The question tests whether economic growth can, in principle, eliminate scarcity — the mismatch between finite resources and unlimited wants.
Case supporting the view. Scarcity is defined relative to wants, not absolutes. Even as resources (output, technology, income) grow, wants also expand. Rising living standards create new wants — faster communications, longer life expectancy, more complex healthcare, new leisure activities — that absorb the additional output. The 'treadmill of wants' means growth raises the ceiling but also raises the floor; the gap between available resources and desired consumption persists. Time, moreover, is a fixed resource that no amount of economic growth can expand: individuals still have 24 hours a day, so the opportunity cost of using an hour one way rather than another remains positive. Finally, the planet's natural resources are physically finite; even very rapid growth cannot overcome absolute constraints such as atmospheric carbon capacity or land area.
Case against the view — qualifications. For specific goods and in specific contexts, economic growth can eliminate scarcity in a meaningful sense. Digital goods can be copied at near-zero marginal cost: once an e-book is produced, an additional copy consumes essentially no resources. The scarcity of such goods is a legal/institutional construct (copyright), not a physical constraint. Basic necessities can approach non-scarcity in rich economies: tap water in a modern city has a positive but tiny unit cost, and air remains a free good in most places. In these specific cases, growth has effectively dissolved scarcity. Technology-driven productivity growth also reduces the resource cost of satisfying a given want, which weakens scarcity for that want even if other wants expand to fill the gap.
Balancing the two. The view holds strongly at the aggregate level because of the treadmill of wants, the fixed resource of time, and planetary limits. The view holds less strongly for specific goods, especially digital goods and the basic physical necessities in rich economies. The distinction matters for policy: the aggregate scarcity means every economy continues to face the three allocation questions, but the shift towards digital and services sectors means the composition of what is scarce changes with growth — information, attention, specialist skills and environmental quality become the scarce resources, while physical production of basic goods becomes relatively less constrained.
Reasoned judgement. Scarcity will remain the fundamental economic problem in the aggregate sense — the mismatch between resources and the full set of human wants is structural, not something growth can eliminate. However, the content of what is scarce evolves as economies grow: in a very rich economy with digital production and services, time, attention, environmental quality and skill become the binding scarcities rather than basic physical goods. The strongest formulation of the view is therefore: scarcity is a permanent feature of economies, but the resources it concerns shift with the structure of growth, and treating scarcity as unchanging — as if the eighteenth-century food constraint still binds — would be misleading in the twenty-first century. On that qualified reading the view is correct.