladimir Lenin was in Swiss exile (Zürich, Bern); Leon Trotsky was in New York City (he had been a Menshevik but was moving toward Lenin); Joseph Stalin was in Siberian exile at Achinsk; Lev Kamenev was also in Siberian exile; Nikolai Bukharin was in New York; Grigori Zinoviev was in Switzerland with Lenin. The Bolshevik Central Committee did not exist in any operative form. The Bolshevik party in Petrograd. A small Bolshevik organisation existed in Petrograd — perhaps a few thousand members across the city by 1917 — heavily penetrated by Okhrana informers and operating semi-legally. Alexander Shlyapnikov was the senior Bolshevik organiser in Petrograd; Vyacheslav Molotov (then a young activist) was also present. The Bolsheviks had factory cells, distributed leaflets, and maintained underground organisation, but they were a minor force compared to Mensheviks and SRs even in working-class Petrograd. Bolshevik response to the strikes. On the eve of the revolution, the Bolshevik organisation in Petrograd actually advised against major demonstrations on International Women's Day (23 February 1917). The reasoning: a premature uprising could be crushed; better to wait for stronger party organisation; the moment was not ripe. The women textile workers ignored the Bolshevik advice and struck anyway. The Bolsheviks scrambled to support the strikes once they had begun, but they were followers, not leaders. The revolutionary week 23-27 February: Bolshevik role. Through the revolutionary week, the Bolsheviks tried to organise support for the strikes: leaflets, factory meetings, calls for further escalation. But they were one of several party organisations doing this — alongside Mensheviks, SRs, anarchists, and unaffiliated activists. The Bolsheviks did not direct the strike escalation, did not call the Volynsky mutiny, did not organise the Petrograd workers' arming. The dominant socialist voice in the streets was Menshevik and SR, not Bolshevik. The Petrograd Soviet (27 February). When the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was re-formed on 27 February 1917 at the Tauride Palace, the Bolsheviks had a small minority of delegates. The Soviet was chaired by Menshevik Nikolai Chkheidze, with SR-affiliated Alexander Kerensky as vice-chair. Bolshevik representation was perhaps 5-10% of delegates. The Soviet's positions in February-March 1917 were Menshevik-SR: conditional support for the Provisional Government, defencism in war (continue fighting), waiting for the Constituent Assembly. The Bolsheviks went along with these positions despite some internal disagreement. The Bolshevik Petrograd party (March 1917). Through early March, the Bolshevik organisation in Petrograd struggled with how to respond to the revolution they had not led. Senior leaders returned from Siberian exile: Stalin arrived in mid-March; Kamenev also returned. They took a moderate position — supporting the Provisional Government conditionally, accepting defencism on the war, working within the Soviet's Menshevik-led consensus. Pravda (the Bolshevik newspaper, restored after the February freedoms) was edited by Stalin and Kamenev with this moderate line. This moderate Bolshevik position broke down after Lenin's return. Lenin's return (3 April 1917). Lenin had been in Switzerland when the revolution began. He learned of it from Swiss newspapers on 2 March 1917 and immediately began organising his return. The British and French would not let him travel through Allied territory (rightly suspecting he would disrupt Russia's war effort). The German government decided to transport Lenin through Germany in a sealed train — they hoped he would weaken Russia. Lenin arrived at the Finland Station in Petrograd on 3 April 1917. He gave his famous 'April Theses' speech to the Bolshevik leadership: no support for the Provisional Government; no continued war; 'all power to the Soviets'; land to the peasants; nationalisation of banks; immediate move toward socialist revolution. The April Theses transformed Bolshevik policy — and put the Bolsheviks on the political left where they would build support over the next eight months. Why the Bolsheviks were marginal in February 1917. The Bolsheviks were marginal in February for several reasons: their leaders were abroad (Lenin in Switzerland, Trotsky in New York, etc.); the Petrograd organisation was small and underground; the Mensheviks had more support among Russian workers in 1917 (especially in Soviet-leadership positions); the SRs had more support among peasants and soldiers; the revolution was not predicted by any party, including the Bolsheviks; and the Bolshevik theoretical position (vanguard party of professional revolutionaries) had produced a tightly disciplined but small organisation rather than a mass party. The February Revolution was a popular spontaneous uprising, not a party-led event — and the Bolsheviks fit poorly into that pattern. Significance for understanding 1917. The Bolsheviks' marginality in February is essential for understanding what came next: the October Revolution was not the continuation of February but a contestation of February's outcomes. The Bolsheviks did not 'continue' a revolution they had led; they would later seize power in a different revolution against the Provisional Government and the Soviet Menshevik-SR leadership. Lenin's April Theses was the moment when the Bolsheviks began to claim leadership of a revolution they had not made — and to direct it toward outcomes the Mensheviks and SRs had not foreseen. Soviet historiography later claimed the Bolsheviks had led February as well as October; this was political mythology. Conclusion. The Bolsheviks played almost no role in the February Revolution. Their leaders were abroad or in exile; their Petrograd organisation advised against the demonstrations that began on 23 February; they were a minority in the Petrograd Soviet; they accepted the Menshevik-SR consensus until Lenin's return on 3 April 1917. The February Revolution was the work of women, workers and soldiers acting spontaneously, with Bolshevik organisations participating but not directing. The Bolsheviks' major role in 1917 would come after February — Lenin's April Theses transformed the party; over eight months they built support; in October they would seize power. But to understand the regime's fall in February, the Bolsheviks are largely irrelevant. The dynasty fell because the Russian people had had enough — not because Lenin or any other party leader led them to revolution. This fact contradicts later Soviet mythology but is essential historical truth. The Bolshevik role would come; it was not yet present in the streets of Petrograd on 27 February 1917.
Why this scores
Paper 4 (a) account (~1,150 words): structured by phase (leaders abroad/in exile → Petrograd organisation → advice against demonstrations → revolutionary week → Soviet minority → March moderate stance → Lenin's return → why marginal → significance → conclusion), specific names and dates throughout, strong analytical framing.

