Russia Under the Provisional Government: Hope and Failure

Formation of the Provisional Government (2 March 1917). On 2 March 1917 (Old Style; 15 March New Style), the Duma's Provisional Committee (formed five days earlier) reorganised itself into a Provisional Government to rule Russia until a Constituent Assembly could be elected to determine Russia's permanent form of government.

Composition of the first Provisional Government:

• Prince Georgy Lvov (Kadet, aristocrat, head of the Zemstvo Union): Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior.
• Pavel Milyukov (Kadets): Foreign Minister.
• Alexander Guchkov (Octobrists): War Minister.
• Alexander Kerensky (Trudovik/SR-affiliated): Justice Minister — the only socialist in the cabinet; also member of the Petrograd Soviet, providing crucial link.
• Mikhail Tereshchenko (sugar magnate): Finance Minister.
• Aleksandr Konovalov (industrialist): Trade and Industry Minister.
• Andrei Shingarev (Kadets): Agriculture Minister.
• And other liberal-conservative figures.

The government was liberal-conservative in composition — dominated by Kadets and Octobrists, with one socialist (Kerensky) providing a link to the Soviet.

The Petrograd Soviet (continuing). The Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies continued in parallel:

• Chaired by Menshevik Nikolai Chkheidze.
• Vice-chair: Alexander Kerensky (also Justice Minister — the link figure).
• ~3,000 delegates by mid-March (workers and soldiers).
• Dominated by Mensheviks and SRs; Bolsheviks a minority (~10%).
• Met daily at the Tauride Palace.

The Dual Power (Dvoevlastiye). The arrangement was the famous Dual Power:

• Provisional Government: formal legal authority — recognised by Russia's Allies (Britain, France, the USA), by the bureaucracy, by international diplomacy.
• Petrograd Soviet: real power — control over workers (factory committees), soldiers (Soviet Order No. 1), transport (railway workers), communications (telegraph and postal workers).

The Provisional Government could not act without Soviet support. The Soviet's leaders (Mensheviks, SRs) believed Marx's stage theory of history required a bourgeois-democratic stage before socialist revolution, so they declined to take government themselves. They saw the Soviet's role as revolutionary watchdog — ensuring the Provisional Government honoured democratic commitments.

This was a fundamentally unstable arrangement.

The first achievements (March-April 1917). The Provisional Government and Soviet jointly implemented major reforms in early March:

Civil liberties:

• Full freedom of speech, press, assembly, association.
• Political prisoners released: ~88,000 freed from prisons; Siberian exiles returned (Stalin, Kamenev, and others arrived from March onwards).
• Death penalty abolished for civilian crimes (later partially restored).
• Police replaced by people's militia.
• Capital punishment for political crimes abolished.

Political reforms:

• Universal suffrage for the future Constituent Assembly — Russia became the country with the most democratic electoral law in the world.
• National minority rights: Polish independence granted (March 1917); Finnish autonomy restored; Jewish disabilities abolished; Pale of Settlement ended.
• Religious tolerance: full religious freedom proclaimed.

Worker rights:

• Eight-hour working day granted by employers under Soviet pressure (Petrograd, then spreading).
• Trade unions legalised without restrictions.
• Strike right affirmed.

For a few weeks, Russia became — temporarily — the freest country in the world. Civil liberties unmatched in any European country existed in 1917 Russia.

The unsolved problems. But the Provisional Government faced four impossible problems that it could not solve:

1. The war. The Provisional Government committed to continuing the war alongside Britain and France. Milyukov as Foreign Minister was particularly determined to fulfil Russia's treaty obligations and seek the territorial gains promised by the Allies (Constantinople, the Straits). The decision to continue the war was made for several reasons:

• Russia's treaty obligations to Britain and France.
• Liberal opinion wanted to defend democracy against German autocracy.
• Allied loans depended on continued Russian participation.
• No alternative to outright surrender — which would have meant German occupation.

