Imperialism in Africa: Causes, Expansion, and Consequences (c.1870 onwards)

European countries took part in the Scramble for Africa for economic, ideological and strategic reasons that reinforced one another.

The most powerful driver was economic need. Industrialising Europe required raw materials such as rubber, palm oil and cotton, and wanted new markets for its manufactured goods and places to invest surplus capital. The discovery of diamonds at Kimberley (1867) and gold on the Witwatersrand (1886) made southern Africa especially attractive, drawing in investors and governments determined to secure these riches.

A second reason was ideological: the belief in a 'civilising mission'. Many Europeans, influenced by Social Darwinism and missionary enthusiasm, genuinely believed they had a duty to spread Christianity, end the slave trade and bring 'progress'. This belief gave a moral justification that encouraged public and government support for expansion.

The decisive accelerator, however, was national and strategic rivalry. Empire became a measure of great-power status, so no country wanted to be left behind. Once one power claimed territory, rivals grabbed neighbouring land to deny it to enemies, and strategic routes — above all the route to India through the Suez Canal — had to be protected, leading Britain to occupy Egypt in 1882. Together, these economic, ideological and strategic pressures pushed European states into the rapid takeover of Africa.

Europeans conquered Africa with remarkable speed after 1870 mainly because of advances in technology, prior exploration, and African disunity.

Technological and scientific advances made conquest one-sided. The discovery that quinine prevented malaria allowed Europeans to survive the interior, which had previously been 'the white man's grave'. The Maxim gun, the first effective machine gun, gave small European forces overwhelming firepower against far larger African armies, while steamships, railways and the telegraph allowed troops, supplies and orders to move rapidly inland.

Earlier exploration had already opened the way. Explorers such as Barth, Livingstone and Stanley had mapped rivers and routes and gathered commercial knowledge, so traders, missionaries and soldiers could follow established paths rather than starting blind. Stanley's mapping of the Congo, for example, directly enabled King Leopold II's claims there.

Finally, African disunity helped Europeans. Rivalries between African states and peoples meant they rarely combined against the invaders, allowing Europeans to divide and conquer. Where a strong, unified state with modern weapons did exist — Ethiopia at Adwa in 1896 — the Europeans were defeated, which shows how important these advantages were elsewhere.

Similarity. Both sources agree that Europeans had powerful motives for involvement in Africa and that expansion was deliberate and purposeful. Source A speaks of a 'sacred duty' to bring 'civilisation', while Source B is candid that men sought to 'secure the richest districts before [their] rivals'. Both therefore present Africa as a place Europeans were determined to enter, and both even acknowledge competition — A implies a duty to act, B refers explicitly to 'rivals'.

Difference. The sources disagree sharply about WHAT the real motive was. Source A presents the motive as idealistic and religious — spreading the Gospel and ending slavery (the 'civilising mission'). Source B dismisses exactly this language ('talk of the Gospel is well enough for the newspapers') and presents the true motive as economic greed — 'rubber and ivory' and the chance to 'make a fortune'. Where A is sincere about moral purpose, B treats moral purpose as public propaganda.

Explaining the difference (provenance and context). The contrast is best explained by who produced each source and why. Source A is a missionary society report (1885), written to win public and financial support, so it naturally emphasises noble, religious motives and would not admit to commercial greed. Source B is a private letter (1890) never intended for publication, so the trader can be frank about profit. The different purposes and audiences explain why one stresses the Gospel and the other money — and remind us that both motives genuinely co-existed in the Scramble, even if each source highlights only one.

Economic motives were certainly a major reason for the Scramble for Africa, but they worked alongside strategic and ideological motives, and it is argued here that strategic rivalry was ultimately decisive in turning economic interest into a frantic land-grab.

The case for economic motives. Industrial Europe needed raw materials (rubber, palm oil, cotton) and new markets, and capitalists sought outlets for surplus investment. The mineral wealth of southern Africa — diamonds at Kimberley (1867) and gold on the Witwatersrand (1886) — drew enormous investment and made the region a centre of conflict. Contemporaries such as Hobson later argued that the search for profit and investment outlets was the engine of imperialism. The economic case is therefore strong.

