Short-term responses and relief for earthquakes

A short-term response is an action taken immediately after a natural hazard (within hours to weeks) to save lives and reduce suffering [1 mark]. Examples include search and rescue, providing emergency medical care, distributing food, water and shelter, and restoring essential services such as electricity and clean water [1 mark].

1. Search and rescue — teams + dogs locate survivors in rubble within the critical 72-hour window [1 mark].
2. Emergency medical aid — field hospitals, triage and treatment of crush injuries [1 mark].
3. Provision of shelter, food and clean water — tents, food packs, water trucks for displaced populations [1 mark].

The short-term response to the Haiti 2010 earthquake (Mw 7.0, ~230,000 deaths) was largely internationally led due to Haiti's limited capacity.

Search and rescue. Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams from over 30 countries arrived within 24–72 hours, rescuing approximately 135 survivors from rubble in the first two weeks [1 mark].

Emergency medical aid. MSF (Doctors Without Borders) set up field hospitals; the US deployed the hospital ship USNS Comfort, which treated around 870 patients including many crush-injury amputations [1 mark].

Shelter, food and water. Around 1.5 million people were displaced and sheltered in UN-coordinated tent camps; the World Food Programme distributed approximately 3.5 million emergency food rations; water trucks attempted to slow a cholera outbreak that ultimately killed over 9,000 [1 mark].

International deployment. The US military deployed around 22,000 troops and 33 ships under Operation Unified Response; total international pledges reached approximately $13.5 billion [1 mark].

Despite the scale of aid, response was hampered by collapsed roads, a damaged port and the destruction of government buildings — illustrating how vulnerability shaped both the disaster and the response.

Japan's response to the Tōhoku 2011 earthquake (Mw 9.1, ~16,000 deaths) demonstrated the self-sufficiency of a well-prepared developed country.

JSDF deployment. The Japan Self-Defense Force deployed approximately 100,000 troops within days — the largest peacetime mobilisation in Japanese history [1 mark].

Sheltering the displaced. Around 470,000 displaced people were sheltered in schools, community centres and gymnasiums, supported by Japan's drilled emergency response system; field hospitals provided medical care [1 mark].

Limited but symbolic international aid. Although approximately 163 countries offered aid, Japan accepted only a fraction; the US deployed around 24,000 personnel and ~24 ships under Operation Tomodachi to assist [1 mark].

Nuclear emergency response. The cascading Fukushima Daiichi nuclear meltdown forced the evacuation of around 470,000 people within the 20–30 km exclusion zone; TEPCO + JSDF teams worked to cool reactors and contain radiation, adding a unique dimension to the short-term response [1 mark].

Japan's response shows how preparation, organisation and self-reliance can manage even an Mw 9.1 event — although Fukushima exposed gaps in planning for cascading hazards.

Typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines on 8 November 2013 as a Category 5 super typhoon with sustained winds of ~315 km/h and a storm surge up to 7 m; it killed approximately 6,300 people and displaced ~4 million.

Search and rescue. The Philippine Armed Forces, supported by approximately 57 international teams, rescued tens of thousands; Tacloban — the worst-hit city — was reached only after debris was cleared from roads, the runway and port [1 mark].

Emergency medical aid. The WHO coordinated international medical teams; field hospitals were established in Tacloban and Ormoc; body recovery and identification was slow due to the death toll and damaged infrastructure [1 mark].

Shelter, food and clean water. Approximately 4 million people were displaced; the UN World Food Programme distributed food packs; clean water was airlifted into affected areas; tarpaulins and tents replaced destroyed homes [1 mark].

International military aid. The US deployed the aircraft carrier USS George Washington and approximately 13,400 personnel; the UK sent HMS Daring; Australia, Japan and other nations contributed military airlift capacity [1 mark].

International funding. The UN appeal for Haiyan raised approximately $1.5 billion within weeks; major NGOs (Red Cross, Oxfam, World Vision) mobilised hundreds of millions in additional funding [1 mark].

Logistical and secondary-impact challenges. Tacloban airport runway and ports were destroyed, delaying aid by 3–5 days in some areas; standing water and lack of sanitation triggered diarrhoea and respiratory outbreaks within two weeks of impact [1 mark].

Overall, Haiyan demonstrated the immense scale required to respond to a Category 5 cyclone in an archipelagic developing country — and how logistical destruction can delay even well-funded international aid.

Short-term international aid plays a vital but uneven role in responding to natural hazards. Its effectiveness depends on the country's capacity, the scale of the disaster and the speed of mobilisation.

Where it works well. In countries with limited domestic capacity, international aid is often the only realistic source of large-scale relief. After Haiti 2010, USAR teams from 30+ countries rescued around 135 survivors; the US deployed ~22,000 troops; and pledges of ~$13.5 billion enabled basic shelter and food distribution for ~1.5 million displaced people. Without this aid, the death toll and suffering would have been even higher [2 marks].

Where it is less effective. Aid is often slow to arrive when local infrastructure is destroyed. After Typhoon Haiyan 2013, Tacloban airport and ports were unusable, delaying aid by 3–5 days; many died waiting. Coordination problems also arise — in Haiti, thousands of NGOs operated with little coordination, leading to duplication in some areas and gaps in others. International pledges are often only partly delivered: of Haiti's ~$13.5 billion pledged, only a fraction was disbursed within the first year [2 marks].

Comparison with self-sufficient response. Japan's Tōhoku 2011 response shows that a prepared, developed country can respond largely without international aid — the JSDF deployed ~100,000 troops and most displaced were sheltered domestically. This points to a key conclusion: international aid is essential for low-capacity countries but is not a substitute for preparation and domestic capacity [1 mark].