But continued war meant continued casualties, continued food shortages, continued home-front crisis. The Bolshevik slogan would become 'Peace, Land, Bread' — and the Provisional Government could deliver none.

2. The land question. ~80% of Russians were peasants; ~15 million had been conscripted; their families wanted land redistribution. The Provisional Government deferred the land question to the future Constituent Assembly — Lvov and Kadets did not want to alienate landlords; SR support for land reform was in the Soviet, not the government.

The deferral was politically disastrous. Peasants began seizing land directly through 1917 — first in Volga regions, then more widely; the Provisional Government's authority in rural Russia collapsed. By autumn 1917, peasant 'jacqueries' (rural uprisings) were widespread.

3. Food and economic crisis. The war-time crisis continued unabated:

• Inflation: continued rising; ~600% by autumn 1917.
• Food shortages: bread queues in cities; peasants hoarding grain.
• Fuel shortages: factories closing; cold winters threatened again.
• Transport collapse: locomotive shortage continuing.
• Strikes: continued through 1917, increasingly anti-government.

The Provisional Government tried price controls and grain monopoly but enforcement was weak. The economic crisis the regime had inherited grew worse.

4. Dual Power itself. The Dual Power arrangement was inherently dysfunctional:

• The Provisional Government could not implement policies the Soviet opposed.
• The Soviet could not govern but could veto.
• Decision-making was slow; key reforms delayed.
• Soviet Order No. 1 had transferred soldier loyalty to the Soviet; the army's discipline collapsed.
• The two bodies competed for legitimacy.

The arrangement was a recipe for political paralysis, which would prove fatal as the year progressed.

Lenin's view from Switzerland. Vladimir Lenin in Swiss exile had reacted to the February Revolution with intense interest. He read of it in newspapers; he began planning his return. He developed the view that:

• The February Revolution was the bourgeois-democratic stage Marxist theory required.
• But Russia could and should move directly to socialist revolution without waiting.
• The Provisional Government was bourgeois and must be opposed.
• The Soviets — workers' and soldiers' councils — were the embryo of a new socialist state.
• The Bolsheviks should reject any cooperation with the Provisional Government.

This view contradicted Menshevik (and even most Bolshevik) orthodoxy. Lenin developed it in his 'Letters from Afar' sent from Switzerland in mid-March. The Bolshevik leadership in Petrograd (Stalin, Kamenev) initially rejected Lenin's position as too radical; they were taking a moderate stance supporting the Provisional Government conditionally.

Lenin's return on 3 April would change everything.

Lenin in Switzerland, February-April 1917. Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (Lenin) had been in Swiss exile since 1914. When the February Revolution began he was in Zürich; he heard of it from Swiss newspapers on 2 March 1917 (Old Style). His reaction was a mixture of excitement and concern:

• Excited that the autocracy had fallen.
• Concerned that the Mensheviks and SRs would support the Provisional Government and the war.
• Determined to return to Russia immediately to direct Bolshevik policy.

The journey home. Getting back to Russia was difficult. Britain and France would not allow Lenin to travel through Allied territory — they correctly suspected he would disrupt Russia's war effort. After negotiations, the German government agreed to transport Lenin and ~30 other Russian revolutionaries across Germany in a 'sealed train' (a train without immigration formalities). The Germans hoped Lenin would weaken Russia's war effort — they were correct.

Lenin's journey:

• 27 March 1917: left Switzerland.
• Sealed train across Germany (Zürich to Sassnitz on the Baltic).
• Ferry from Sassnitz to Trelleborg (Sweden, neutral).
• Train through Sweden to Finland (then part of Russia).
• 3 April 1917 (Old Style; 16 April New Style): arrived at the Finland Station in Petrograd.

At the Finland Station, Lenin was met by a large crowd of Bolshevik supporters with a band playing the Marseillaise. Chkheidze (Menshevik Soviet chairman) tried to greet him with a formal welcome speech emphasising socialist solidarity and the Provisional Government. Lenin ignored Chkheidze entirely and addressed the crowd directly, denouncing the Provisional Government and the imperialist war.

