Machinery of justice

The power of the police to stop and search a person in a public place is found in section 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), and its exercise is governed by Code of Practice A.

Under s1 PACE, a constable may stop and search a person or vehicle for stolen or prohibited articles — such as offensive weapons, items for use in theft or burglary, and bladed articles — in a public place. The power may only be used where the officer has reasonable suspicion that such an article will be found. Reasonable suspicion must be based on objective grounds (for example, intelligence or behaviour), and Code A makes clear it cannot rest on personal factors such as a person's race, age or appearance alone.

Before the search, ss2-3 PACE require the officer to provide certain safeguards, often remembered by the acronym GOWISELY: the officer must give their Grounds for the search, the Object sought, their Warrant card (if not in uniform), their Identity (name) and Station, the Entitlement to a copy of the record, that it is a Legal search, and the You-are-detained-for-the-purpose information. A record of the search must be made.

The search of a person in public is limited: under s2 PACE an officer may require the removal only of an outer coat, jacket and gloves; more extensive searches must be conducted out of public view. Wider stop-and-search powers also exist under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (searching for controlled drugs) and the Terrorism Act 2000.

Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) refers to methods of settling civil disputes without going to court. The four main methods can be arranged from the most informal to the most formal.

Negotiation is the simplest and most informal method. The parties (or their lawyers) communicate directly with one another to try to reach a settlement. There is no third party involved, it is private and costs nothing, and the parties retain complete control over the outcome.

Conciliation involves a neutral third party (a conciliator) who plays an active role: the conciliator listens to both sides and suggests a possible basis for settlement. It is commonly used in employment disputes (for example through ACAS), but the conciliator's proposed solution is not binding unless the parties agree to it.

Mediation also uses a neutral third party (a mediator), but the mediator's role is to facilitate communication and help the parties find their own solution — the mediator does not impose or even suggest an outcome. This is the key distinction from conciliation. Mediation is confidential and aims to preserve the relationship between the parties.

Arbitration is the most formal method. The parties agree to refer their dispute to a neutral arbitrator, who hears evidence and arguments and makes a binding decision (an 'award'). Arbitration is governed by the Arbitration Act 1996, and a Scott v Avery clause in a contract can require the parties to arbitrate before any court action. The arbitrator's award is enforceable like a court judgment.

The powers of arrest and detention are governed by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) and its accompanying Codes of Practice.

Arrest is governed by s24 PACE (as amended by the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005) and Code G. Since the amendment, the power of arrest without warrant applies to any offence, but TWO conditions must both be satisfied. First, the officer must have reasonable grounds to suspect that the person is committing, has committed, or is about to commit an offence. Second, the officer must have reasonable grounds to believe that the arrest is necessary — for example, to ascertain the person's name or address, to prevent injury or damage, to protect a child, or to allow the prompt and effective investigation of the offence. On arrest the person must be told they are under arrest and the grounds for it, and be cautioned.

Detention is governed by ss34-46 PACE and Code C. When a suspect is brought to the police station, an independent custody officer must decide whether there is enough evidence to charge, or whether detention is necessary to secure or preserve evidence or obtain it by questioning. The basic time limit for detention without charge is 24 hours; this may be extended to 36 hours by a superintendent, and up to a maximum of 96 hours on application to a magistrates' court. The custody officer must keep a custody record and carry out periodic reviews of the detention.

While detained, the suspect has important rights: the right to have someone informed of the arrest (s56 PACE) and the right to free legal advice (s58 PACE), although these may be delayed in limited circumstances for serious (indictable) offences.

Civil cases (disputes between individuals or businesses, such as contract and tort claims) are heard in a hierarchy of courts. The two main first-instance courts are the County Court and the High Court. The County Court deals with the bulk of civil claims, including most contract, tort and debt cases. The High Court hears the larger and more complex claims and is divided into three divisions: the King's Bench Division (KBD) (contract and tort), the Chancery Division (trusts, wills, business and property) and the Family Division (family and matrimonial matters). The Magistrates' Court has only a limited civil jurisdiction (such as some family and licensing matters).

Civil appeals lie generally from the County Court and High Court to the Court of Appeal (Civil Division), and from there (or, exceptionally, directly) to the Supreme Court, the final appeal court for the United Kingdom.

The Woolf reforms, which produced the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (in force 1999), aimed to make civil justice cheaper, quicker and simpler, encouraging settlement and the use of ADR. They introduced a system of case management by judges and allocated cases to one of three tracks according to value and complexity:

• The small claims track handles low-value claims (generally up to £10,000). It is informal, with no recovery of legal costs, designed so litigants can represent themselves.
• The fast track handles claims of medium value (generally £10,000-£25,000), with a streamlined procedure and a trial usually lasting no more than one day.
• The multi-track handles the highest-value and most complex claims (generally over £25,000), with active judicial case management.

