The same deficit, expressed as the same share of GDP, is a substantially more dangerous position for a poor country, and the reasons are about financing and composition rather than about size.
The case that it is more serious begins with who will lend. A deficit must be financed, and a high-income country with a long record of repayment and a currency others are willing to hold can borrow readily and cheaply. A low-income country borrows in a foreign currency, at higher interest because it is seen as riskier, and often for shorter periods that must be refinanced — so the financing is more expensive, less certain and can be withdrawn. When lenders withdraw, the country must eliminate its deficit immediately, which means cutting imports of fuel, medicine and food.
The composition of imports makes that far worse. A high-income country's imports include a great deal that can be postponed — cars, electronics, holidays — so it can reduce them without crisis. A low-income country typically imports fuel, food, medicines and machinery it cannot produce, none of which can be given up without serious consequences. Its ability to adjust is therefore much smaller.
Exchange rate exposure compounds it. Debt denominated in a foreign currency becomes more expensive to service in domestic terms when the currency falls, and a country in deficit is exactly the country whose currency is falling — so the burden grows at the moment it is hardest to bear. A country borrowing in its own currency does not face this.
Finally, the export base is usually narrow and volatile. A country dependent on one or two commodities sees its export earnings swing with world prices it cannot influence, so its capacity to service debt is unpredictable in a way a diversified exporter's is not.
The case that it is not necessarily more serious is that a deficit in a poor country is frequently the right thing to be running. A developing country needs machinery, technology and infrastructure equipment it cannot make itself, and importing them means a deficit. That deficit is investment: it raises future productive capacity and the export earnings from which the borrowing is repaid. A country that insisted on balancing its current account would be restricting its development to what it could finance from its own very limited savings. On this view a deficit is what development looks like, and its absence would be the worrying sign.
My judgement is that a deficit is more dangerous for a low-income country and frequently more necessary, and that both are true at once because the danger and the necessity come from the same source.
The country needs to import what it cannot produce, and it cannot produce very much — which is precisely why it must import and why it has so little with which to pay. The deficit is therefore both the mechanism of development and the country's principal vulnerability.
What resolves the tension is not the size of the deficit but what it buys. Financing imports of capital goods creates the capacity to repay; financing consumption does not. A low-income country running a deficit to import machinery is doing what development requires; one running the same deficit to import consumer goods is accumulating obligations against nothing.
The second consideration is the terms. Concessional lending at low rates over long periods is serviceable from modest growth; commercial borrowing at high rates in a foreign currency is not, and the history of debt crises consists largely of countries that borrowed on the second basis.
So the honest conclusion is that the deficit itself is the wrong thing to judge. A high-income country can afford to be careless about a deficit and a low-income country cannot — but what the low-income country must be careful about is its composition and its financing, not its existence.