The April Theses (4 April 1917). The next day, 4 April 1917, Lenin delivered his 'April Theses' — first to a Bolshevik meeting at the Tauride Palace, then to a joint Bolshevik-Menshevik meeting (where the Mensheviks denounced him). Published in Pravda on 7 April, the theses were Lenin's programme for the Bolsheviks. The ten key points:

1. No support for the Provisional Government: it is a bourgeois government continuing the imperialist war.
2. Immediate end to the war: 'revolutionary defencism' rejected — peace must come now.
3. All power to the Soviets: the Soviet system, not parliament, is the future.
4. No parliamentary republic: a republic of Soviets of Workers', Agricultural Labourers' and Peasants' Deputies.
5. Confiscation of all landed estates for redistribution to peasants.
6. Nationalisation of all land: under control of local soviets.
7. Single national bank: under Soviet control.
8. Workers' control of production: factory committees to control production.
9. Renaming the party: from Russian Social Democratic Labour Party to 'Communist Party' (reflecting Marx, not the discredited Second International).
10. A new International: a Third (Communist) International to replace the Second International that had supported the war.

The immediate reaction. Lenin's April Theses were shocking:

• Mensheviks denounced him as 'Bonapartist', 'utopian', divorced from reality.
• Most Bolsheviks were stunned. Kamenev wrote a Pravda editorial arguing against the theses as 'unacceptable'. Stalin had been taking the moderate Bolshevik line in Petrograd.
• Plekhanov (the 'father of Russian Marxism') called the theses 'delirious'.
• SRs dismissed them as fantasy.

But Lenin persisted. Through April he campaigned within the Bolshevik party to win them to his position. The arguments were intense: most Bolshevik veterans (Kamenev, Zinoviev, and at first Stalin) preferred a moderate stance, working within the Provisional Government framework. Lenin argued that the Russian Revolution must be a socialist revolution now, not a bourgeois-democratic one waiting for capitalism to mature.

The April Crisis (18-21 April 1917). Lenin's position was vindicated by the April Crisis.

Background: Milyukov as Foreign Minister had been pressing Allied war aims. On 18 April 1917 (1 May NS), he sent a diplomatic note to the Allies promising continued Russian war effort for full pre-war war aims including territorial annexations (Constantinople, the Straits).

The note was leaked to the press and caused massive anti-government demonstrations in Petrograd on 20-21 April. Demonstrators demanded:

• Milyukov's resignation.
• End of the war.
• 'Down with annexationist war aims'.

The crisis was the first major popular protest against the Provisional Government. The Soviet's leadership was alarmed; the Soviet pressured the government.

The first coalition (5 May 1917). The April Crisis forced a government reshuffle. Milyukov resigned (later joined the Russian National Centre); Guchkov resigned as War Minister (replaced by Kerensky). A new first coalition government was formed on 5 May 1917:

• Prince Lvov remained as PM.
• Kerensky became War Minister (taking responsibility for the war).
• Tereshchenko became Foreign Minister.
• Victor Chernov (SR) became Agriculture Minister.
• Irakli Tsereteli (Menshevik) became Posts and Telegraphs Minister.
• Total: 6 socialists in a 16-member cabinet.

The socialist Mensheviks and SRs had entered the government — formally bridging the Dual Power gap. For the moderate left, this was the optimum political settlement: socialist participation in government to direct it toward reform.

For Lenin, this was 'class betrayal' by the Mensheviks and SRs. The Bolsheviks now stood alone as the only major party rejecting the Provisional Government entirely.

Bolshevik growth (April-July 1917). Through April-July 1917, the Bolsheviks grew rapidly:

• February 1917: ~24,000 members across Russia.
• April 1917: ~80,000 members.
• July 1917: ~240,000 members.

The growth came from workers and soldiers disillusioned with the Provisional Government's continuation of the war, failure to address land, and the worsening food crisis. Lenin's slogans — 'Peace, Land, Bread' and 'All Power to the Soviets' — were simple, clear, and addressed exactly what the population wanted.

