The claim is strong: sustainability should DOMINATE the other six objectives. It expresses the ethical intuition that there is no point maximising growth, employment or redistribution on a planet made uninhabitable by climate change. Evaluated carefully, however, the claim is too strong as an unconditional priority; the better formulation is that sustainability must be a BINDING CONSTRAINT on, rather than a dominant replacement for, the other objectives.
Framing — what 'primary' means. 'Primary macroeconomic policy objective' can mean two different things: (i) that sustainability outranks the other objectives whenever they conflict (strong version), or (ii) that sustainability acts as a binding constraint on the pursuit of the other objectives — growth, redistribution and so on may be pursued only within the sustainability constraint (weak version). The weak version is close to a consensus modern position; the strong version is the contested claim.
Case for sustainability as primary. First, the LONG-RUN COSTS of unmitigated climate change are catastrophic — Stern's 2007 review estimated 5-20% of annual world GDP permanently; recent IPCC AR6 damage estimates sharpen the figure. These costs dwarf any plausible short-run cost of other objectives. Second, climate externalities are INTERGENERATIONAL — today's actions impose costs on generations with no vote and no voice, so markets and politics systematically under-price them. A political ranking that puts sustainability first corrects this bias. Third, sustainability is a PRE-CONDITION for every other objective: a world of permanent heatwaves, flooded coasts and failed agriculture cannot deliver growth, employment or development. Fourth, delay is EXPENSIVE — the longer the transition is postponed, the more severe the eventual adjustment and the greater the stranded-asset losses. These arguments together make a serious case for primacy.
Case against — the other objectives also have serious claims. First, PRICE STABILITY is institutionally safeguarded by independent central banks because inflation damages the welfare of the poor fastest and distorts long-term planning; removing the central bank's inflation-targeting mandate in favour of a sustainability mandate would hand monetary policy to a different form of discretionary judgement and lose decades of credibility. Second, LOW UNEMPLOYMENT and ECONOMIC GROWTH have been the single largest welfare-improving outcomes of the past 70 years, lifting over a billion people out of poverty; subordinating them to sustainability in a developing economy that has yet to grow risks locking in poverty. Third, DEVELOPMENT (health, education, poverty reduction) is the welfare-end growth is supposed to serve; subordinating it to sustainability is category confusion if sustainability is defined narrowly as environmental. Fourth, BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS stability is a precondition for sustained investment of ANY kind — including the green-investment programme that sustainability requires; subordinating BoP risks the external-crisis-induced reversal of climate programmes. Fifth, REDISTRIBUTION addresses a separate welfare dimension (fairness, equity) that cannot be reduced to environmental metrics. These are not vanity objectives — they protect first-order welfare outcomes.
Government-failure risks. Both over- and under-pursuit of sustainability carry risks. Under-pursuit risks the catastrophic long-run damages that motivate the primacy claim in the first place. Over-pursuit risks regulatory capture (biofuel-subsidy fiascos; politically connected green industries), command-and-control inefficiency (choosing which technologies win rather than letting carbon pricing allocate), and a political backlash from workers in high-carbon industries that reverses the policy altogether (France's gilets jaunes). The best policy is MARKET-BASED (carbon pricing with revenue recycling, cap-and-trade with price floors and ceilings) rather than command-and-control — this minimises the output and employment costs per tonne of emissions reduced.
Qualifying mechanisms. The ranking depends on four conditions. (i) STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT. For low-income economies with persistent poverty and limited emissions per head, prioritising sustainability over development would be morally and economically questionable — these economies need growth-for-development, with sustainability as a long-run constraint. For high-income economies with large per-capita emissions, sustainability has a stronger primacy claim. (ii) TIME HORIZON. Over short horizons, growth and employment have strong immediate welfare content; over long horizons, sustainability dominates because climate damages are intergenerational and non-linear. (iii) POLICY INSTRUMENT. Market-based sustainability policies with revenue recycling can achieve emissions targets at low or negative net cost; command-and-control with no recycling can be very costly. (iv) CO-BENEFITS. Local air-pollution control, biodiversity protection and climate change often share the same instrument (phase out coal) — pursuing sustainability also delivers health and development co-benefits, which weakens the apparent conflict with the other objectives.
Trade-offs and complementarities (preview of 10.2). The seven objectives are not fully independent. Growth of the WRONG KIND (high-carbon, extractive, inequality-widening) conflicts with sustainability, development and redistribution all at once. Growth of the RIGHT KIND (inclusive, green, broad-based) complements all of them. The strongest Level-4 position is that the apparent primacy question is REFRAMED by the inclusive-growth paradigm: the real policy question is not 'which objective dominates' but 'what pattern of growth delivers all seven'. This is the mature policy formulation and is where the 9708 syllabus's expansion of the objective list is pointing.
Dynamic efficiency. A further mechanism cuts in favour of sustainability's claim: by pricing carbon and raising the return to clean technology, sustainability policy accelerates innovation in energy, transport and materials — a dynamic-efficiency boost that outlasts the short-run output cost of the transition. Energy transitions in the 19th century (coal → oil) delivered large productivity gains with manageable transition costs; the current transition can plausibly do the same.
Reasoned judgement. The strong version of the claim — sustainability dominates the other six — is too strong as an unconditional priority. Price stability, growth, employment, BoP stability, development and redistribution all have serious welfare claims that cannot simply be subordinated. The weak version — sustainability is a BINDING CONSTRAINT within which the other objectives must be pursued — is defensible and increasingly reflects actual policy practice (net-zero targets with growth and employment policies designed to operate within them). The sharpest Level-4 formulation is that sustainability belongs in the FIRST TIER of macroeconomic objectives (alongside price stability as a condition for all the others), but it does not dominate the welfare-defining objectives (development, employment, redistribution) which it ultimately serves. The 9708 syllabus's inclusion of sustainability as an objective in its own right — rather than as a sub-point under growth — reflects exactly this view: it is a co-equal objective, not a dominant one. For a developed economy with high emissions and a stable macro environment, something close to primacy is defensible; for a low-income developing economy, sustainability must be a binding constraint but development remains the welfare target.