Conclusion. Short-term international aid saves lives but is uneven, slow when infrastructure is destroyed, and limited by donor fatigue. Investing in PREPARATION (drills, codes, EEWS) and DOMESTIC CAPACITY in vulnerable countries gives a far higher return on lives saved [1 mark].

Short-term responses vary by hazard type — but in all three cases, the same Pearson responses appear: search + rescue, medical aid, shelter/food/water, restoring services and international aid. The differences lie in WHO leads, HOW FAST, and which hazard-specific actions are needed.

Earthquake — Haiti 2010 (Mw 7.0, ~230k deaths). The response was internationally led because Haiti's government was overwhelmed. USAR teams from 30+ countries rescued ~135 survivors; MSF + USNS Comfort provided medical care; ~1.5 million displaced lived in UN tent camps; the US deployed ~22,000 troops; total pledges ~$13.5 billion. Earthquake-specific actions: rescue from collapsed buildings within the 72-hour 'golden window'; treatment of crush injuries (frequent amputations) [2 marks].

Volcanic eruption — Eyjafjallajökull 2010 (VEI 4, Iceland). Direct human impacts were small — only ~700 evacuated from flood-prone areas, no fatalities. The 'response' was dominated by AVIATION-sector response rather than humanitarian aid: European airspace closed for 6 days, ~107,000 flights cancelled, ~$5 billion in aviation losses. Airlines repositioned aircraft, governments coordinated alternative transport (rail, ferry, road). Iceland's authorities handled evacuation and lahar flood response domestically. Volcano-specific actions: ash-cloud monitoring + airspace closure + lahar evacuation [2 marks].

Tropical cyclone — Typhoon Haiyan 2013 (Cat 5, Philippines). Hybrid response: Philippine government led, supported by major international military and humanitarian aid. ~4 million displaced; ~6,300 deaths; ~57 international teams; US deployed USS George Washington with ~13,400 personnel; UN appeal raised ~$1.5 billion. Cyclone-specific actions: storm surge rescue (boats + helicopters); rapid burial to prevent disease; clean water airlift to combat post-flood epidemics [2 marks].

Comparison + conclusion. Across all three: international military + NGO aid was critical where domestic capacity was overwhelmed (Haiti, Philippines); domestic response sufficed where capacity was strong (Iceland). Cascading hazards required hazard-specific responses — crush injuries (earthquake), aviation closures (volcano), waterborne disease (cyclone). The key variable is NOT the hazard type but the COUNTRY's CAPACITY + PREPARATION [2 marks].

Short-term responses to natural hazards vary enormously between countries — and the principal cause is wealth and preparation rather than the hazard itself. Comparing Haiti 2010, Tōhoku 2011 and Typhoon Haiyan 2013 makes this clear.

**Case 1 — Haiti 2010 (Mw 7.0, ~230,000 deaths, ~$8 billion damage).** Despite a moderate magnitude (M7.0), Haiti's response was catastrophically slow and externally dependent. With no enforced building code, the presidential palace and main hospital collapsed; with no national rescue capacity, the country relied entirely on international USAR teams (30+ countries) — many of which took 24-72 hours to arrive. ~135 survivors were rescued from rubble; many died waiting. ~1.5 million people were displaced into UN tent camps; cholera outbreaks killed >9,000. International pledges reached ~$13.5 billion but only a fraction was disbursed in the first year [2 marks].

Case 2 — Tōhoku 2011 (Mw 9.1, ~16,000 deaths, ~$235 billion damage). Japan was struck by an earthquake ~700× more powerful than Haiti's — yet ~14× FEWER people died. The JSDF deployed ~100,000 troops within days; ~470,000 displaced were sheltered in schools and community centres; medical care continued in largely intact hospitals; only limited international aid was needed (US Operation Tomodachi ~24,000 personnel). Japan's preparation — EEWS giving Tokyo ~60 seconds warning, building codes since 1981, annual drills — was decisive. The exception was Fukushima Daiichi, where preparation for cascading nuclear-tsunami hazards proved inadequate [2 marks].

Case 3 — Typhoon Haiyan 2013 (Cat 5, ~6,300 deaths, ~4m displaced). The Philippines is an emerging country with intermediate capacity. The government led the response with ~57 international teams supporting; the US deployed ~13,400 personnel with USS George Washington; the UN appeal raised ~$1.5 billion. However, infrastructure failure (Tacloban airport destroyed) delayed aid by 3-5 days, and ~4 million displaced overwhelmed shelter capacity. Bangladesh's cyclone preparation programme — which cut cyclone deaths ~99% (500,000 in 1970 → 26 in 2020) — shows what cheap preparation could have achieved in the Philippines [2 marks].

Counter-argument — hazard type DOES matter. Some hazards intrinsically require different responses regardless of country: earthquakes need rapid rubble-rescue + crush-injury medical capacity; cyclones need pre-evacuation + post-flood disease control; volcanoes need ash-cloud aviation responses (Eyjafjallajökull 2010 closed European airspace 6 days). The TYPE of response is shaped by the hazard; the EFFECTIVENESS is shaped by the country [2 marks].

Evaluation. The evidence overwhelmingly supports the statement. Haiti (M7.0, low capacity) suffered ~14× more deaths than Japan (M9.1, high capacity); Bangladesh shows that even poor countries can dramatically cut deaths with cheap preparation. The hazard determines the TYPE of response needed; wealth and preparation determine its SPEED, SCALE and EFFECTIVENESS. Investment in preparation gives far higher return than reliance on post-disaster international aid [2 marks].