The party transformed. By mid-1917 the Bolshevik party was being transformed by Lenin:

• From Menshevik-compatible moderate party to revolutionary socialist party.
• From small underground organisation to mass workers' party.
• From following Soviet policy to challenging it.
• From defending Russia to opposing the war.

The April Theses had been ridiculed; by autumn 1917 they would be Bolshevik policy preparing for the seizure of power.

The June Offensive (18 June - 16 July 1917). By June 1917, Kerensky as War Minister needed to demonstrate Russia could still fight. The Allies (Britain, France) were pressing for a Russian offensive to relieve pressure on the Western Front. Kerensky launched the June Offensive (also called the Kerensky Offensive or the Galician Offensive) — Russia's last major military operation of WWI.

Plan and objectives:

• Attack along the Galician Front against Austria-Hungary and German troops supporting them.
• Restore Russian military credibility with the Allies.
• Restore discipline by giving the army a successful campaign.
• Strengthen the Provisional Government politically through victory.

Kerensky's mobilisation:

• He toured the front giving impassioned speeches to inspire troops — the famous 'persuader-in-chief' tour.
• Spent ~6 weeks visiting units.
• Some units cheered; others were skeptical.
• Soldiers' committees debated whether to obey orders to attack.

The offensive (18 June - mid-July 1917). The offensive opened on 18 June 1917 (Old Style; 1 July New Style):

• Initial gains (first 3-4 days): Russian forces captured Halicz and Kalush in Galicia.
• Then collapse: many soldiers refused to advance; others retreated when Austrian counter-attacks came.
• German counter-attack (19 July OS): a fresh German offensive broke the Russian line; Russian forces retreated in disarray.
• Russia lost much of Galicia; ~400,000 Russian casualties; mass desertion.

Consequences of the June Offensive:

• Total military failure: Russia could not effectively continue the war.
• Army discipline destroyed: the offensive showed that soldiers' committees would not enforce attack orders; mass desertion ran into the millions; soldiers were leaving the front to claim land.
• Kerensky's prestige damaged: he had been the architect of the offensive.
• Soldiers turned against the Provisional Government: their slogan became 'Peace!' — exactly what the Bolsheviks promised.
• Bolshevik growth accelerated: anti-war sentiment surged.

The June Offensive completed the destruction of the Russian army as a fighting force. From this point, mass desertion became the dominant reality — soldiers walked home in unprecedented numbers.

The July Days (3-7 July 1917, Old Style). The June Offensive's failure triggered the July Days — a chaotic semi-uprising in Petrograd that nearly destroyed the Bolshevik party.

Background: By early July, Petrograd was in a fever:

• June Offensive collapsing.
• Food shortages worsening.
• Anti-war sentiment intense among soldiers and sailors.
• Bolshevik propaganda demanding 'All Power to the Soviets'.
• Sailors of Kronstadt (a naval base near Petrograd, dominated by anarchists and Bolsheviks) particularly militant.

The Kronstadt sailors and First Machine Gun Regiment (a Petrograd unit due to be sent to the front) were primed for action.

3 July 1917 (16 July NS): spontaneous mass demonstrations began. Workers and soldiers, fearing being sent to the front, marched on the Tauride Palace demanding the Soviet take power. The crowds were armed with rifles.

4 July 1917: ~500,000 demonstrators in Petrograd. Kronstadt sailors arrived by ship. Some confrontations with troops loyal to the Provisional Government. Several deaths.

The Bolshevik dilemma. The Bolshevik Central Committee was split:

• Lenin and some others: thought the uprising was premature; the Bolsheviks lacked national support; the moment was not right.
• Kamenev and others: wanted to support the demonstrations.
• Trotsky (who had recently joined the Bolsheviks from the Mezhraiontsy faction in July): pragmatic.

In the end, the Bolsheviks decided to lead the demonstrations but not press for full insurrection. Lenin gave a speech to demonstrators from the Kshesinskaya Mansion (Bolshevik HQ) calling for restraint while supporting their demands. He was uncertain.

