The Growth of Extremist Powers and Their Impact on International Relations (1929–36)

The World Disarmament Conference failed because of irreconcilable national interests, the clash between France and Germany, and the destructive effect of Hitler coming to power.

The most fundamental reason was the conflict between French security and German equality. France, still fearful of its larger neighbour, insisted on firm guarantees of protection before it would disarm, and refused to let Germany rearm to its level. Germany, however, demanded 'equality of treatment' — either everyone should disarm down to its level, or it should be allowed to rearm up to theirs. These positions were almost impossible to reconcile, because French security depended on German weakness.

A second reason was the wider mood of distrust and self-interest among the powers. With over 60 nations attending, each guarded its own military needs, and none was willing to weaken itself while rivals remained armed. The League had no power to force agreement, so the talks drifted.

The decisive blow, however, was Hitler coming to power in January 1933. Hitler had no intention of remaining disarmed and was determined to rearm Germany. Using France's refusal of equality as his excuse, he withdrew Germany from both the Conference and the League of Nations in October 1933. With Germany gone, the Conference was effectively dead, and its collapse showed that collective approaches to security were giving way to national rearmament.

The Great Depression encouraged extremism mainly through mass unemployment, the resulting loss of faith in democracy, and the appeal of extremist promises and scapegoats.

The first reason was economic hardship. The Wall Street Crash of 1929 and the recall of American loans caused factories to close, banks to fail and unemployment to soar. In Germany, which depended heavily on American loans, around 6 million people were jobless by 1932, while Japan's silk and export economy was devastated. This desperation made people willing to consider radical solutions.

The second reason was the collapse of faith in democracy. Democratic governments — Germany's Weimar coalitions, Japan's civilian politicians — seemed weak, divided and unable to fix the crisis. Voters concluded that democracy itself had failed, opening the door to those who promised decisive action.

The third reason was the positive appeal of extremist movements. Extremists offered work, order, national pride and a return to greatness, and they provided scapegoats to blame for the suffering — Jews and Communists in Nazi Germany, foreign powers and weak politicians in militarist Japan. This combination of hardship, disillusion and an attractive alternative explains why support for extremism grew so rapidly, carrying Hitler to the Chancellorship in January 1933.

Similarity. Both sources agree that the Conference failed because France and Germany could not reconcile their aims, and both frame the failure as the fault of the OTHER side. Source A insists France 'cannot lay down her arms while her security remains unguaranteed', while Source B complains that Germany 'alone remain[s] disarmed while others keep their weapons'. Both therefore identify the same underlying deadlock — the clash between French security and German equality — even though they draw opposite conclusions from it.

Difference. The sources disagree sharply about WHO was to blame. Source A blames Germany, presenting German 'equality' as a dangerous demand from a neighbour who 'dreams of revenge', and so justifies France's refusal to disarm. Source B blames France and the other powers for breaking their promise of 'equality of treatment' and keeping Germany 'in chains', presenting Germany's withdrawal as a justified response to injustice. Where A defends French caution, B defends German departure.

Explaining the difference (provenance and context). The contrast is best explained by who produced each source and why. Source A is a French government memorandum (1933), written to justify France's insistence on security; given France's fear of a resurgent Germany, it naturally portrays German demands as a threat. Source B is a German official statement of October 1933 — the very moment Hitler took Germany out of the Conference and the League — and it is therefore propaganda designed to justify that decision by casting Germany as the wronged party. The opposing national interests and purposes explain why one stresses security and the other equality — and together they confirm that the irreconcilable France–Germany clash, deepened by Hitler's arrival, was the real cause of failure.

The Great Depression was certainly a major reason for the rise of extremism, but it acted upon grievances and ambitions that already existed, and it is argued here that the Depression was the decisive TRIGGER rather than the sole cause.

The case for the Depression. The economic collapse after 1929 transformed politics. Mass unemployment — around 6 million in Germany by 1932 — destroyed faith in democratic governments that seemed powerless. In Germany, Nazi seats in the Reichstag leapt from 12 (1928) to 230 (July 1932), carrying Hitler to the Chancellorship in January 1933. In Japan, the ruin of the export economy discredited civilian politicians and empowered the militarists, while economic pressure pushed Mussolini towards aggressive expansion. The timing strongly suggests the Depression was the engine of extremism's advance.

The case for other factors. However, extremism had deeper roots that pre-dated the slump. In Germany, resentment of the Treaty of Versailles and the trauma of the 1923 hyperinflation had already weakened the Weimar Republic and fed nationalist anger. Japanese and Italian expansionist ambitions existed before 1929. The weakness of the League of Nations meant aggression could go unpunished. Extremist movements existed throughout the 1920s — they simply lacked mass support while prosperity lasted.

