Exam Technique

(a) Conclusion: this money should be spent on ending poverty, not on space exploration (a policy claim).

(b) One reason: millions go hungry while billions are spent on space (also acceptable: a Mars mission costs more than a developing nation's annual food budget).

(c) Evidence type: a statistical / cost-comparison claim; secondary — a figure asserted by the author, not data they gathered first-hand.

(d) Emotive/loaded phrase: "planting flags on distant planets" (also acceptable: "waste billions").

(a) Conclusion: ban all private cars from the city centre immediately (a policy claim).

(b) Perspective: an environmental / public-health perspective concerned with pollution and safety.

(c) Two pieces of evidence: (i) "air pollution exceeds safe limits on 200 days a year" — statistical data; (ii) "traffic accidents injure hundreds of pedestrians annually" — statistical data (both secondary).

(d) Word/phrase signalling strength: "all" / "immediately" (also acceptable: "must") — signalling an absolute, urgent policy claim.

Deconstruction (brief). The conclusion is the policy claim "we must impose strict legal limits on children's screen use." It is supported by two pieces of evidence — a charity survey (70% of parents believe children spend too long on screens) and a rise in child mental-health referrals — and the emotive opening "destroying childhood".

Evaluating the evidence (R-R-S).

• The 70% survey: it measures parents' beliefs/perceptions, not actual harm — a relevance gap (what parents believe is not evidence that screens cause harm). Conducted by a parenting charity with a possible advocacy vested interest, and no method is given (reliability).
• The rise in referrals: relevant to children's mental health, but it does not establish that screens caused it — a correlation-not-causation issue (other factors could explain the rise). On its own it is insufficient for the strong conclusion.

Evaluating the reasoning. The argument assumes that the rise in referrals is caused by screen time, and that parents' perceptions reflect reality. The recommendation is also extreme ("strict legal limits") relative to the evidence offered, and the emotive "destroying childhood" substitutes feeling for proof.

Judgement and A* finish. The argument is weak as it stands: it relies on perception data and an uncontrolled correlation to justify strong legislation. To be convincing it would need longitudinal studies that actually link amount of screen use to measured mental-health outcomes, ideally controlling for other factors, and objective measures of children's screen use rather than parental opinion.

Deconstruction (brief). The conclusion is a strong, superlative claim: "donating to well-building is the most effective way to help the developing world." Its support is one statistic — school attendance "rose 40%" in the first village — presented by the charity itself.

Evaluating the evidence (R-R-S).

• Reliability: the figure comes from the charity's own project — a vested interest in showing success — and no method is given.
• Relevance: rising school attendance is relevant to wellbeing, but it is not the same as being the "most effective" form of aid overall.
• Sufficiency: it is a single case study (one village); one result cannot support a worldwide, superlative claim — a hasty generalisation.

Evaluating the reasoning. The argument assumes the well caused the rise in attendance (rather than, say, a new school, a good harvest or another programme — a correlation-causation gap), and that one village generalises to "the developing world". It also offers no comparison with other aid methods, yet claims to be the most effective.

Judgement and A* finish. The argument greatly over-reaches its evidence: a single, self-reported case is stretched into a global superlative. To support the claim it would need large-scale, independent studies across many regions, ideally comparing well-building with other interventions (so "most effective" is actually tested), and evidence that the wells, not other factors, caused the improvements.

Introduction and thesis. Both sources address whether GM crops should be embraced, reaching opposite conclusions — A for, B against. This answer argues that A is the more convincing on the narrow question of productivity, but B raises a serious concern A ignores, so the verdict is qualified.

Comparing the evidence. A offers a concrete statistic — a 2022 trial showing 28% higher GM maize yields — directly relevant to the hunger claim, though it is a single trial with no detail on scale or independence. B offers no comparable data: its claims about corporate dependency and "unknown" ecosystem effects are largely assertions, and "unknown" is, by definition, unevidenced. On evidence quality, A is stronger, whereas B's strongest point (corporate control of seeds) is plausible but unquantified.

Comparing the reasoning and assumptions. A's reasoning is weakened by a false dilemma — "banning them condemns the hungry to starvation" — which ignores that hunger is also a problem of distribution, not just yield; it assumes higher yields automatically reduce hunger. B reasons more cautiously (a precautionary stance on unknown effects) but rests on its own assumption that traditional farming can feed a growing world, which it does not evidence, and the "unknown effects" appeal can be used to resist almost any innovation.

Comparing perspectives and criteria. A argues from a productivity/humanitarian perspective (feed people now); B from an autonomy and sustainability perspective (who controls food, and long-term ecological safety). These weigh different criteria — immediate output versus independence and precaution — and a complete judgement must consider both.

Reasoned judgement. On balance, Source A is more convincing on the evidence it offers — it provides real yield data, whereas B relies on assertion and an open-ended "unknown". However, A is not decisively convincing overall: its false dilemma ignores distribution, and B's concern about corporate control of seeds is a genuine, serious point A never addresses. The most defensible position is that GM crops' productivity case is well-evidenced and should not be dismissed, but that B's questions about dependency and long-term effects must be answered before A's confident conclusion is accepted. Had A engaged with distribution and corporate control, its case would be far stronger; had B provided evidence for its ecosystem fears, the balance would shift toward it.

Introduction and thesis. Both sources address whether space exploration is justified while poverty persists, reaching opposite conclusions — A to ground it, B to continue. This answer argues that Source B presents the more convincing case, though A raises a real moral question about priorities.

Comparing the evidence. B offers concrete examples of benefits — satellite navigation, weather forecasting, medical imaging, climate monitoring — that plausibly originated in or were advanced by space research; these directly support its claim. A, by contrast, offers little beyond the assertion that "billions… could feed millions" and gives no evidence that the money would in fact be redirected to the poor. On evidence, B is stronger, although its spin-off examples are stated rather than sourced.

Comparing the reasoning and assumptions. A's central flaw is a false dilemma — space or solving poverty — when in practice societies fund many things at once, and space spending is a small fraction of budgets. It also assumes the money saved would actually reach the hungry. B reasons more soundly by showing space and Earthly benefit are linked, but it assumes those benefits require a continued programme and that they outweigh the opportunity cost — points it does not fully establish.

Comparing perspectives and criteria. A argues from an immediate-humanitarian perspective (urgent need now); B from a long-term-innovation perspective (the future tools that benefit everyone, including the poor). They prioritise different criteria — present need versus future capability — and a strong judgement weighs both rather than assuming one is the only measure.

Reasoned judgement. On balance, Source B is more convincing. It supports its case with concrete examples of real-world benefits and avoids A's false dilemma, whereas A relies on an emotive trade-off and the unevidenced assumption that grounding space would feed the hungry. A's moral concern about priorities is genuine and should not be dismissed — but as argued it is weaker, because it neither evidences the redirection of funds nor engages with the ways space research already benefits people on Earth. Had A shown that space budgets are large enough, and would actually be redirected, to make a real dent in poverty, its case would be far stronger.