A change in the exchange rate — nominal or real — affects an economy through many channels, three of which are highlighted in the question: FDI inflows, economic growth, and inflation. The channels operate on different time scales, in different directions, and with different sensitivities to the drivers of the exchange-rate move. The policy question — whether to stabilise the rate — depends on which effects dominate and on the alternatives available for stabilising each outcome directly.
Channel 1 — FDI inflows.
FDI flows respond to the exchange rate through two main mechanisms. First, a depreciation lowers the foreign-currency cost of acquiring domestic assets, which makes the host country cheaper for cross-border investors — this tends to RAISE FDI inflows, especially for cost-sensitive export-oriented investment. Second, a depreciation that reflects weak fundamentals can signal risk and lower expected real returns — this tends to LOWER FDI inflows, especially for market-seeking investment and in economies with weak institutional credibility.
The net effect depends on the type of FDI. Export-platform FDI (where the foreign investor serves third-country markets from the host) is attracted by cheaper labour and asset costs; a depreciation typically raises inflows. Market-seeking FDI (where the investor serves the host's own market) sees a depreciation as a signal of weak purchasing power and risk; inflows typically fall. Resource-seeking and strategic-asset FDI are intermediate.
Exchange-rate VOLATILITY is a separate issue. High volatility raises uncertainty on expected cash flows and discourages all types of FDI, independent of the direction of the move. A volatile regime discourages FDI even when the average rate is fundamentally correct.
Channel 2 — economic growth.
Exchange-rate movements affect growth through net exports and through investment. A depreciation raises net exports in the medium run (subject to the Marshall-Lerner condition PEDx+PEDm>1) and so lifts aggregate demand and growth, with the J-curve dip in the short run. An appreciation does the opposite — reduces net exports, pulls output below potential, slows growth.
The size of the effect depends on export share of GDP and on pass-through. For a highly open export-oriented economy (export share 40%+), exchange-rate movements have large growth effects. For a less open economy (export share 10-15%), effects are smaller.
The effect on investment runs through two channels: (i) exchange-rate volatility raises risk and dampens investment, especially in tradable sectors; (ii) a sustained real depreciation raises exporters' profitability and encourages investment in capacity expansion, while a sustained real appreciation discourages it. The investment channel has a longer time scale (5-10 years) than the trade channel (1-3 years).
Channel 3 — inflation.
Exchange-rate movements affect inflation through pass-through. A depreciation raises the domestic-currency price of imported final goods (direct effect) and imported intermediate inputs (indirect effect, raising production costs). The size of the pass-through depends on import share of consumption and production, the elasticity of demand for imports, and whether firms absorb the cost rise in margins.
Pass-through can set off a wage-price spiral in economies with weak monetary-policy credibility. In those economies the real-exchange-rate competitiveness gain is quickly eroded as domestic inflation outpaces foreign inflation, which from RER=NER×(Pd/Pf) brings the real exchange rate back towards its pre-depreciation level. The headline nominal depreciation does not translate into durable real competitiveness.
An appreciation operates in the opposite direction — lower imported inflation. For an economy with inflation above target, this is a benefit; for an economy already at target, it can push inflation below target.
Should policy stabilise the exchange rate?
Case for stabilisation.
(i) Reducing exchange-rate volatility raises FDI inflows and investment generally, by lowering uncertainty premiums on cross-border cash flows.
(ii) Stabilisation imports price stability through anchoring, especially for an economy with weak monetary-policy credibility — the inflation benefits of a credible peg can be large.
(iii) Stabilisation smooths growth by preventing large destabilising moves that would otherwise force rapid internal adjustment.
(iv) It raises certainty for exporters and importers, facilitating trade.
Case against stabilisation.
(i) Stabilising the exchange rate requires sacrificing monetary-policy independence (impossible trinity under open capital markets). The cost of giving up independent monetary policy for domestic stabilisation is typically very large — the economy cannot use interest rates to manage inflation or employment when they diverge from the anchor's.
(ii) The exchange rate's role as an AUTOMATIC adjustment mechanism is lost. External shocks that would otherwise be absorbed by exchange-rate moves must now be absorbed by domestic adjustment — output, employment, wages — which is more painful.
(iii) Stabilisation requires reserves and may still fail against speculative attack. Failed stabilisation efforts are costly.
(iv) Policy stabilisation of the exchange rate conflates its role as a MACROECONOMIC VARIABLE (which the central bank should want to influence for domestic objectives) and as a PRICE (which should reflect fundamentals). The two objectives can conflict.
Qualifications.
Alternative stabilisation tools. Many of the benefits of exchange-rate stabilisation (price stability, lower uncertainty) can be achieved by direct inflation targeting and macroprudential policy, without surrendering monetary-policy independence. For many modern economies these alternatives dominate.
Degree of stabilisation. A fully fixed rate is one option; a managed float that smooths volatility without targeting a parity is another; a crawling peg is a third. The question is not binary.
Economy's structural features. Small, highly open, trade-concentrated economies have a stronger case for stabilisation than large, diversified ones.
Driver of the exchange-rate movement. A move driven by fundamentals should typically be left to run its course; a move driven by speculative noise can be leaned against. Policy should distinguish.
Capital-account openness. With capital controls, the impossible trinity binds less — stabilisation is cheaper. With open capital accounts, stabilisation is expensive.
Reasoned judgement. Exchange-rate movements have significant and genuine effects on FDI, growth and inflation — effects that are not uniform in direction, depend on the drivers of the move, and vary by economy. The case for policy stabilisation of the exchange rate rests mainly on the FDI / investment uncertainty cost of volatility and on the inflation-anchoring benefit for economies with weak monetary-policy credibility. The case against rests on the loss of monetary-policy independence, the loss of automatic external adjustment, and the vulnerability of stabilisation to speculative attack. For most modern economies the alternatives — credible inflation targeting, macroprudential policy, and a managed-float approach that limits volatility without targeting a parity — deliver most of the stabilisation benefits at a smaller cost. The strongest formulation is therefore conditional: policy stabilisation of the exchange rate is justified for a narrow set of economies with trade / financial concentration and credibility deficits, through a managed-float or crawling-peg rather than a hard peg. For the majority of modern economies, policy should allow the exchange rate to move with fundamentals, use alternative tools to achieve inflation and investment-uncertainty objectives, and intervene only to lean against disorderly moves. The effects on FDI, growth and inflation are real, but they are not generally sufficient justification for abandoning exchange-rate flexibility.