The collapse of the July Days. On 4-5 July the Provisional Government counter-attacked:

• Released to the press documents allegedly showing Lenin was a German agent paid to disrupt Russia (the 'July Letters' — partly forgeries but with some truth about German money for Bolshevik propaganda).
• Loyal troops (especially Cossacks) cleared the streets.
• Public mood turned against the Bolsheviks: anti-German sentiment was deep, and the 'German agent' rumour stuck.
• Bolshevik newspapers shut down.
• Bolshevik leaders arrested: Trotsky, Lunacharsky, Kamenev arrested; Bolshevik HQ raided.
• Lenin fled to Finland disguised as a railway worker (he hid in Razliv at the lakeside, then crossed to Finland).

By 7 July 1917, the July Days were over. The Bolsheviks had been discredited and dispersed. The Provisional Government had won.

The political consequences.

1. Lvov resigns; Kerensky becomes Prime Minister (8 July 1917). Prince Lvov resigned as Prime Minister, exhausted and unable to continue. Alexander Kerensky became Prime Minister on 8 July 1917 (21 July NS). He combined PM and War Minister; he formed a second coalition government with more socialists. Kerensky was now the dominant figure in Russian politics.

2. The Bolsheviks suppressed (temporarily).

• Lenin in Finland.
• Trotsky in prison.
• Bolshevik newspapers banned.
• Party membership dropping.
• Many believed the Bolsheviks were finished.

3. Apparent victory for the moderate left. The Mensheviks and SRs in government, with Bolsheviks suppressed and the war continuing, the moderate left appeared in control. This appearance would be deeply misleading.

Why the July Days mattered (in retrospect). The July Days are often dismissed as a Bolshevik failure but they had several long-term consequences:

• The Bolsheviks learned what NOT to do: a premature uprising without national support fails. Lenin would be more careful in October.
• The Bolsheviks now identified with armed insurrection — a position they would consolidate by October.
• The 'German agent' charge would haunt Lenin but did not destroy the Bolsheviks long-term.
• The Provisional Government's authority looked stronger temporarily but rested on shaky foundations — the army was disintegrating, the economy was collapsing, the population was radicalising.

By mid-July 1917, the Bolsheviks had been beaten, the Provisional Government had survived, and Kerensky was the strong man. But this was only the appearance of stability. The next crisis was approaching — the Kornilov Affair — which would transform the political landscape again.

The crisis after July. After the July Days, Kerensky's Provisional Government appeared stronger but faced multiple challenges:

• Army disintegrating: mass desertion after the June Offensive failure.
• Economy collapsing: inflation, food shortages worsening.
• Bolsheviks suppressed but recovering: their slogans still resonated.
• Right-wing pressure: conservatives and military officers wanted firmer government.
• National minorities: Ukraine declaring autonomy; Finland pushing for independence.
• Constituent Assembly elections repeatedly delayed.

Kerensky's response: try to strengthen his government by appealing to both moderates and the army.

General Lavr Kornilov. Lavr Georgyevich Kornilov (1870-1918) was a charismatic Russian general:

• Cossack background from Western Siberia; mother was Kazakh; striking 'Asian' appearance commented on at the time.
• Brilliant military record in the Russo-Japanese War and WWI.
• Famously escaped from Austrian captivity in 1916, disguised as a peasant.
• Conservative monarchist in political sympathies.
• Hostile to Soviet Order No. 1 and to soldiers' committees that destroyed army discipline.

Kerensky appointed Kornilov Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army on 18 July 1917, replacing General Brusilov. Kerensky thought a strong general could restore army discipline.

But Kornilov had his own political agenda. He wanted:

• Death penalty restored at the front for discipline.
• Soldiers' committees abolished.
• Trade-union restrictions reimposed.
• Order restored in the rear.
• Some kind of military dictatorship to save Russia.

The Moscow State Conference (12-15 August 1917). Kerensky convened a Moscow State Conference in mid-August to demonstrate national unity. ~2,400 delegates from Soviets, Dumas, professional organisations, etc. attended.