Key Definitions and Keywords — The February/March 1917 Revolution and the Fall of the Tsar

Definitions to memorise and the exact keywords mark schemes credit for the february/march 1917 revolution and the fall of the tsar answers — sharpened from recent examiner reports for the 2026 Cambridge IGCSE sitting.

February Revolution
Examiner keyword
23 February - 3 March 1917 (Old Style; 8-16 March New Style). Spontaneous popular uprising in Petrograd that brought down the Tsarist regime. Triggered by International Women's Day strikes; escalated through mass strikes; decided by Petrograd garrison mutiny (Volynsky Regiment, 27 Feb); ended Romanov dynasty (since 1613) with Nicholas II's abdication and Mikhail's refusal of the throne.
International Women's Day 1917
Thursday 23 February 1917 (Old Style; 8 March New Style). Women textile workers in Petrograd's Vyborg district struck and called male workers out from neighbouring factories. ~90,000 on strike; demonstrations carrying banners 'Bread!', 'Down with autocracy!', 'Down with the German woman!'. Bolsheviks had advised against demonstrations; women workers ignored them.
Putilov Works lockout
22 February 1917. Putilov Works (Russia's largest factory, ~30,000 workers) management responded to strikes by locking out the entire workforce. The locked-out Putilov workers became the shock-troops of the early February Revolution.
Volynsky Regiment mutiny
Examiner keyword
Dawn, Monday 27 February 1917. Soldiers of the Volynsky Guards Regiment's Training Detachment refused to deploy against demonstrators; killed their commanding officer Captain Lashkevich; marched out to spread the mutiny. Litovsky, Preobrazhensky, Moscow regiments joined; ~80,000-100,000 soldiers joined the revolution by evening. The decisive moment of the February Revolution.
Znamenskaya Square shootings
Sunday 26 February 1917. Pavlovsky Regiment troops fired on demonstrators at Znamenskaya Square (now Vosstaniya Square) on Nevsky Prospect; ~50+ killed including women. Pavlovsky 4th Company mutinied that evening, refusing further deployment. Prelude to the broader Volynsky mutiny on 27 February.
Petrograd Soviet (1917)
Examiner keyword
Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies re-formed at the Tauride Palace on 27 February 1917 (drawing on the 1905 model). Chaired by Menshevik Nikolai Chkheidze with Alexander Kerensky as vice-chair. ~3,000 delegates by mid-March. Dominated by Mensheviks and SRs; Bolsheviks a minority. Soviet Order No. 1 (1 March) gave it command over the Petrograd garrison.
Dual Power (Dvoevlastiye)
Examiner keyword
Unstable parallel-authority arrangement after February 1917. Provisional Government (formal legal authority — Lvov, Milyukov, Guchkov, Kerensky) operated alongside Petrograd Soviet (real power over workers, soldiers, transport, communications). Lasted until October 1917. Produced political stalemate that undermined the Provisional Government.
Provisional Government (March 1917)
Formed 2 March 1917 from the Duma's Provisional Committee. Prince Georgy Lvov (Kadet aristocrat) Prime Minister; Pavel Milyukov Foreign Minister; Alexander Guchkov War Minister; Alexander Kerensky Justice Minister (only socialist); Mikhail Tereshchenko Finance Minister. Liberal-conservative composition; operated alongside Petrograd Soviet in Dual Power.