The case for other motives. However, much expansion cannot be explained by profit alone. Many newly seized territories were economically worthless deserts or bush, acquired chiefly for prestige and to deny them to rivals — a national competition in which empire measured great-power status. Strategic concerns were often decisive: Britain occupied Egypt in 1882 not for profit but to protect the Suez Canal and the route to India. The ideological 'civilising mission' also mobilised genuine public and missionary support for expansion.

Judgement. If 'main reason' means the factor that turned long-standing interest into the sudden Scramble of the 1880s–90s, then economic appetite created the desire but strategic rivalry created the urgency. Economic motives explain WHY Europe wanted Africa; great-power competition explains why the takeover happened so fast and so completely. Economic motives were thus fundamental but not, on their own, the main reason — they became overwhelming only when fused with national and strategic rivalry.

Superior technology was the most important reason for the SPEED and completeness of the European conquest of Africa, but it was an enabler rather than the underlying cause; it must be weighed against the motives that created the will to conquer and against African disunity. This answer judges 'most important' as the factor without which conquest on this scale and pace could not have occurred.

The case for technology as decisive. Technology made conquest militarily one-sided. The Maxim gun allowed tiny European forces to defeat far larger African armies, as at Omdurman (1898). Quinine removed the disease barrier that had kept Europeans on the coast, while steamships, railways and the telegraph projected and coordinated force across vast distances. Without these advantages, the rapid takeover between the 1880s and 1914 is hard to imagine — strong evidence that technology was the crucial enabler.

The case for other factors. Yet technology only explains HOW, not WHY. The motives examined above (economic appetite, strategic rivalry, the civilising mission) created the determination to conquer; without them, the technology would not have been used for this purpose. African disunity was also vital: rivalries between peoples prevented united resistance and allowed divide-and-rule. Most tellingly, where technology was matched — Ethiopia had imported modern rifles and was unified under Menelik II — the Europeans were defeated at Adwa (1896). This proves technology was not automatically decisive; its effect depended on the absence of comparable African strength and unity.

Judgement. Technology was the most important PROXIMATE reason — the factor that made conquest swift, cheap and near-total — and Adwa shows that where the technological gap closed, conquest failed. But it was a tool: the motives supplied the purpose and African disunity supplied the opportunity. Technology was therefore decisive for the manner and speed of conquest, but it operated within, and depended upon, the deeper causes of European ambition and African division.

The sources offer strong support for the view that profit drove the Scramble, but taken together they show that greed operated alongside strategic and ideological motives rather than alone.

Sources that support the view (greed). Sources B and D provide direct support. Source B, a candid private letter, states bluntly that Europeans were in Africa 'for rubber and ivory' to 'make a fortune', dismissing higher motives as newspaper talk. Source D, a mining prospectus, promises 'rich dividends' from gold and diamonds — clear evidence that the prospect of profit mobilised investment and expansion. Cross-referenced, B and D agree that material gain was a powerful and openly acknowledged motive.

Sources that challenge the view. Sources A and C qualify this picture. Source A presents a sincere ideological motive — spreading the Gospel and ending slavery — suggesting that for some, religion and 'civilisation', not greed, drove involvement. Source C reveals a purely strategic concern: a minister anxious that a rival power must not control the Nile's headwaters. This is about security and great-power rivalry, not profit, and shows that governments could expand for reasons unconnected to immediate financial gain.

Evaluation of the sources. Provenance affects how much weight each carries. Source B (a private letter) is candid and therefore valuable evidence of genuine motive, though it reflects one trader's view. Source D is self-interested — a prospectus exists to attract investors and may EXAGGERATE profits — yet that very purpose confirms that the LANGUAGE of profit was central to imperial ventures. Source A, written to raise missionary funds, may overstate idealism, while Source C, an internal government memo not meant for publication, is candid about strategic fear and so is especially reliable on official motives.

Judgement on 'how far'. The sources strongly support greed as A major motive (B and D), but they do NOT support it as the SOLE or even sole 'main' driver: C shows strategic rivalry and A shows ideology operating independently of profit. The most reliable sources for actual decision-making — the candid private letter (B) and the internal memo (C) — point to greed and strategy respectively, suggesting the two worked together. The sources therefore support the view to a considerable but limited extent: profit was central, but the Scramble was driven by a combination of greed and strategic rivalry rather than greed alone.