Judgement. If 'main reason' means the factor without which extremism would not have triumphed when and where it did, then the deeper grievances were the FUEL but the Depression was the SPARK. The resentment of Versailles and the ambitions of the militarists were real, but they had been contained by the relative prosperity and the 'Locarno spirit' of the mid-1920s. By destroying that prosperity and discrediting democracy, the Depression turned long-standing grievances into mass support for extremism. It was therefore the decisive reason — not because it created the grievances, but because it gave them their opportunity.

The Great Depression was the most important reason for the SCALE and TIMING of aggressive foreign policies in the 1930s, but it was a trigger acting on pre-existing ambitions and on a fatally weak international system; it must be weighed against the grievances of Versailles and the failure of collective security. This answer judges 'responsible' as the factor without which aggression on this scale would not have erupted when it did.

The case for the Depression as decisive. The slump turned economic crisis into expansionist aggression. In Japan, the collapse of exports discredited civilian government and empowered the militarists, leading directly to the invasion of Manchuria (1931) in search of raw materials and markets. In Germany, the Depression brought Hitler to power (January 1933), and an aggressive, rearming, expansionist Germany followed. In Italy, economic pressure and the need to bolster Fascist prestige pushed Mussolini towards the invasion of Abyssinia (1935). The chronology is striking: the great acts of aggression cluster after 1931, suggesting the Depression was the crucial trigger.

The case for other factors. Yet the Depression only explains the OPPORTUNITY and the TIMING, not the underlying drive. Japanese and Italian imperial ambitions, and German resentment of the Versailles settlement, all pre-dated 1929 and would have sought expression regardless. Above all, the weakness of the League of Nations and the disunity of the democracies allowed aggression to succeed: the failure of the Disarmament Conference (1932–34) freed Hitler to rearm, and the collapse of the Stresa Front (1935) — wrecked by the Anglo-German Naval Agreement and the Abyssinian crisis — showed that the powers would not combine to stop him. Aggression paid because no one stopped it.

Judgement. The Depression was the most important PROXIMATE cause — it created the regimes and the timing of aggression and removed the prosperity that had restrained ambition in the 1920s. But it was not sufficient on its own: the ambitions supplied the purpose, and the weakness of collective security supplied the freedom to act. The decisive truth is that the Depression turned latent ambition into open aggression precisely because the international system was too divided and feeble to resist it. The Depression was therefore responsible to a great extent — but as the trigger that exploited deeper faults, not as the sole cause.

The sources offer strong support for the view that fear of Communism obstructed an alliance against Hitler, but taken together they show that this fear worked alongside other divisions and was actively exploited by Germany rather than being the sole obstacle.

Sources that support the view. Sources B and C provide direct support. Source B, a British conservative editorial, shows exactly the suspicion at work: it dismisses an alliance with Moscow as 'a deal with the very revolutionaries who plot through the Comintern', revealing that the Western fear of Communism made cooperation with the USSR politically impossible for many. Source C reinforces this from the French side, regretting that the Franco-Soviet pact 'alarms London and divides us when unity against Berlin is most needed'. Cross-referenced, B and C agree that distrust of the USSR, rooted in fear of Communism, was splitting the potential opponents of Hitler.

Sources that qualify the view. Sources A and D complicate the picture. Source A shows that the obstacle did NOT lie with the USSR, which was actively seeking 'collective security' by joining the League and allying with France — so the failure was one of Western response, not Soviet unwillingness. Source D suggests that fear of Communism was not merely a spontaneous obstacle but a weapon Hitler deliberately exploited: the Anti-Comintern Pact was designed to 'rally the civilised powers against the Bolshevik threat' and 'isolate Moscow'. This implies German policy actively widened the divide, so the obstacle was as much created by Hitler as by Western fear itself.

Evaluation of the sources. Provenance affects the weight each carries. Source A is a Soviet diplomatic note and is self-interested in presenting the USSR as the reasonable party, yet it is corroborated by the genuine Soviet steps of 1934–35 (joining the League, the Franco-Soviet Pact). Source B, a conservative editorial, openly expresses partisan anti-Communist opinion, but that very openness makes it valuable evidence of the attitudes blocking an alliance. Source C, a private memo not meant for publication, is especially candid and reliable about the diplomatic damage being done. Source D is German propaganda and must be treated with care, but its purpose — to exploit anti-Communism — confirms that this fear was central to the diplomacy of the period.

Judgement on 'how far'. The sources strongly support the view that fear of Communism was A major obstacle (B and C), and the most candid source (C) confirms it was dividing the democracies. However, they do not support it as the SOLE obstacle: A shows the USSR was willing, while D shows the fear was deliberately manipulated by Germany. The sources therefore support the view to a considerable but qualified extent — fear of Communism was the principal reason the democracies hesitated to ally with the USSR, but it became decisive only because Hitler actively exploited it and the Western powers allowed it to override the threat he posed.