Soviet Order No. 1
Examiner keyword
Issued by Petrograd Soviet on 1 March 1917 (Old Style; 14 March New Style). Required soldiers' committees in every military unit; officers' authority required Soviet confirmation; ended automatic discipline. Intended for Petrograd garrison only but spread to the front; collapsed Russian army discipline; contributed to later military failures and Bolshevik success.
Pskov abdication
2 March 1917 (Old Style; 15 March New Style). Nicholas II's train was diverted to the Northern Front Headquarters at Pskov; Duma deputies Alexander Guchkov (Octobrist) and Vasily Shulgin (Nationalist) arrived to demand abdication; the Stavka generals had collectively recommended abdication; Nicholas signed the abdication document himself, first for Alexei then for brother Grand Duke Mikhail. End of the dynasty.
Grand Duke Mikhail's refusal
3 March 1917. Grand Duke Mikhail Romanov (Nicholas II's brother) met with Duma Provisional Committee members. They were divided: Milyukov urged him to take the throne; Rodzianko and Kerensky urged refusal. Mikhail refused the throne pending a future Constituent Assembly. The Romanov dynasty (ruling Russia since 1613) ended.
Mikhail Rodzianko
Russian Octobrist politician; Chairman of the Fourth State Duma 1911-17. Repeatedly warned Nicholas II of the impending crisis during 1916-17. Chair of the Duma's Provisional Committee from 27 February 1917. Conservative monarchist who tried to save constitutional monarchy until forced to accept republic.
Alexander Kerensky (February 1917)
Russian Trudovik/SR-affiliated lawyer and politician. Member of the Duma's Provisional Committee from 27 February 1917; Justice Minister in the Provisional Government from 2 March; vice-chair of the Petrograd Soviet — the only major figure bridging Provisional Government and Soviet. Brilliant orator; would become Prime Minister in summer 1917.
End of the Romanov dynasty
Examiner keyword
3 March 1917. With Grand Duke Mikhail's refusal of the throne after Nicholas II's abdication, the Romanov dynasty (which had ruled Russia since 1613, when Michael I was elected by the Zemsky Sobor) ended. Nicholas and family were placed under house arrest; eventually murdered by Bolsheviks at Ekaterinburg on 17 July 1918.
Lenin's return (3 April 1917)
Lenin arrived at the Finland Station in Petrograd on 3 April 1917 (Old Style; 16 April New Style) after travel from Switzerland through Germany in a German-sponsored 'sealed train'. Delivered the 'April Theses' demanding no support for the Provisional Government, 'all power to the Soviets', land to peasants, immediate move toward socialist revolution. Transformed Bolshevik policy.

Common Mistakes and Misconceptions — The February/March 1917 Revolution and the Fall of the Tsar

The traps other students keep falling into on the february/march 1917 revolution and the fall of the tsar questions — taken from recent Cambridge IGCSE examiner reports and mark schemes — and how to avoid them.

