Poverty (absolute: income below a fixed threshold; relative: income below a specified fraction of median) and inequality (the spread of the distribution) are related but distinct goals. The main policy instruments are: progressive income taxes, inheritance and capital taxes, means-tested cash benefits, universal benefits (including UBI), negative income tax, in-kind transfers (free healthcare, education, housing) and labour-market policies (minimum wage, training). Each has a different effectiveness profile against the two goals.
Progressive income tax reduces post-tax inequality directly: because the share taken is higher at the top, net income is more compressed than gross income. Its effectiveness is bounded by behavioural responses — labour supply, migration and avoidance — and by the Laffer-curve limit on the top rate. In practice, revenue-maximising top rates probably lie around 50-60%; beyond this, further rate rises reduce revenue and the equity gain.
Inheritance and capital taxes attack wealth inequality directly — unlike income tax, they tax the stock. They raise revenue from the wealthiest households and reduce the intergenerational transmission of advantage. Their effectiveness is limited by avoidance (gifting, trusts, offshore holdings) and by their narrow base — in most OECD countries, these taxes raise under 1% of GDP in revenue.
Means-tested cash benefits are the most target-efficient way to raise the incomes of the poorest — each dollar is concentrated below the threshold. They suffer three well-known failures: incomplete take-up (60-80%), high effective marginal tax rates (the poverty trap), and administrative complexity. Universal Credit (UK) and similar schemes aim to integrate overlapping means-tested benefits into a single system with a moderate taper.
Universal benefits (including UBI) achieve 100% take-up and avoid the poverty trap, at the cost of lower target efficiency: much of the transfer flows to non-poor households. For a fixed budget, UBI reduces poverty less than means-tested benefits, but it reduces inequality more uniformly across the distribution. Evidence from Finnish, Alaskan and Kenyan trials shows improved wellbeing without large labour-supply losses.
Negative income tax (NIT) combines the target efficiency of means-testing with the automatic take-up of a universal scheme. It delivers payments only below a threshold but through the tax system, so there is no application and no stigma. A single taper rate well below 100% replaces overlapping benefit withdrawals, eliminating the poverty trap. Evidence from US NIT experiments (1970s) shows modest labour-supply reductions mainly among secondary earners and substantial poverty reduction.
In-kind transfers (free healthcare, education, early-years provision) have strong equity AND efficiency properties: they raise human capital, reduce the intergenerational transmission of poverty, and avoid the poverty trap because they are not withdrawn as income rises. The Nordic model relies heavily on universal in-kind provision; cross-country evidence links universal public services to low poverty and high productivity.
Labour-market policies. A minimum wage raises the wage floor and may compress wage inequality, but if set above the equilibrium wage it may create unemployment at the bottom end (Topic 8.3). Training, employment subsidies and anti-discrimination enforcement raise the earning capacity of low-income groups directly.
Trade-offs and limitations. All of these policies face the equity-efficiency trade-off at some margin: higher taxes reduce incentives at the top, higher benefits may reduce labour supply at the bottom, inheritance taxes may reduce savings. Policies also face information constraints (the state cannot observe effort or ability), political constraints (middle-income voters may oppose high taxes they fund), and administrative constraints. International capital mobility limits the top end of progressive taxation.
Interaction with growth. Cross-country evidence (IMF 2014, OECD) suggests that MOST redistribution within the OECD range is not associated with lower growth; above that range, trade-offs reappear. Scandinavian economies demonstrate that high equity and high productivity are compatible when the policy mix includes universal public services, moderate taper rates and investment in human capital.
Judgement. No single policy is 'most effective' against both poverty and inequality. The strongest systems combine (i) a negative income tax or Universal-Credit-style cash backbone (for cash support with low MTRs and high take-up); (ii) universal in-kind public services (healthcare, education, early years) for human capital and intergenerational mobility; (iii) a progressive income tax up to the revenue-maximising rate; (iv) inheritance and capital taxes to address wealth inequality; (v) targeted labour-market policies (training, anti-discrimination). The policy MIX matters more than the choice of any individual instrument: effectiveness is maximised when instruments are complementary (NIT closes the poverty trap, in-kind transfers raise human capital, progressive taxation funds both). Effectiveness is also BOUNDED — behavioural responses, Laffer effects, administrative costs and political feasibility all set limits — but these limits are far above the current practice of many economies, so there is substantial scope for improvement without triggering serious efficiency losses. The claim that 'nothing works' is too pessimistic; the claim that 'any redistribution works' is too optimistic. Effectiveness depends on design, scale and complementarity.