ADR offers real advantages over litigation for many disputes, but it is not a universal substitute for the courts; this answer judges ADR against the criterion of which mechanism best delivers a fair, enforceable and efficient resolution for the type of dispute in question.

The advantages of ADR over the courts. ADR is generally cheaper and faster than litigation: a mediation can resolve a dispute in days, whereas a contested court trial can take many months and large legal costs, even on the streamlined fast track. ADR is private and confidential, unlike open court, which is valuable for businesses protecting their reputation. It is flexible and, crucially, tends to preserve relationships because methods such as mediation are cooperative rather than adversarial — important for commercial partners or separating families. Arbitration also allows the parties to choose an expert in the relevant field as decision-maker, and the Woolf reforms themselves actively encourage ADR, with the courts able to penalise parties who unreasonably refuse it.

The disadvantages of ADR. The picture is not one-sided. Most ADR outcomes (negotiation, conciliation, mediation) are not binding and depend on goodwill; if a party refuses to honour the agreement, the dispute may end up in court after all. ADR sets no binding precedent, so it cannot clarify the law for future cases. There may be an imbalance of power between the parties that a court process, with its procedural protections, would correct. And there is no public scrutiny, which matters where a wrongdoer should be held publicly accountable. Arbitration in particular can become almost as costly and legalistic as litigation, partly losing the speed-and-cost advantage. By contrast, a court delivers an enforceable judgment and authoritative legal certainty.

Distinguishing the methods. It is important not to treat ADR as one thing. Arbitration, governed by the Arbitration Act 1996 and often triggered by a Scott v Avery clause, produces a binding award enforceable like a court judgment — so it shares more of litigation's strengths (and some of its costs). Mediation and conciliation are non-binding and cheaper, but riskier where compliance is doubtful.

Conclusion. For most commercial and family disputes, ADR is preferable to litigation because the savings in cost, time and relationships outweigh the loss of precedent and public scrutiny — which is precisely why the Woolf reforms promote it. However, where the parties need a binding, enforceable and public ruling, or where an authoritative interpretation of the law is required, the courts remain essential. ADR is therefore best seen not as a replacement for the courts but as the better first choice for the majority of private disputes, with litigation reserved for those that genuinely need it.

The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) was designed to strike a balance between giving the police effective powers to investigate crime and protecting the rights of the individual through clear safeguards. This answer judges that balance against the criterion of whether each significant power is matched by a workable safeguard, and argues that PACE largely achieves balance, though some powers tilt towards the state.

The argument that the police have extensive powers. The police do hold wide powers. Under s1 PACE (with Code A) they may stop and search in public for stolen or prohibited articles; under s24 PACE (with Code G) they may arrest without warrant for any offence; and under ss34-46 PACE (with Code C) they may detain a suspect without charge for up to 24 hours, extendable to 36 and ultimately 96 hours. They may take fingerprints and samples under ss61-63, and broader powers exist under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and the Terrorism Act 2000, the latter historically including controversial suspicionless stop powers. Critics argue these powers, especially stop and search, have been used disproportionately and on weak grounds.

The argument that the individual is protected. However, every major power is constrained. The reasonable suspicion threshold limits s1 and s24, and arrest also requires the necessity test under s24, so the police cannot arrest at will. Detention is policed by an independent custody officer, subject to time limits and reviews, and the suspect has the right to have someone informed (s56) and to free legal advice (s58). The Codes of Practice (A, C and G) give detailed, enforceable rules on how each power must be exercised. Above all, where the police breach these rules, a court may exclude the resulting evidence: a confession may be excluded under s76 PACE if obtained by oppression or unreliability, and any evidence may be excluded under s78 PACE if its admission would have an unfair effect on the proceedings. This exclusionary discipline gives the safeguards real teeth.

Conclusion. Measured against the criterion of power matched by safeguard, PACE strikes a broadly defensible balance: each investigative power is tied to a Code-based safeguard and ultimately disciplined by the exclusion of evidence under ss76 and 78. The statement therefore overstates the position for the ordinary suspect. Nevertheless, it is not wholly wrong — where suspicion thresholds are diluted, as in some stop-and-search practice and the Terrorism Act 2000 powers, the balance does tilt towards the state, and continued scrutiny of those specific powers is justified. On balance, PACE protects the individual adequately in the general case but leaves genuine concern at its margins.