✕Saying the Bolsheviks led the February Revolution.
Why it happens
Soviet propaganda later claimed this.
How to avoid it
The Bolsheviks played almost no role in February. Lenin was in Switzerland; Trotsky was in New York; Stalin in Siberian exile. The Petrograd Bolshevik organisation advised against demonstrations on 23 February; women textile workers ignored them. The revolution was led by women, workers and soldiers acting spontaneously. The Bolsheviks' role came after February (Lenin's April Theses).
✕Saying the February Revolution took weeks or months.
Why it happens
Major revolutions usually take longer.
How to avoid it
The February Revolution took 5 days (23-27 February OS) in the streets; the abdication came on 2 March; Mikhail refused on 3 March. The whole process from first strikes to end of dynasty was 9 days. The speed reflects how ready the regime was to fall — structural causes had been building for decades.
✕Saying Nicholas II abdicated of his own choice without pressure.
Why it happens
He signed the document.
How to avoid it
Nicholas was under massive pressure: army defection in Petrograd (27 Feb), train diverted to Pskov (1 March), generals' collective recommendation (Alekseyev's poll: Brusilov, Ruzsky, Evert, Grand Duke Nicholas), Duma demand (Guchkov + Shulgin), imperial family plotting, Allied warnings. He abdicated because almost everyone of consequence had concluded he must — he no longer had political or military capacity to refuse.
✕Saying the army remained loyal to the Tsar throughout the February Revolution.
Why it happens
Armies usually support governments.
How to avoid it
The Petrograd garrison mutinied on 27 February (Volynsky Regiment killed Captain Lashkevich, then Litovsky/Preobrazhensky/Moscow followed); ~80,000-100,000 soldiers joined the revolution. At Stavka, the generals (Alekseyev's poll) recommended abdication. The army — the regime's ultimate base — defected. This was the decisive moment of the revolution.
✕Saying Dual Power was a stable arrangement.
Why it happens
It lasted 8 months.
How to avoid it
Dual Power was inherently unstable — the Provisional Government had formal authority but the Soviet had real power over workers/soldiers/transport. The Soviet declined to take government itself (Marx's stage theory); the Provisional Government could not act effectively without Soviet support. The arrangement produced political stalemate that undermined the Provisional Government and contributed to its October 1917 fall.
✕Saying the Romanov dynasty was founded by Nicholas II.
Why it happens
Confusion about dynastic history.
How to avoid it
The Romanov dynasty began in 1613 when Michael I was elected Tsar by the Zemsky Sobor, ending the 'Time of Troubles'. It ruled Russia for over 300 years (1613-1917). Nicholas II was the last Romanov ruler, not the founder. His abdication ended the dynasty (3 March 1917).

The February/March 1917 Revolution and the Fall of the Tsar — Cambridge IGCSE History 0470

The February/March 1917 Revolution and the Fall of the Tsar

Short Notes - The February/March 1917 Revolution and the Fall of the Tsar

Detailed Study Notes

At a glance

What you’ll learn

Quick recap

How it’s examined

Take this whole topic with you

1Describe the February Revolution

2Describe Nicholas II's abdication

3Paper 4: Write an account of how the Tsar fell in 1917

4Explain why the Petrograd garrison joined the revolution

5Paper 4: How important was spontaneity in the February Revolution?

6Paper 2 source skill: a Women's Day photograph

February Revolution

International Women's Day 1917

Putilov Works lockout

Volynsky Regiment mutiny

Znamenskaya Square shootings

Petrograd Soviet (1917)

Dual Power (Dvoevlastiye)

Provisional Government (March 1917)

Soviet Order No. 1

Pskov abdication

Grand Duke Mikhail's refusal

Mikhail Rodzianko

Alexander Kerensky (February 1917)

End of the Romanov dynasty

Lenin's return (3 April 1917)

✕Saying the Bolsheviks led the February Revolution.

✕Saying the February Revolution took weeks or months.

✕Saying Nicholas II abdicated of his own choice without pressure.

✕Saying the army remained loyal to the Tsar throughout the February Revolution.

✕Saying Dual Power was a stable arrangement.

✕Saying the Romanov dynasty was founded by Nicholas II.

The February/March 1917 Revolution and the Fall of the Tsar

Short Notes - The February/March 1917 Revolution and the Fall of the Tsar

Detailed Study Notes

At a glance

What you’ll learn

Quick recap

How it’s examined

Take this whole topic with you

1Describe the February Revolution

2Describe Nicholas II's abdication

3Paper 4: Write an account of how the Tsar fell in 1917

4Explain why the Petrograd garrison joined the revolution

5Paper 4: How important was spontaneity in the February Revolution?

6Paper 2 source skill: a Women's Day photograph

February Revolution

International Women's Day 1917

Putilov Works lockout

Volynsky Regiment mutiny

Znamenskaya Square shootings

Petrograd Soviet (1917)

Dual Power (Dvoevlastiye)

Provisional Government (March 1917)

Soviet Order No. 1

Pskov abdication

Grand Duke Mikhail's refusal

Mikhail Rodzianko

Alexander Kerensky (February 1917)

End of the Romanov dynasty

Lenin's return (3 April 1917)

✕Saying the Bolsheviks led the February Revolution.

✕Saying the February Revolution took weeks or months.