Kornilov made a triumphal entry into Moscow — hailed by right-wing delegates as the man to save Russia. He demanded militant measures. The conference revealed the growing political divide: the left (Soviets, Bolsheviks, some moderates) feared Kornilov; the right embraced him.

The Kornilov Affair: what happened (25-31 August 1917).

What happened next is one of the most disputed episodes of 1917, with two contradictory narratives:

Kornilov's account: Kerensky had asked him to march troops on Petrograd to restore order against Bolsheviks and to back the government against radicals. Kornilov was acting on Kerensky's orders.

Kerensky's account: Kornilov was attempting a military coup against the government. Kerensky had not authorised it.

The truth is contested. The intermediary was Vladimir Lvov (a politician, no relation to Prince Lvov) who carried messages between Kornilov and Kerensky. Lvov may have misunderstood or distorted what each said. Modern historians believe there was a mutual misunderstanding: Kerensky and Kornilov each thought they were cooperating, but each interpreted the cooperation differently.

The unfolding crisis:

25 August 1917: Kornilov began moving the Third Cavalry Corps (commanded by General Krymov) and the Native (Wild) Division toward Petrograd. The stated purpose: restore order in case of Bolshevik uprising; or, alternatively, install Kornilov as military dictator.

27 August: Kerensky was alarmed; he denounced Kornilov as a traitor, dismissed him from his command, and called for resistance. The political confusion was complete.

Kornilov refused to step down: he ordered his troops to continue to Petrograd. The military advance continued.

Kerensky's desperate response: arming the Bolsheviks. With his own authority shaky, Kerensky took an extraordinary step: he released Bolshevik political prisoners and armed Bolshevik workers to defend Petrograd against Kornilov:

• Trotsky and other Bolshevik leaders released from prison.
• Red Guards (Bolshevik militia) formed and armed by the Provisional Government — ~25,000 armed Bolshevik workers.
• Soviet committees organised the defence of Petrograd.
• Railway workers (loyal to the Soviet) stopped trains carrying Kornilov's troops.
• Bolshevik agitators infiltrated Kornilov's units and persuaded soldiers to refuse to attack the revolution.

The Kornilov coup collapsed:

• His troops never reached Petrograd.
• Railway workers stopped the trains.
• Soldiers refused to fight against the revolution.
• General Krymov shot himself in shame on 31 August.
• Kornilov was arrested at the front headquarters.

The Kornilov coup was over by 31 August 1917 without significant fighting in Petrograd. But the political consequences were enormous.

Consequences of the Kornilov Affair.

1. Bolshevik resurgence. The Bolsheviks emerged as the heroes of the defence of Petrograd. The 'German agent' rumour was forgotten. The Red Guards now existed and were armed. Bolshevik membership surged from ~240,000 (July) to ~350,000 (October).

2. Soviet leftward shift. The Petrograd Soviet shifted leftward dramatically. The Mensheviks and SRs were associated with Kerensky's failures; the Bolsheviks with the defence of the revolution. On 9 September 1917 (OS), the Bolsheviks won a majority in the Petrograd Soviet for the first time. Trotsky was elected chairman on 25 September. The same shift happened in the Moscow Soviet and many other city Soviets.

3. Kerensky's authority collapsed. Kerensky was politically wounded by the affair. He had:

• Quarreled with the army's commander-in-chief.
• Released and armed the Bolsheviks — his future opponents.
• Lost the right (who blamed him for betraying Kornilov).
• Lost the left (who saw him as an unreliable defender of the revolution).
• Lost the army (officers were demoralised by Kornilov's failure and disgrace).

Kerensky's government continued but was a shell.

4. Conservative right destroyed. The Kornilov Affair effectively destroyed conservative right-wing politics in Russia for the duration of 1917. The right was tainted by association with attempted coup; the army was demoralised; the Kadets were embarrassed by their tacit sympathy with Kornilov.

