Building paragraphs with evidence

One of the clearest ways social media has harmed society is by damaging the mental wellbeing of the young. (Point) This harm is visible in the documented rise in anxiety and low self-esteem among teenagers who spend long hours on image-driven platforms such as Instagram, where carefully edited, idealised images of other people's lives are presented as if they were ordinary reality. (Example) This matters because users are encouraged to measure their own unremarkable lives against a curated fiction, so that comparison becomes constant and dissatisfaction is built into the experience of using the platform; what looks like harmless scrolling steadily erodes a young person's sense of self-worth. (Analysis) Social media has therefore harmed society at least in this respect, by quietly undermining the wellbeing of the generation that uses it most — a real cost that any balanced judgement of its effects must take seriously. (Link)

One major argument for a larger state is that it reduces inequality and protects the vulnerable. (Point) The clearest example is the Nordic model, where countries such as Sweden and Denmark levy high taxes to fund extensive welfare, public healthcare and education, and consistently report some of the highest living standards and levels of life satisfaction in the world. (Example) This matters because it shows that a state which redistributes wealth need not stifle prosperity; instead, by guaranteeing healthcare and education to everyone regardless of income, it widens the opportunities available to poorer citizens and narrows the gap between rich and poor that an unregulated market tends to entrench. (Analysis) A government that plays a large role can therefore improve, rather than diminish, the lives of its citizens, which suggests its role should indeed be significant — at least where reducing inequality is concerned. (Link)

Why the original fails: it narrates what happens in Switzerland but never makes a claim, never explains the 'so what?', and never mentions the question's key word, 'fairest'. It is pure description and would sit in Band 2.

Rewritten as analytical PEAL:

One genuine strength of direct democracy is that it gives citizens an unmediated say on the issues that affect them, which makes a strong claim to fairness. (Point) Switzerland is the clearest example, holding frequent national referendums on questions ranging from constitutional amendments to specific policies, so that voters decide directly rather than leaving every choice to elected representatives. (Example) This matters because the outcomes then reflect the people's actual preferences rather than the priorities of a professional political class, and it forces governments to win genuine public consent for their decisions; where representatives can be captured by party or lobby interests, a direct vote cannot be so easily diverted. (Analysis) Direct democracy is therefore fairer in the important sense that every citizen's voice counts equally on the issue itself — a real strength that any verdict on whether it is the fairest form of government must weigh. (Link)

Although elections create accountability, they do not by themselves guarantee that the resulting government will be good. (Point) The 2011 Arab Spring is a telling example: across the Middle East and North Africa, protesters overthrew authoritarian rulers and demanded elections, yet in several countries the votes that followed did not produce stable or effective government. (Example) This matters because elections deliver good government only when they rest on supporting institutions — independent courts, a free press and a professional civil service — and where these were weak or absent, an elected majority could dominate or even dismantle the very checks that protect citizens; Hungary under Viktor Orban shows the same danger persisting within Europe, where elections continue but judicial and media independence have been eroded into what Orban himself calls an 'illiberal democracy'. (Analysis — with embedded counter-point) It might be objected that even imperfect elections are better than none, and that is fair; but this only reinforces the point, since it shows elections matter as part of a wider framework rather than as a guarantee on their own. (Counter, answered) Elections are therefore necessary for good government but far from sufficient — which is precisely how far one can agree with the claim. (Link)

Direct democracy's strongest claim to fairness — that every citizen decides each issue equally — is also the source of its deepest weakness, and weighing two cases together exposes the tension. (Point) On one hand, Switzerland's frequent referendums show direct democracy at its fairest: citizens vote directly on constitutional and policy questions, so that no elected intermediary can substitute its judgement for the public's, and political equality is near-absolute. (Example 1) On the other hand, the 2016 United Kingdom referendum on European Union membership reduced an immensely complex question — with tangled economic, legal and constitutional consequences — to a single binary choice, the practical meaning of which was contested for years afterwards. (Example 2) What this contrast reveals is that fairness of process and fairness of outcome are not the same thing: the Swiss case proves that direct democracy can make participation perfectly equal, while the Brexit case proves that equal participation does not ensure the considered, well-informed decisions that just outcomes require, and may even allow a majority to disregard a vulnerable minority. (Analysis of the tension) Direct democracy is therefore the fairest form of government only in the narrow sense of equal participation on each issue; judged by whether it produces fair results, it falls short — a distinction that any full answer to the question must confront. (Link)

It must be conceded that there are genuine occasions on which the state should limit freedom for the sake of security — but examining the strongest version of that case actually reveals its limits. (Point) The most powerful example in its favour is the COVID-19 pandemic, when many governments assumed sweeping powers over movement and assembly, and most citizens accepted these restrictions as a temporary necessity to save lives; here a real and serious threat plainly justified curbing ordinary liberties. (Example — the concession) Yet the same episode also exposes the condition on which such limits depend, and this is where the concession turns: the powers were tolerated precisely because they were understood to be temporary, proportionate and open to scrutiny, and the danger arises when those conditions lapse — China's extensive surveillance and developing social-credit system shows how measures introduced in the name of order can harden into permanent, near-total monitoring that suppresses dissent rather than preventing harm. (Analysis — turning the concession) The pandemic case, then, does not show that the state should freely limit freedom for security; it shows that it may do so only where the threat is genuine, the response proportionate, and the power accountable. (Sub-judgement) The view in the question is therefore acceptable only under strict and reviewable limits, and dangerous without them — which is as far as one can reasonably go in agreeing with it. (Link)