5. Bolshevik strategy crystallises. The Bolsheviks now had:

• Armed workers (Red Guards).
• Majorities in key Soviets.
• Released leadership (Trotsky, Kamenev).
• Lenin in Finland writing 'State and Revolution'.
• Clear path to power through the Soviets.

Lenin began calling for immediate insurrection from Finland. He wrote to the Central Committee: 'History will not forgive us if we do not assume power now.' The Bolsheviks had moved from defeat in July to dominance in October — within three months.

The wider point. The Kornilov Affair was the decisive turning point of 1917. Before it: Bolsheviks were suppressed, Provisional Government strong, moderate left dominant. After it: Bolsheviks armed and ascendant, Provisional Government discredited, moderate left collapsing. Kerensky had armed his own gravediggers.

The path from the Kornilov Affair (August) to the October Revolution (25 October) was direct. The Bolsheviks would now move to take power. The Provisional Government would not survive the year.

The autumn crisis. After the Kornilov Affair (end of August 1917), the Provisional Government faced terminal crisis on every front. The autumn months of September-October 1917 were a period of accelerating disintegration.

1. Economic collapse. The economic crisis was reaching catastrophic levels:

• Inflation: ~600% by autumn 1917; the rouble was nearly worthless.
• Food shortages: bread queues lengthening; Petrograd at risk of starvation in winter.
• Industrial output collapsing: factories shutting down for lack of fuel and materials.
• Strikes: 700,000+ workers on strike in September-October.
• Transport chaos: railway breakdown; food supplies not reaching cities.

2. Land collapse. The peasants gave up waiting for the Constituent Assembly. By autumn 1917 they were seizing land directly in a vast wave:

• ~3,500 reported peasant disturbances in September-October.
• Manor houses burned in many provinces.
• Landlords' land redistributed by village commune resolution.
• The Provisional Government's authority in rural Russia effectively ceased.

The SRs had supported land redistribution at the Constituent Assembly but accepted government policy of waiting; peasants did not wait. The Bolsheviks' position — land to the peasants now — was vindicated in practice as peasants did exactly what the Bolsheviks proposed.

3. Army disintegration. The army had been crumbling since the June Offensive. By autumn:

• Mass desertion: estimated 2 million deserters by October 1917 (out of an army of ~7 million).
• Soldiers heading home to claim land.
• Officer authority collapsed completely.
• Bolshevik agitation intense in the army.
• Soviet committees dominant in many units.

By late October, the Russian army no longer fought effectively. The front held only by inertia.

4. National minorities breaking away.

• Ukraine: the Rada (Ukrainian Council) declared autonomy; talked of independence.
• Finland: pushed for full independence.
• Baltic States: similar movements.
• Caucasus: Georgian Mensheviks moving toward autonomy.
• Central Asia: Muslim political movements.

The Russian Empire was disintegrating as well as the Russian state.

5. Constituent Assembly delays. Constituent Assembly elections were the supposed answer to all political questions, but were repeatedly delayed:

• March 1917: originally promised 'as soon as possible'.
• May 1917: announced for September.
• June 1917: announced for 17 September.
• August 1917: postponed to 12 November.
• September 1917: postponed to 25 November.

Each delay further discredited the Provisional Government. The Bolsheviks said: 'You've been waiting since March; you'll keep waiting. We promise to act NOW.'

6. Bolshevik takeover of Soviets. The most dramatic political shift was the Bolshevik takeover of the Soviets:

• 31 August/9 September 1917: Bolsheviks won majority in Petrograd Soviet for first time.
• September 1917: Bolshevik majority in Moscow Soviet.
• September-October 1917: Bolshevik majorities in most major industrial city Soviets (Kiev, Helsingfors, Reval, Saratov, etc.).
• 25 September 1917: Trotsky elected Chairman of Petrograd Soviet.

The Soviet base of legitimacy now belonged to the Bolsheviks. The Provisional Government's claim that the Soviets supported it was no longer true in the major cities.

7. Bolshevik party growth. The Bolshevik party grew rapidly:

• February 1917: ~24,000 members.
• April 1917: ~80,000.
• July 1917: ~240,000.
• October 1917: ~350,000.

The party was now a mass organisation with deep working-class roots in Petrograd and other industrial centres.

8. Red Guards. The Red Guards — Bolshevik workers' militia — had been formed during the Kornilov Affair (when Kerensky armed them). By October 1917 they numbered ~25,000-40,000 armed workers, organised in factory units, ready for further action. They were the Bolsheviks' military arm in Petrograd.

Kerensky's failed responses.

1. Republic declared (1 September 1917). Kerensky declared Russia a Republic on 1 September 1917, hoping to gain democratic legitimacy. But this was largely symbolic; substantive problems were not addressed.

2. Democratic Conference (14-22 September 1917). Kerensky convened a Democratic Conference of ~1,500 delegates to provide an interim parliament. It produced the Pre-Parliament (Council of the Republic), which began meeting on 7 October. But it had no real authority and could not save the regime.

3. Third coalition government (25 September). Kerensky formed a third coalition government with new ministers. It included socialists but excluded the Bolsheviks. It was Kerensky's last cabinet before the October Revolution.

Lenin returns from Finland (early October). Lenin had been in Finland since July (Razliv and then Helsingfors), where he wrote 'State and Revolution' — his theoretical work on the future Bolshevik state. From Finland he sent increasingly urgent letters to the Bolshevik Central Committee demanding immediate insurrection.

In early October 1917 (the exact date is disputed; possibly 7-9 October OS) Lenin secretly returned to Petrograd in disguise. He immediately pressed for armed insurrection.

The Bolshevik decision for insurrection. 10 October 1917 (OS) / 23 October NS: the Bolshevik Central Committee met secretly. After fierce debate, 10 voted for armed insurrection and 2 voted against (Kamenev and Zinoviev, who thought it premature). The decision was made.

Lenin's argument: 'History will not forgive us if we do not assume power now. To wait is criminal.'

Kamenev and Zinoviev's protest. Kamenev and Zinoviev wrote a public letter opposing insurrection, published in Maxim Gorky's newspaper Novaya Zhizn on 18 October 1917. This alerted the Provisional Government to the impending insurrection — but Kerensky still took limited counter-measures.

Final preparations (October 1917). Through October, the Bolsheviks prepared:

• Trotsky as Chairman of Petrograd Soviet established the Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC) on 12-16 October — formally to defend Petrograd against German attack; in reality to organise the insurrection.
• Red Guards prepared.
• Soldiers and sailors organised.
• Key buildings identified for seizure.
• The Winter Palace (Provisional Government HQ) targeted.

Kerensky's last days. By late October, Kerensky knew an insurrection was coming but was unable to prevent it:

• The garrison would not obey his orders.
• The Cossacks were unreliable.
• The Cadets (military students) and Junkers (officer cadets) were too few.
• Reinforcements from the front could not arrive in time.

The Provisional Government had lost the ability to defend itself.

The wider point. Between the Kornilov Affair (August) and the October Revolution (25 October), the Provisional Government disintegrated while the Bolsheviks consolidated. The Bolsheviks had:

• Armed workers (Red Guards).
• Majorities in Soviets.
• Mass party membership.
• Lenin's leadership.
• Clear simple slogans ('Peace, Land, Bread', 'All Power to the Soviets').
• A defining grievance (continued war) the government could not address.

The Provisional Government had:

• No army.
• No popular support.
• Economic collapse.
• Peasant land seizures.
• Minority breakaways.
• A Constituent Assembly that kept being delayed.

The October Revolution would be the working-out of forces already in motion — the consequence of the Provisional Government's failure rather than just a Bolshevik triumph. The Provisional Government collapsed because it could not deliver peace, land, or bread; the Bolsheviks promised to do all three.

By 25 October 1917 (OS) / 7 November NS, the Bolsheviks would seize power in Petrograd. The Provisional Government's eight-month experiment in liberal democracy was over.